| Publication Type | | Preprints |
| Author | | Alia Gizatulina, Martin Hellwig |
| Year of Publication | | 2009 |
| Issue | | 2009/28 |
| Abstract | | For an incomplete-information model of public-good provision with interim participation constraints, we show that efficient outcomes can be approximated, with approximately full surplus extraction, when there are many agents and each agent is informationally small. The result holds even if agents' payoffs cannot be unambiguously inferred from their beliefs, i.e., even if the so-called BDP property ("Beliefs Determine Preferences") of Neeman (2004) does not hold. The contrary result of Neeman (2004) rests
on an implicit uniformity requirement that is incompatible with the notion that agents are informationally small because there are many other agents who have information about them. |
| Publisher | | Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods |
| Place Published | | Bonn |
| Export | | Tagged BibTex XML |
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| Published in: | | Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 145, pp. 2260–2281, 2010 |
| Supplementary Material | | |
| Keywords | | Mechanism Design, surplus extraction, BDP, informational smallness, correlated information |
| JEL-Codes | | D82, D44, D40, D80 |
