Cooperation in Symmetric and Asymmetric Prisoner's Dilemma Games

Publication Type  Preprints
Author  Martin Beckenkamp, Heike Hennig-Schmidt, Frank P. Maier-Rigaud
Year of Publication  2006
Issue  2006/25
Abstract  

We experimentally study the effect of asymmetry on cooperation in a 40 period prisoner's dilemma game in fixed partner design. We distinguish between a high and low payoff symmetric prisoner's dilemma and an asymmetric game combined out of both symmetric ones. Asymmetry significantly decreases cooperation, as low-type players are more likely to defect after mutual cooperation while high-type players initiate cooperation more often than the former. Asymmetry also has a significant negative effect on the stability of cooperation rendering long sequences of mutual cooperation extremely rare.

Pagination  39
Publisher  Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
Place Published  Bonn
Export  Tagged BibTex XML
Download  
Supplementary Material  
Keywords  Asymmetry, Prisoner's Dilemma, Experiments, Symmetry
JEL-Codes  C91, C81, D70