| Publication Type | | Preprints |
| Author | | Kristoffel Grechenig, Martin Kolmar |
| Year of Publication | | 2011 |
| Issue | | 2011/24 |
| Abstract | | The modern state has monopolized the legitimate use of force. This concept is twofold.
First, the state is empowered with enforcement rights; second, the rights of the individuals
are (partly) restricted. In a simple model of property rights with appropriation and defense
activity, we show that a restriction of private enforcement is beneficial for the property
owner, even if there are no economies of scale from public protection. We emphasize the
role of the state as a commitment device for a certain level of enforcement. However, commitment will only work if the state can regulate private protection. A ban of private enforcement measures can even be beneficial in situations where there would be no private enforcement at first place because the “shadow” of defense has a negative impact on the investments in property rights infringements. From a legal perspective, our approach emphasizes a regulation of victim behavior as opposed to the standard approach which focuses on the regulation of criminal behavior. |
| Publisher | | Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods |
| Place Published | | Bonn |
| URL | | http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1946760 |
| Export | | Tagged BibTex XML |
| Download | | |
| Supplementary Material | | |
| Keywords | | Contests, Property Rights, Enforcement, Private Protection, Law |
| JEL-Codes | | K42, P14, P37, P48, N40 |
