0 Burhop, Carsten Lübbers, Thorsten 9998 Explorations in Economic History 0 Burhop, Carsten Bayer, Christian 9998 Journal of Economic History 31 Burhop, Carsten Lübbers, Thorsten 2011 Bonn Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2011/18 We investigate a sample of 180 technology licensing contracts closed by German chemical, pharmaceutical, and electrical engineering companies between 1880 and 1913. Our empirical results suggest that strategic behaviour seems to be relevant for the design of licensing contracts, whereas inventor moral hazard and risk aversion of licensor or licensee seem to be irrelevant. Moreover, our results suggest that uncertainty regarding the profitability of licensed technology influenced the design of licensing contracts. More specifically, profit sharing agreements or producer milestones were typically included into licensing contracts. 31 Burhop, Carsten Chambers, David Cheffins, Brian 2011 Bonn Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2011/15 This study of initial public offerings (IPOs) carried out on the Berlin and London stock exchanges between 1900 and 1913 casts doubt on the received â��law and financeâ�� wisdom that legally mandated investor protection is pivotal to the development of capital markets. IPOs that resulted in official quotations on the London Stock Exchange performed as well as Berlin IPOs despite the Berlin market being more extensively regulated than the laissez faire London market. Moreover, the IPO failure rate on these two stock markets was lower than it was with better regulated US IPOs later in the 20th century. 31 Burhop, Carsten Gelman, Sergey 2011 Bonn Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2011/19 We analyze the determinants of illiquidity and its impact on asset pricing for purely call-auction traded stocks on Berlin Stock Exchange using 22 years of daily data (1892-1913). We use the Lesmond et al. (1999) measure of transaction costs to proxy illiquidity. We show that transaction costs were low and comparable to todayâ��s costs. Liquidity was negatively correlated with active informed trading, particularly being low for small and distressed stocks and in crises times. Liquidity concerns were a major driver of asset pricing: we find significant illiquidity level and illiquidity risk premia as well as an explicit premium for informed trading. 0 Burhop, Carsten 2011 German Economic Review 12 11-32 31 Traxler, Christian Burhop, Carsten 2010 Bonn Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2010/35 Using panel data for Prussia during 1882 to 1910, we replicate Mehlum, Miguel, and Torvikâ��s (2006) study on the causal effect of poverty on crime in 19th century Germany. In addition, our data set allows us to make several original contributions to the literature. We confirm the robust positive effect of poverty on property crime. Employing the rye price as a proxy for poverty, we show that the effect is less pronounced for provinces with a large agricultural sector. As Mehlum et al., we also find a strong negative impact of poverty on violent crime. However, once we account for beer consumption, this effect vanishes. 31 Burhop, Carsten Gelman, Sergey 2010 Bonn Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2010/20 31 Burhop, Carsten Kollmer-von-Oheimb-Loup, Gert Streb, Jochen 2010 Die Finanzierung von Innovationen Ostfildern Jan Thorbecke Verlag 35-53 31 Burhop, Carsten 2009 Die internationale Finanzkrise: Was an ihr ist neu, was alt? Worauf muss in Zukunft geachtet werden? 31. Symposium des Instituts für bankhistorische Forschung e. V. am 10. Juni 2009 im Hause der Deutschen Bundesbank Stuttgart 47 73-88 Bankhistorisches Archiv, Beiheft 0 Burhop, Carsten Lübbers, Thorsten 2009 Journal of Economic History 69 501-528 0 Bayer, Christian Burhop, Carsten 2009 Explorations in Economic History 46 464-481 31 Burhop, Carsten Lübbers, Thorsten 2009 Bonn Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2009/25 0 Burhop, Carsten Bayer, Christian 2009 Applied Economics Letters 16 141-145 0 Burhop, Carsten 2009 Business History 51 559-591 0 Burhop, Carsten 2009 Business History Review 83 475-503 31 Broadberry, Stephen N. Burhop, Carsten 2009 Bonn Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2009/18 Throughout the period 1871-1938, the average British worker was better off than the average German worker, but there were significant differences between major sectors. For the aggregate economy, the real wage gap was about the same as the labour productivity gap, but again there were important sectoral differences. Compared to their productivity, German industrial workers were poorly paid, whereas German agricultural and service sector employees were overpaid. This affected the competitiveness of the two countries in these sectors. There were also impor-tant differences in comparative real wages by skill level, affecting the extent of poverty. 31 Burhop, Carsten 2009 Bonn Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2009/26 We describe the transfer of patents in late 19th- and early 20th- century Germany using a new and comprehensive database containing information on about 20,000 transactions. The number of transactions shows an upward trend, in total numbers and as a share of patents in force. In total, about eight percent of patents were transferred at least once during their existence. Many transactions involved the transfer of patents with an above-average quality from individual inventors to firms and to newly-created â�� â��entrepreneurialâ�� â�� firms. In addition, valuable patents were transferred between firms. About two-thirds of all transfers occurred during the first three years of a patentsâ�� existence, giving the new owner potentially a long period of patent protection. 31 Burhop, Carsten Lübbers, Thorsten 2008 Bonn Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2008/13 In this paper, we evaluate the impact of cartelisation and managerial incentives on the productive efficiency of German coal mining corporations. We focus on coal mining in the Ruhr district, Germanyâ��s main mining area. We use stochastic frontier analysis and an unbalanced dynamic panel data set for up to 28 firms for the years 1881-1913 to measure productive efficiency. We show that coal was mined with decreasing returns to scale. Moreover, it turns out that cartelisation did not affect productive efficiency. Controlling for corporate governance variables shows that stronger managerial incentives were significantly correlated with productive efficiency, whereas the debt-equity ratio did not influence it. 31 Bayer, Christian Burhop, Carsten 2008 Bonn Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2008/11 This paper proposes to exploit a reform in legal rules of corporate governance to identify contractual incentives from the correlation of executive pay and firm performance. In particular, we refer to a major shift in the legal and institutional environment, the reform of the German joint-stock companies act in 1884. We analyze a sample of executive pay for 46 firms for the years 1870 to 1911. In 1884, a law reform substantially enhanced corporate control, strengthened the monitoring incentives of shareholders, and reduced the discretionary power of executives in Germany. Pay-performance sensitivity decreased significantly after this reform. While executives received a bonus of about three to five per cent in profits before 1884, after the reform this parameter decreased to a profit share of about two per cent. At least the profit share that is eliminated by the reform must have been incentive pay before. This incentive mechanism was replaced by other elements of corporate governance. 0 Burhop, Carsten Bayer, Christian 2008 Schmalenbach Business Review 60 378-399 31 Burhop, Carsten Lübbers, Thorsten 2008 Bonn Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2008/38 <p>The allocation of intellectual property rights between firms and employed researchers causes a principal-agent problem between the two parties. We investigate the working contracts of inventors employed by German chemical, pharmaceutical, and electrical engineering firms at the turn of the 20th century and show that some firms were aware of the principal-agent problem and offered performance-related compensation schemes to their scientists. However, neither a higher total compensation nor a higher share of variable compensation in total compensation is correlated with a higher innovative output. Thus, incentives techniques were already used during the early history of industrial research laboratories, but their impact on innovative output was unsystematic.</p> 0 Burhop, Carsten 2008 European Review of Economic History 12 201-219 31 Burhop, Carsten 2008 Bonn Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2008/03 In this paper, we describe the emergence and evolution of pharmaceutical research at the German company E. Merck during the late 19th and early 20th century. Revolutionary changes in the scientific knowledge base, especially the rise of bacteriological research, and the market entry of dyestuff producers into pharmaceuticals made the re-organisation of pharmaceutical research during the 1890s a necessary corporate strategy. Consequently, Merck restructured its in-house research between 1895 and 1898. Moreover, the firm deepened its co-operation with universities and other outside inventors. Jointly and severally, the firm depended on outside inventors for the generation of new products, whereas in-house scientists improved the productive efficiency. Moreover, we show that a significant number of new products were launched between the late 1890s and 1905. During the following years, however, resource constraints restricted Merckâ��s innovative capacity. 31 Broadberry, Stephen N. Burhop, Carsten 2008 Bonn Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2008/27 0 Broadberry, Stephen N. Burhop, Carsten 2008 Journal of Economic History 68 930-934 0 Burhop, Carsten Gelman, Sergey 2008 European Review of Economic History 12 39-66 31 Burhop, Carsten 2008 Bonn Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2008/46 In this article, we evaluate underpricing of initial public offerings (IPOs) at the Berlin Stock Exchange between 1870 and 1896. In contrast to modern data, first day returns were extraordinary low and averaged less than five percent, even during the speculative period of the early 1870s. Moreover, standard underpricing theories based on asymmetric information, signalling mechanisms, or litigation risk cannot explain underpricing. In contrast to modern markets, the past market return had a negative influence on initial returns. Finally, we show that cash-flow relevant information contained in the corporate charter were readily factored in the first market price. Thus, the historical capital market differed from todayâ��s market, but seems to have been efficient. 0 Burhop, Carsten 2007 Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte 94 165-172 0 Broadberry, Stephen N. Burhop, Carsten 2007 Journal of Economic History 67 315-349 31 Burhop, Carsten Walter, R. 2007 Innovationsgeschichte Stuttgart Steiner 295-307 0 Burhop, Carsten 2006 Bankhistorisches Archiv 32 1-25 0 Burhop, Carsten 2006 Explorations in Economic History 43 39-63 0 Burhop, Carsten 2006 Bankhistorisches Archiv 32 91-112 0 Burhop, Carsten Wolff, Guntram B. 2005 Journal of Economic History 65 613-657 0 Burhop, Carsten 2005 Economics Letters 86 57-61 0 Burhop, Carsten 2005 Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte 92 281-300 0 Burhop, Carsten Wolff, Guntram B. 2004 Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte 91 141-154 0 Burhop, Carsten 2004 Business History 46 525-543 7 Burhop, Carsten 2004 Stuttgart Steiner Verlag 279 0 Burhop, Carsten 2002 Bankhistorisches Archiv 28 103-128