Hellwig M., A Contribution to the Theory of Optimal Utilitarian Income Taxation, issue 2005/23, Bonn, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, pp. 51, 2005. Abstract Full text

published in:

Journal of Public Economics, vol. 91, pp. 1449-1477, 2007.

Beckenkamp M., Hennig-Schmidt H., Maier-Rigaud F. P., Cooperation in Symmetric and Asymmetric Prisoner's Dilemma Games, issue 2006/25, Bonn, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, pp. 39, 2006. Abstract Full text

Nicklisch A., Wolff I., Cooperation norms in multiple-stage punishment, issue 2009/40, Bonn, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, 2009. Abstract Full text

Nicklisch A., Wolf I., The cooperation norms in multiple-stage punishment, Journal of Public Economic Theory, vol. 13, no. 5, pp. 791-827, 2011.

Fischer S., Grechenig K., Meier N., Cooperation under punishment: Imperfect information destroys it and centralizing punishment does not help, issue 2013/06, Bonn, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, 2013. Abstract Full text

Coordination in the Absence of Sovereign Intervention, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (26th International Seminar on the New Institutional Economics), Engel C., Schweizer U., (Eds.), vol. 165, Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck, pp. 192, 2009.

Schneider V., Leifeld P., Malang T., Coping with Creeping Catastrophes: National Political Systems and the Challenge of Slow-Moving Policy Problems, Long-Term Policies: Governing Social-Ecological Change, Siebenhüner B., Jacob K., Arnold M., (Eds.), Abingdon, Routledge, pp. 221-238, 2013.

Towfigh E. V., Polterauer J., Schrammen G., Corporate Citizenship und die NGOs: Konflikt, Kooperation oder Kooptation, Lust auf Zukunft: Kommunikation für eine nachhaltige Globalisierung, Dettling D., Hamkens T., Kempmann L., van Damm T., (Eds.), Hamburg, 2004.

Engel C., Güth W., Corporate Culture as a Resource for Management: Comment, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, vol. 162, pp. 97-100, 2006. Full Text

Engel C., Corporate Design for Regulability. A Principal-Agent-Supervisor Model, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, vol. 162, pp. 104-124, 2006. Full Text Preprint

Engel C., Corporate Design for Regulability. A Principal-Agent-Supervisor Model, issue 2005/15, Bonn, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, pp. 28, 2005. Abstract Full text

published in:

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, vol. 162, pp. 104-124, 2006.

Bayer C., Burhop C., Corporate Governance and Incentive Contracts: Historical Evidence from a Legal Reform, issue 2008/11, Bonn, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, 2008. Abstract Full text

published in:

Explorations in Economic History, vol. 46, no. 4, pp. 464-481, 2009.

Bayer C., Burhop C., Corporate Governance and Incentive Contracts: Historical Evidence from a Legal Reform, Explorations in Economic History, vol. 46, no. 4, pp. 464-481, 2009. Preprint

Hellwig M., Corporate Governance and the Financing of Investment for Structural Change, Investing Today for the World of Tomorrow - Studies on the Investment Process in Europe, Deutsche Bundesbank, (Ed.), Berlin, Heidelberg, New York, Springer-Verlag, pp. 201-224, 2001.

Burhop C., Bayer C., A corporate governance reform as a natural experiment for incentive contracts, Schmalenbach Business Review, vol. 60, no. 4, pp. 378-399, 2008.

Bouwen P., Corporate lobbying in the European Union: towards a theory of access, Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 9, issue 3, pp. 365-390, 2002.

Höffler F., Cost and Benefits from Infrastructure Competition. Estimating Welfare Effects from Broadband Access Competition, Telecommunications Policy, vol. 31, no. 6-7, pp. 401-418, 2007.

Höffler F., Cost and Benefits from Infrastructure Competition. Estimating Welfare Effects from Broadband Access Competition, issue 2005/01, Bonn, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, pp. 22, 2005. Abstract Full text

Hakenes H., Schnabel I., Credit Risk Transfer and Bank Competition, issue 2009/33, Bonn, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, 2009. Abstract Full text

published in:

Journal of Financial Intermediation, vol. 19, no. 3, pp. 308-332, 2010.

Hakenes H., Schnabel I., Credit Risk Transfer and Bank Competition, Journal of Financial Intermediation, vol. 19, no. 3, pp. 308-332, 2010. Preprint

Bauer M. W., A Creeping Transformation? The European Commission and the Management of EU Structural Funds in Germany, Library of Public Policy and Public Administration, Dordrecht, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2001. Abstract

Yu G., Crimes of Disrupting the Order of the Socialist Market Economy, Criminal Law, Jia Y., (Ed.): Xi’an Jiaotong University Publishing House, pp. 300-375, 2005.

Yu G., Criminal Illegality as the Essence of Crime, Journal of Northwest University (Philosophy and Social Science Edition), vol. 36, no. 4, pp. 88-92, 2006.

Hilbig B. E., Pohl R. F., Bröder A., Criterion knowledge: A moderator of using the recognition heuristic?, Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, vol. 22, no. 5, pp. 510-522, 2009.

Engel C., Crutches for our Hobbling Reason, Max Planck Research, vol. 2002/03, pp. 15-18, 2002.