C.II.2 Independent Research Group: Intuitive Experts

Head: Dr. Andreas Glöckner

PostDoc

Dr. Stephan Dickert (Psychology)

Doctoral Candidates

Stephan Tontrup (Law)
Milan Djodjevic (Law)
Andrea Ahlgrimm (Psychology)
Nina Horstmann (Psychology)
Tanja Ostermann (Psychology)

Student Researchers

Roman Portack (Law)
Christina Gansen (Law)
Janet Kleber (Psychology)
Maria Rische (Psychology)
Maria Gladigau (Psychology)

The Background

One of the current challenges of psychological decision research is to understand the complex interplay between intuitive and deliberate processes. Another important issue is to enhance research in Law and Psychology by providing computationally specified and plausible models of decision-making in complex environments which capture processes of judges as well as of lay people. The research group Intuitive Experts aims to tackle both issues using a model-driven approach to empirically investigating legal decisionmaking. Thereby, synergetic effects of interdisciplinary research will be used both to test and enhance the psychological model by collecting evidence in complex environments and to provide tailored empirical answers to important legal issues. Following Herbert A. Simon’s critique of rational choice theory, until very recently the focus of psychological decision research has been on investigating deviations from rationality based on the view that humans’ cognitive capacity is limited. In several publications by Glöckner and Betsch (Glöckner, 2006; Glöckner, 2007; Glöckner & Betsch, forthcoming), however, it has been shown that these limitations are not as severe as often assumed and that individuals draw upon intuitive processes to overcome the obvious limitations of mere deliberate reasoning.

Discarding the classic bounded rationality perspective and looking deeper into the mechanisms of the mind, a complex interplay between automatic and deliberate proc62 esses unfolds that is computationally powerful, highly efficient and adaptive. Glöckner and Betsch (forthcoming) argue that the phenomenon commonly called “intuition” (i.e., instantly emerging feelings or insights in decisions) is only one observable signal from this complex system; it is just the tip of the iceberg. The authors propose that the same mechanisms are the core operational processes of all decisions although individuals become aware of them only in these very few situations. Glöckner (forthcoming) has argued that by better understanding these mechanisms, it will be possible to differentiate prescriptions for the design of legal rules, institutions, and organizations but also for personal and professional decision-making.

The Model

Although the importance of intuitive and deliberate processes has been repeatedly highlighted, comprehensive integrative models are still rarely found. Glöckner and Betsch (Betsch, 2005; Glöckner, 2007; Glöckner & Betsch, forthcoming) have proposed the parallel constraint satisfaction (PCS) rule which describes the complex interaction of both kinds of processes in a hierarchical network model. A primary network which is based on intuitive processes (similar to Gestalt-processes in perception) operates towards constructing consistent interpretations of available information. It weighs different interpretations of the evidence against each other and finally settles on the most consistent interpretation that usually enters awareness. A secondary network of deliberate construction processes is used to supervise and support these automatic consistency-maximizing processes. The efficient interplay between networks allows individuals, on the one hand, to take into account a huge amount of information, to compensate for missing information and thereby to shift the bounds of rational reasoning, and, on the other hand, quickly to adapt to environmental change and to find globally optimal, instead of locally optimal, solutions.

The Research Strategy

Research within the group falls into three categories: (a) model development and simulation, (b) model testing and (c) investigating implications for legal institutions, organizations and individuals. Because of the breadth of the overall approach, suffice it here to sketch exemplary research questions for these categories.

3.1 Model Development and Simulation

By highlighting the fascinating complexity of human cognitive capabilities, the PCS model takes a very positive perspective on decision-making. Any descriptive decision-making model, however, must also account for empirically observed deviations from rationality (e.g., framing effects, endowment effects). A systematic modelling approach will be used to show the potential of the PCS model to do so and to derive predictions concerning further deviations from rationality with a focus on the ones that are of importance for legal issues such as order-of-presentation effects in legal procedure.

3.2 Model Testing

The PCS rule will be tested using a multidisciplinary and multi-perspective approach. First, following standard psychological methodology, experimental studies will be carried out to investigate the predictions of the model concerning fundamental psychological questions such as: Which factors influence the usage and the operation of intuitive and deliberate processes in decision-making? Which factors influence the quality of the resulting decisions? Do experts and lay persons differ in their usage of both kinds of processes in the predicted direction? Second, taking a legal perspective, currently discussed legal issues will be analyzed against the backdrop of the model. Specific predictions will be derived and empirically tested in less controlled but context-rich situations to assure high external validity. For instance, the legal question of how to solve the dilemma of the anticommons (Heller, 1998) without dramatically cutting property rights will be investigated by testing the prediction that certain instructions to think about the situation should reduce the magnitude of the effect by de-biasing individuals’ mental representations. Third, taking an institutional-evolution perspective, the historical development of legal institutions will be analyzed to test whether evolutionary processes have shaped substantive and procedural law to be efficient institutions according to the predictions of the PCS rule and other models. The rules for taking into account evidence in criminal cases as prescribed in the German criminal procedure will, for instance, be analyzed concerning the enabling of intuitive processes in decision-making.

3.3 Implications for Legal Institutions, Organizations and Individuals

By investigating the model, implications for legal institutions, organizations and individuals will naturally be generated. Assuming that the predictions of the model are empirically supported, prescriptions will be derived that should help to optimize the interplay between intuitive and deliberate processes to construct appropriate mental representations of decision tasks. For legal institutions, the improved understanding of decisionmaking processes should allow for more specific and more parsimonious interventions (e.g., reducing the anti-commons dilemma by cognitive instructions instead of by cutting property rights). Finally, improving our understanding of the complex interaction of processes might help to qualify and differentiate startling findings that deliberation sometimes decreases the quality of decisions (Dijksterhuis et al., 2006) and to avoid overgeneralizing such findings to legal issues.