D82

Printer-friendly version PDF version
  • Bierbrauer F., A Note on Optimal Income Taxation, Public Goods Provision and Robust Mechanism Design, Journal of Public Economics, vol. 93, pp. 667-670, 2009. Preprintapplication/pdf icon
  • Bierbrauer F., A unified approach to the revelation of public goods preferences and to optimal income taxation, issue 2008/39, Bonn, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, 2008. Abstract Full textapplication/pdf icon
  • Bechtold S., Höffler F., An economic analysis of trade-secret protection in buyer-seller relationships, issue 2007/18, Bonn, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, pp. 26, 2007. Abstract Full textapplication/pdf icon
  • Bierbrauer F., An incomplete contracts perspective on the provision and pricing of excludable public goods, issue 2010/01, Bonn, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, 2010. Abstract Full textapplication/pdf icon
  • Gizatulina A., Hellwig M., Beliefs, Payoffs, Information: On the Robustness of the BDP Property in Models with Endogenous Beliefs, issue 2011/28, Bonn, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, 2011. Abstract SSRN Full textapplication/pdf icon
  • Jansen J., Beyond the Need to Boast: Cost Concealment Incentives and Exit in Cournot Duopoly, issue 2009/32, Bonn, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, 2009. Abstract Full textapplication/pdf icon
      published in:Research in Economics, vol. 66, issue 2009/32, no. 3, Bonn, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, pp. 239-245, 2012.
  • Herweg F., Müller D., Weinschenk P., Binary Payment Schemes: Moral Hazard and Loss Aversion, issue 2010/38, Bonn, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, 2010. Abstract Full textapplication/pdf icon
      published in:American Economic Review, vol. 100, pp. 2451-2477, 2010.
  • Bierbrauer F., Collectively Incentive Compatible Tax Systems, issue 2006/24, Bonn, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, pp. 34, 2006. Abstract Full textapplication/pdf icon
  • Lang M., Contracting with Subjective Evaluations and Communication, issue 2012/14, Bonn, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, 2012. Abstract SSRN Full textapplication/pdf icon
  • Bierbrauer F., Distortionary Taxation and the Free-Rider Problem., issue 2006/06, Bonn, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, pp. 26, 2006. Abstract Full textapplication/pdf icon
  • Hellwig M., From Posteriors to Priors via Cycles: An Addendum, issue 2011/07, Bonn, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, 2011. Abstract Full textapplication/pdf icon
      forthcoming in:Economics Letters, In Press.
  • Hellwig M., From Posteriors to Priors via Cycles: An Addendum, Economics Letters, In Press. Preprintapplication/pdf icon
  • Hellwig M., Incentive Problems with Unidimensional Hidden Characteristics: A UniÂ…fied Approach, issue 2006/26, Bonn, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, 2006. Abstract Full textapplication/pdf icon
      published in:Econometrica, vol. 78, no. 4, pp. 1201–1237, 2010.
  • Hellwig M., Incomplete-Information Models of Large Economies with Anonymity: Existence and Uniqueness of Common Priors, issue 2011/08, Bonn, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, 2011. Abstract Full textapplication/pdf icon
  • Jansen J., Information Acquisition and Strategic Disclosure in Oligopoly, issue 2007/13, Bonn, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, pp. 46, 2007. Abstract Full textapplication/pdf icon
      published in:Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, vol. 17, no. 1, pp. 113-148, 2008.
  • Gizatulina A., Hellwig M., Informational Smallness and the Scope for Limiting Information Rents, issue 2009/28, Bonn, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, 2009. Abstract Full textapplication/pdf icon
      published in:Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 145, pp. 2260–2281, 2010.
  • Gizatulina A., Hellwig M., Informational Smallness and the Scope for Limiting Information Rents, Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 145, pp. 2260–2281, 2010. Preprintapplication/pdf icon
  • Bierbrauer F., Hellwig M., Mechanism Design and Voting for Public-Good Provision, issue 2011/31, Bonn, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, 2011. Abstract Full textapplication/pdf icon
  • Weinschenk P., Moral Hazard and Ambiguity, issue 2010/39, Bonn, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, 2010. Abstract Full textapplication/pdf icon
  • Jansen J., On Competition and the Strategic Management of Intellectual Property in Oligopoly, issue 2009/13, Bonn, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, 2009. Abstract Full textapplication/pdf icon
      published in:Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, vol. 20, no. 4, pp. 1043-1071, 2011.
  • Jansen J., On Competition and the Strategic Management of Intellectual Property in Oligopoly, Discussion Paper Series, issue 339, Mannheim, University of Mannheim / Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15, 2010. Full Textapplication/pdf icon
  • Bierbrauer F., On the legitimacy of coercion for the financing of public goods, issue 2009/15, Bonn, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, 2009. Abstract Full textapplication/pdf icon
  • Bierbrauer F., On the optimality of optimal income taxation, issue 2010/14, Bonn, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, 2010. Abstract Full textapplication/pdf icon
  • Bierbrauer F., Sahm M., Optimal Democratic Mechanisms for Taxation and Public Good Provision, issue 2008/09, Bonn, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, 2008. Abstract Full textapplication/pdf icon
  • Bierbrauer F., Optimal Income Taxation and Public-Goods Provision with Preference and Productivity Shocks, issue 2010/18, Bonn, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, 2010. Abstract Full textapplication/pdf icon
  • Bierbrauer F., Optimal Income Taxation, Public Goods Provision and Robust Mechanism Design, issue 2008/31, Bonn, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, 2008. Abstract Full textapplication/pdf icon
      published in:Journal of Public Economics, vol. 93, pp. 667-670, 2009.
  • Hellwig M., Optimal Income Taxation, Public-Goods Provision und Public-Sector Pricing: A Contribution to the Foundations of Public Economics, issue 2004/14, Bonn, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, pp. 57, 2004. Abstract Full textapplication/pdf icon
  • Lauermann S., Price Setting in a Decentralized Market and the Competitive Outcome, issue 2008/06, Bonn, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, 2008. Abstract Full textapplication/pdf icon
  • Weinschenk P., Procrastination in Teams, Contract Design and Discrimination, issue 2011/13, Bonn, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, 2011. Abstract Full textapplication/pdf icon
  • Bierbrauer F., Hellwig M., Public-Good Provision in a Large Economy, issue 2010/02, Bonn, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, 2010. Abstract Full textapplication/pdf icon
  • Hellwig M., Risk Aversion in the Small and in the Large. When Outcomes are Multidimensional, issue 2004/06, Bonn, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, pp. 27, 2004. Abstract Full textapplication/pdf icon
  • Jansen J., Share to Scare: Technology Sharing in the Absence of Intellectual Property Rights, issue 2009/36, Bonn, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, 2009. Abstract Full textapplication/pdf icon
  • Jansen J., Strategic Information Disclosure and Competition for an Imperfectly Protected Innovation, issue 2009/06, Bonn, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, 2009. Abstract Full textapplication/pdf icon
      published in:Journal of Industrial Economics, vol. 58 , no. 2, pp. 349–372, 2010.
  • Jansen J., Strategic Information Disclosure and Competition for an Imperfectly Protected Innovation, Journal of Industrial Economics, vol. 58 , no. 2, pp. 349–372, 2010. Link Preprintapplication/pdf icon
  • Bierbrauer F., Boyer P. C., The Pareto-Frontier in a simple Mirrleesian model of income taxation, issue 2010/16, Bonn, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, 2010. Abstract Full textapplication/pdf icon
  • Ganuza J. J., Jansen J., Too Much Information Sharing? Welfare Effects of Sharing Acquired Cost Information in Oligopoly, issue 2010/40, Bonn, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, 2010. Abstract Full textapplication/pdf icon
      forthcoming in:Journal of Industrial Economics, In Press.
  • Hakenes H., Peitz M., Umbrella Branding and External Certification , issue 2008/10, Bonn, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, 2008. Abstract Full textapplication/pdf icon
      published in:European Economic Review, vol. 53, no. 2, pp. 186–196, 2009.
      published in:International Journal of Industrial Organization, vol. 26, pp. 546-556, 2008.
  • Bierbrauer F., Mechtenberg L., Winners and Losers of Early Elections: On the Welfare Implications of Political Blockades and Early Elections, issue 2008/50, Bonn, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, 2008. Abstract Full textapplication/pdf icon
  • Gizatulina A., Wondering How Others Interpret It: Social Value of Public Information, issue 2013/08, Bonn, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, 2013. Abstract Full textapplication/pdf icon