Conference on Private Information, Interdependent Preferences and Robustness: Theory and Applications

Date: May 30-June 1, 2013

Place: University of Bonn, Germany

 

Conference Organizers: Dirk Bergemann, Felix Bierbrauer, Martin Hellwig, Benny Moldovanu, Stephen Morris

 

Program

Thursday, May 30, 2013
14.00 – 17.30 h                                            coffee break: 16.00 - 16.30 h

Part I: Mechanism Design and Incentives in Bayesian Games

  1. Emir Kamenica: Competition in Persuasion (with Matthew Gentzkow)
    Discussant: Paul Heidhues
  2. Benny Moldovanu: Optimal Mechanism Design without Money (with Alex Gershkov and Xianwen Shi)
    Discussant: Felix Bierbrauer
  3. Eduardo Azevedo: Strategyproofness in the Large (with Eric Buddish)
    Discussant: Xianwen Shi


Friday, May 31, 2013
09.00 – 12.30 h                                            coffee break: 11.00 - 11.30 h

Part II. Mechanism Design and Behavior

  1. Andrew Caplin and Daniel Martin: A testable theory of imperfect perception
    Discussant: Jonathan Weinstein
  2. Dirk Bergemann and Satoru Takahashi: Interdependent Preferences and Strategic Distinguishability
    Discussant: Alia Gizatulina  
  3. Felix Bierbrauer and Nick Netzer: Mechanism Design and Intentions
    Discussant: Alexander Frankel

12.30 – 13.30 h Lunch Break

13.30 – 17.00 h                                            coffee break: 15.30 - 16.00 h

Part III. Public Economics

  1. Tilman Börgers: Robust Mechanism Design and Dominant Strategy Voting Rules (with Doug Smith)
    Discussant: Thomas Tröger
  2. Casey Rothschild: Optimal Taxation with Rent-Seeking (with Florian Scheuer)
    Discussant: Johannes Münster
  3. Felix Bierbrauer and Martin Hellwig: Mechanism Design and Voting for Public-Goods Provision
    Discussant: Takuro Yamashita

Part I.b Mechanism Design and Incentives in Bayesian Games

  1. Alia Gizatulina and Martin Hellwig: The Genericity of the McAfee-Reny Conditon for Full Surplus Extraction in Models with a Continuum of Types
    Discussant: Alfredo Di Tillio
     

20.00 h Conference Dinner


Saturday, June 1, 2013
09.00 – 12.30 h                                                  coffee break: 11.00 - 11.30 h

Part IV: Dynamic Mechanism Design

  1. Daniel Krähmer and Roland Strausz: The benefits of sequential screening
    Discussant: Rahul Deb
  2. William Fuchs: Costs and Benefits of Dynamic Trading in a Lemons Market (with Andrzej Skrzypacz)
    Discussant: Stephan Lauermann
  3. Toomas Hinnosaar: Calendar Mechanisms
    Discussant: Olga Gorelkina

12.30 – 13.30 h Lunch Break                                   coffee break: 15.30 - 16.00 h

13.30 – 16.00 h

Part V. Macroeconomics

  1. Marek Kapicka: Efficient Allocations in Dynamic Private Information Economies with Persistent Shocks: A First Order Approach
    Discussant: Philipp Strack
  2. Nicola Pavoni: On the Dual Approach to Recursive Optimization (with Chris Sleet (CMU, Pittsburgh) and Matthias Messner (BOCCONI)
    Discussant: Ctirad Slavík