International Seminars on the New Institutional Economics

organized by
Christoph Engel and Urs Schweizer (from 2000)
Christian Kirchner and Rudolf Richter (1999)
Herbert Hax (1998)
Jürgen Eichberger (1997)
Ekkehart Schlicht and Timur Kuran (1996)
Erich Schanze (1995)
Eirik G. Furubotn and Rudolf Richter (1983 - 1994)

Testing Contracts

29th Seminar on the New Institutional Economics - Krakow - 2011

Organized by Christoph Engel and Urs Schweizer

Contract law is among the most studied topics of law and economics scholarship. While first generation work has mostly been theoretical, this conference focuses on empirical studies, be they based on field or on experimental evidence.

Contributions by Richard Brooks and Alexander Stremitzer and Stephan Tontrup, Jonathan Klick and Bruce Kobayashi and Larry Ribstein, Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, Claudia Landeo and Kathryn Spier, Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Zev Eigen, Eric Talley and Drew O'Kane

B2C - Business to Consumer Transactions

28th Seminar on the New Institutional Economics - Budapest - 2010

Organized by Christoph Engel and Urs Schweizer

Economies of scale and scope, different skills, and a host of behavioural factors create an asymmetry between business suppliers and consumer buyers. This conference studies the sources of the asymmetry, as well as the viability of solutions.

Contributions by Roman Inderst, Abraham Wickelgren, Samuel Issacharoff, Geoffrey Miller, Stefan Bühler and Daniel Halbheer, Gregory Werden and Luke Froeb, Kenneth Ayotte and Henry Hansmann, Clemens Otto and Vikrant Vig

Jurimetrics

27th Seminar on the New Institutional Economics - Kloster Eberbach - 2009

Organized by Christoph Engel and Urs Schweizer

Much like econometrics and cliometrics, jurimetrics uses statistical tools to analyse field data that matters for the law. This could be data originating in the legal system itself, like the incidence of concurring votes. It could be data resulting from an exercise in coding legal documents, like the effectiveness of legal orders in handling standardised cases. Or it could be data on social issues that matter for the interpretation of the law, like the use of shareholder rights.

Background Material

Contributions by Theodore Eisenberg, Michael Heise, Martin T. Wells, Mathias Siems, Simon F. Deakin, Holger Spamann, Daniel Rubinfeld, Joanna Shepherd, Yair Listokin, Kathryn Zeiler

Coordination in the Absence of Sovereign Intervention

26th Seminar on the New Institutional Economics - Lübbenau - 2008

Organized by Christoph Engel and Urs Schweizer

Sovereignty is a powerful and a convenient institution. Yet is many contexts, like public international law, international trade or on the Internet, it is not available, or it is substantially weakened. This conference explores the issue from a law and economics perspective.

Contributions by Erik Posner, Niels Petersen, Andreas Paulus, Charles Manski, George Norman, Anne van Aaken, Albrecht Ritschl

Mechanism Design and the Law

25th Seminar on the New Institutional Economics - Prague - 2007 (JITE 164 No. 1, 2008)

Organized by Christoph Engel and Urs Schweizer

In the law and economics tradition, legal rules are interpreted as solutions to incentive problems. These problems are particularly hard to solve if interaction is strategic. Game theory is the tool to analyse them. Consequently, there is a growing literature that uses game theory to analyse legal rules. A related tool has much less travelled into law: mechanism design. The conference explores both.

Contributions by Kathy Spier/Yeon Koo Che, Andrew Daughety/Jennifer Reinganum, Paul Heidhues/Andreas Blume, Dominique Demougin/Bruno Deffains, Benjamin Hermalin, Alon Klement/Zvika Neeman, Avery Katz

Experimental Law and Economics

24th Seminar on the New Institutional Economics - Bad Meinberg - 2006 (JITE 163 No. 1, 2007)

Organized by Christoph Engel and Urs Schweizer

Behavioural Law and Economics is gaining momentum rapidly. Yet most of this work is based on evidence that has been borrowed, be it from experimental economics or from psychology. Since, in its disciplinary context of origin, the data has not been generated in light of its implications for law, its fit for questions of legal analysis and design is often less than perfect. The issues explored range from contract law over labour law and antitrust to regulation and procedural law.

Background Material

Contributions by Randolph Sloof/Hessel Oosterbeek/Joep Sonnemans, Armin Falk/David Huffman, Andreas Nicklisch/Sven Fischer, Bernd Irlenbusch/Georg Borges, Anil Caliskan/David Porter/Stephen Rassenti/Vernon L. Smith/Bart J. Wilson, Werner Güth/Hartmut Kliemt/M. Vittoria Levati/Georg von Wangenheim, Jeffrey Rachlinski/Chris Guthrie/Andrew J. Wistrich

Interacting with a Corporate Actor

23rd Seminar on the New Institutional Economics - Bad Irsee - 2005 (JITE 162, No. 1, 2006)

Organized by Christoph Engel and Urs Schweizer

Legal personality is an elegant invention. One signature by the President of the Republic can oblige 80 million Germans. If the CEO has signed a contract, no shareholder can claim that he had opposed the engagement. Consequently, in economic analysis, corporate actors are sometimes just treated as unitary actors.

Contributions by Lucian Bebchuk, Mike Burkart, Christoph Engel, Michael Klausner, Donald Langevoort, Edward Rock, Arndt Sorge, Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden

Game Theory and the Law

22nd Seminar on the New Institutional Economics - Marienbad - 2004 (JITE 161 No. 2, 2005)

Organized by Christoph Engel and Urs Schweizer

Individual egoism does not always sum up to the common good. The invisible hand is not always active. If not, the law often steps in. It also, in antitrust, takes action to maintain workable competition as a mechanism for neutralising the detrimental effects of strategic interaction. Finally, the relationship between legal authorities and the citizen is normally strategic in character.

Contributions by Dominque Demougin/Claude Fluet, Xinyu Hua/Kathryn Spier, Urs Schweizer, Charles Cameron/Lewis Kornhauser, Benjamin Hermalin, Paul Mahoney/Chris Sanchirico

The Generation and Distribution of Knowledge

21st Seminar on the New Institutional Economics - Wienhausen - 2003 (JITE 160 No. 1, 2004)

Organized by Christoph Engel and Urs Schweizer

Knowledge is a highly special commodity. Some knowledge is indeed been traded. More knowledge can be seen as being produced. But much knowledge remains implicit, is “knowing how”, rather than “knowing that”, can only be exploited by initiated users and so forth.

Contributions by Paolo Saviotti, Thomas Gehrig, Paul David, Roger Noll, Ulrich Kamecke, Rebecca Eisenberg, Margaret Radin, Graeme Dinwoodie

Causes and Management of Conflicts

20th Seminar on the New Institutional Economics - Wörlitz - 2002 (JITE 159 No. 1, 2003)

Organized by Christoph Engel and Urs Schweizer

In the tradition of the New Institutional Economics, institutions are seen as governance tools. They help individuals cooperate, or they overcome market failure. Many institutions serve a different purpose however: they manage conflict. Conflict has many causes: a difference of interests, a clash of ideology, identity, honour, or irrational elements in human behavioural dispositions. All of these conflicts can be modelled in rational choice terms.

Contributions by Geoffrey Brennan/Werner Güth/Hartmut Kliemt, Claude Fluet, Vincy Fon/Francesco Parisi, Eric Posner, Daniel Arce/Todd Sandler, Armin Falk/Ernst Fehr/Urs Fischbacher, Robert Mnookin, Barry O’Neill