Articles (peer-reviewed) [810]

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Pages

Forthcoming
A Note on Quality Disclosure and Competition
Journal of Industrial Economics
forthcoming
Endogenous information acquisition in matching problems
Social Choice and Welfare
forthcoming
Salience, competition, and decoy goods
Economics Letters
forthcoming
Abstract
We consider a brand manufacturer who can offer, next to its high-quality product, also a decoy good and faces competition by a competitive fringe that produces low quality. We show that the brand manufacturer optimally provides a decoy good to boost the demand for its main product if consumers’ purchasing decisions are distorted by salient thinking. The optimal decoy good is designed such that the superior quality of the brand manufacturers’ main product and the unattractive feature of the fringe product are salient.
The Hidden Cost of Compensation
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics
173
forthcoming
2017
A Must Lie Situation: Avoiding Giving Negative Feedback
Games and Economic Behavior
2017
Abstract
We examine under what conditions people provide accurate feedback to others. We use feedback regarding attractiveness, a trait people care about, and for which objective information is hard to obtain. Our results show that people avoid giving accurate face-to-face feedback to less attractive individuals, even if lying in this context comes at a monetary cost to both the person who gives the feedback and the receiver. A substantial increase of these costs does not increase the accuracy of feedback. However, when feedback is provided anonymously, the aversion to giving negative feedback is reduced.
HSH Nordbank: Verantwortlichkeit in der Demokratie
Wirtschaftsdienst
97
1
4-5
2017
Leadership effectiveness and institutional frames
Experimental Economics
19
4
842-863
2017
Abstract
Leadership mechanisms provide a potential means to mitigate social dilemmas, but empirical evidence on the success of such mechanisms is mixed. In this paper, we explore the institutional frame as a relevant factor for the effectiveness of leadership. We compare subjects’ behavior in public-goods experiments that are either framed positively (give-some game) or negatively (take-some game). We observe that leader and follower decisions are sensitive to the institutional frame. Leaders contribute less in the take-some game, and the correlation between leaders’ and followers’ contribution is weaker in the take-some game. Additionally, using a strategy method to elicit followers’ reactions at the individual level, we find evidence for the malleability of followers’ revealed cooperation types. Taken together, the leadership institution is found to be less efficient in the take- than in the give-frame, both in games that are played only once and repeatedly.
Legibility and the Informational Foundations of State Capacity
Journal of Politics
79
1
118-132
2017
On the Incentive Effects of Sample Size in Monitoring Agents - A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis
German Economic Review
18
1
91-98
2017