Articles (peer-reviewed) [1066]

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Forthcoming
Concession Bargaining – An Experimental Comparison of Protocols and Time Horizons
The Journal of Conflict Resolution
forthcoming
Endogenous information acquisition in matching problems
Social Choice and Welfare
forthcoming
Endogenous role assignment and team performance
International Economic Review
forthcoming
Evidence-Based Jurisprudence meets Legal Linguistics. Unlikely Blends Made in Germany
Brigham Young University Law Review (BYU L. Rev.)
43
forthcoming
Forum Selling Abroad
Southern California Law Review
forthcoming
If the Worst Comes to the Worst. Dictator Giving When Recipient’s Endowments are Risky
European Economic Review
forthcoming
Abstract
Donors may often not be sure whether a recipient really deserves their help. Does this uncertainty deter generosity? In an experiment we find that, to the contrary, under most specifications of uncertainty, dictators give more, compared with the donation the same dictator makes to a recipient they know to have the expected value of the endowment with certainty. They are particularly concerned about the possibility that a recipient leaves the lab with no payoff from the game.
Information Aggregation Through Stock Prices and the Cost of Capital
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics
forthcoming
Language group differences in time preferences: Evidence from primary school children in a bilingual city
European Economic Review
forthcoming
Literacy and the migrant-native wage gap
Review of Income and Wealth
forthcoming
Modeling a Satisficing Judge
Rationality and Society
forthcoming
Abstract
Judges and juries frequently must decide, knowing that they do not know everything that would be relevant for deciding the case. The law uses two related institutions for enabling courts to nonetheless decide the case: the standard of proof, and the burden of proof. In this paper, we contrast a standard rational choice approach with a satisficing approach. Standard theory would want judges to rationally deal with the limitations of the evidence. We posit that this is not only descriptively implausible, but also normatively undesirable. We propose a theoretical framework for a judge who only considers scenarios that "she does not dare to neglect", and aims at decisions that are "good enough", given the undissolvable limitations of the evidence. We extend this approach to parties who strategically exploit the limited factual basis, and to judges who have to allocate limited resources for fact finding to more than one case.