Search results for: Author=Chmura, Thorsten [10]

2017
At the Mercy of a Prisoner. Three Dictator Experiments
Applied Economics Letters
24
774-778
2017
Abstract
We test male juvenile prisoners on a dictator game with another anonymous co-prisoner as recipient. Prisoners give more than students, but less than nonstudents of their age. They give more to a charity than to another prisoner. In one of two experiments, those convicted for violent crime give more than those convicted for property crime.
2016
Natural groups and economic characteristics as driving forces of wage discrimination
European Economic Review
90
178-200
2016
2014
Generalized Impulse Balance: An experimental test for a class of 3x3 games
Review of Behavioral Economics
1
27-53
2014
2013
Selfishness As a Potential Cause of Crime. A Prison Experiment
2013/05
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
Bonn
2013
Abstract
For a rational choice theorist, the absence of crime is more difficult to explain than its presence. Arguably, the expected value of criminal sanctions, i.e. the product of severity times certainty, is often below the expected benefit. We rely on a standard theory from behavioral economics, inequity aversion, to offer an explanation. This theory could also explain how imperfect criminal sanctions deter crime. The critical component of the theory is aversion against outperforming others. To test this theory, we exploit that it posits inequity aversion to be a personality trait. We can therefore test it in a very simple standard game. Inequity averse individuals give a fraction of their endowment to another anonymous, unendowed participant. We have prisoners play this game, and compare results to findings from a meta-study of more than 100 dictator games with non-prisoners. Surprisingly, results do not differ, not even if we only compare with other dictator games among close-knit groups. To exclude social proximity as an explanation, we retest prisoners on a second dictator game where the recipient is a charity. Prisoners give more, not less.
2012
Learning in experimental 2 x 2 games
Games and Economic Behavior
76
44-73
2012
2011
Learning in experimental 2 x 2 games
2011/26
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
Bonn
2011
Abstract
In this paper, we introduce two new learning models: impulse-matching learning and action-sampling learning. These two models together with the models of self-tuning EWA and reinforcement learning are applied to 12 different 2 x 2 games and their results are compared with the results from experimental data. We test whether the models are capable of replicating the aggregate distribution of behavior, as well as correctly predicting individuals' round-by-round behavior. Our results are two-fold: while the simulations with impulse-matching and action-sampling learning successfully replicate the experimental data on the aggregate level, individual behavior is best described by self-tuning EWA. Nevertheless, impulse-matching learning has the second highest score for the individual data. In addition, only self-tuning EWA and impulse-matching learning lead to better round-by-round predictions than the aggregate frequencies, which means they adjust their predictions correctly over time.
Stationary Concepts for Experimental 2x2 Games: A Reply
American Economic Review
101
1041-1044
2011
2010
At the Mercy of the Prisoner Next Door. Using an Experimental Measure of Selfishness as a Criminological Tool
2010/27
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
Bonn
2010
Abstract
Do criminals maximise money? Are criminals more or less selfish than the average subject? Can prisons apply measures that reduce the degree of selfishness of their inmates? Using a tried and tested tool from experimental economics, we cast new light on these old criminological questions. In a standard dictator game, prisoners give a substantial amount, which calls for more refined versions of utility in rational choice theories of crime. Prisoners do not give less than average subjects, not even than subjects from other closely knit communities. This speaks against the idea that people commit crimes because they are excessively selfish. Finally those who receive better marks at prison school give more, as do those who improve their marks over time. This suggests that this correctional intervention also reduces selfishness.
2007
Experiments and Simulations on Day-to-Day Route Choice-Behaviour
Games and Economic Behavior
58
394-406
2007
2005
Testing (Beliefs about) Social Preferences: Evidence from an Experimental Coordination Game
Economics Letters
88
214-220
2005