Search results for: Author=Dorrough [6]

2018
Cross-national in-group favoritism in prosocial behavior: Evidence from Latin and North America
Judgment and Decision Making
13
1
42-60
2018
2017
Race for Power in Public Good Games with Unequal, Unstable Punishment Power
Journal of Behavioral Decision Making
30
2
582-609
2017
When knowledge activated from memory intrudes on probabilistic inferences from description - the case of stereotypes
Acta Psychologica
180
64-78
2017
2016
A Multinational investigation of cross-societal cooperation
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America
113
39
10836-10841
2016
Abstract
In a globalized world, establishing successful cooperation between people from different nations is becoming increasingly important. We present results from a comprehensive investigation of cross-societal cooperation in one-shot prisoner’s dilemmas involving population-representative samples from six countries and identify crucial facilitators of and obstacles to cooperation. In interactions involving mutual knowledge about only the other players’ nationalities, we demonstrate that people hold strong and transnationally shared expectations (i.e., stereotypes) concerning the cooperation level of interaction partners from other countries. These expectations are the strongest determinants of participant cooperation. Paradoxically, however, they turn out to be incorrect stereotypes that even correlate negatively with reality. In addition to erroneous expectations, participants’ cooperation behavior is driven by (shared) social preferences that vary according to the interaction partner’s nationality. In the cross-societal context, these social preferences are influenced by differences in wealth and ingroup favoritism, as well as effects of specific country combinations but not by spatial distance between nations.
Revealing side effects of quota rules on group cooperation
Journal of Economic Psychology
57
136-152
2016
2015
The development of ingroup favoritism in repeated social dilemmas
Frontiers in Psychology
6
2015
Abstract
In two comprehensive and fully incentivized studies, we investigate the development of ingroup favoritism as one of two aspects of parochial altruism in repeated social dilemmas. Specifically, we test whether ingroup favoritism is a fixed phenomenon that can be observed from the very beginning and remains stable over time, or whether it develops (increases vs. decreases) during repeated contact. Ingroup favoritism is assessed through cooperation behavior in a repeated continuous prisoner's dilemma where participants sequentially interact with 10 members of the ingroup (own city and university) and subsequently with 10 members of the outgroup (other city and university), or vice versa. In none of the experiments do we observe initial differences in cooperation behavior for interaction partners from the ingroup, as compared to outgroup, and we only observe small differences in expectations regarding the interaction partners' cooperation behavior. After repeated interaction, however, including a change of groups, clear ingroup favoritism can be observed. Instead of being due to gradual and potentially biased updating of expectations, we found that these emerging differences were mainly driven by the change of interaction partners' group membership that occurred after round 10. This indicates that in social dilemma settings ingroup favoritism is to some degree dynamic in that it is enhanced and sometimes only observable if group membership is activated by thinking about both the interaction with the ingroup and the outgroup.