Search results for: Author=Engel, Christoph [385]

Pages

Forthcoming
2017
At the Mercy of a Prisoner. Three Dictator Experiments
Applied Economics Letters
24
774-778
2017
Abstract
We test male juvenile prisoners on a dictator game with another anonymous co-prisoner as recipient. Prisoners give more than students, but less than nonstudents of their age. They give more to a charity than to another prisoner. In one of two experiments, those convicted for violent crime give more than those convicted for property crime.
Editorial Preface
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics
173
1
1-3
2017
How to Protect Entitlements: An Experiment
2017/05
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
Bonn
2017
Abstract
In a full-information, zero transactions costs world, the degree of protection afforded to an entitlement does not affect the likelihood of efficient trade. In reality, imperfect information is often inevitable. Specifically, a party will usually have incomplete information about fairness norms held by the other party – fairness norms that affect the other party’s willingness to pay (WTP) or willingness to accept (WTA). Importantly, these fairness norms may depend on how strongly the entitlement is protected. We experimentally test the effect of the degree of protection on the parties’ WTP and WTA and on the likelihood of efficient trade by varying the legal remedy for infringing upon the owner’s entitlement. We show that our participants can be divided into three groups corresponding to three different fairness norms: negative types whose WTP and WTA are decreasing in the strength of the legal remedy; positive types whose WTP and WTA are increasing in the strength of the legal remedy; and flat types whose WTP and WTA do not depend on the strength of the legal remedy. We find that type is role-dependent, such that a higher WTP and a lower WTA – the combination most conducive to efficient trade – is obtained with a weaker legal remedy.
The Hidden Cost of Compensation
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics
173
106-109
2017
The Valuation of Moral Rights: A Field Experiment
2017/04
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective on Goods
Bonn
2017
Abstract
U.S. intellectual property law is firmly rooted in utilitarian principles. Copyright law is viewed as a means to give proper monetary incentives to authors for their creative effort. Many European copyright systems pursue additional goals: Authors have the right to be named as author, to control alterations and to retract their work in case their artistic beliefs have changed. Protecting these “moral rights” might be justified by the preferences of typical authors. We present the first field experiment on moral rights revealing the true valuation of these rights by over 200 authors from 24 countries. A majority of authors are not willing to trade moral rights in the first place. They demand substantial prices in case they decide to trade. The differences between authors from the U.S. and Europe are small. These results call into question whether moral rights protection should differ across the Atlantic and whether a purely profit-based theory of copyright law is sufficient to capture the complex relationship between human behavior and creativity.
2016
A Random Shock Is Not Random Assignment
2016/09
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
Bonn
2016
A Random Shock Is Not Random Assignment
Economics Letters
145
45-47
2016
Bargaining in the Absence of Property Rights. An Experiment
Journal of Law and Economics
59
2
477-495
2016
Does Class Action Have a Deterrent Effect?
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics
172
104-107
2016