Search results for: Author=Güth, Werner [72]

Pages

Forthcoming
Concession Bargaining – An Experimental Comparison of Protocols and Time Horizons
The Journal of Conflict Resolution
forthcoming
Corporate Social Responsibility
Handbook on the economics of social responsibility: individuals, corporations and institutions
Edward Elgar
Cheltenham
forthcoming
Experimental Economics – A philosophical Perspective
Oxford Handbook of Philosophy
forthcoming
Mechanism Design and the Law
Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics
(Eds.),
forthcoming
On becoming Honorable and Respecting Honor – An Experimental Study
Journal of Economic Policy
forthcoming
To be the tail of the lions or the head of the foxes
Management Science
forthcoming
Voluntary Cooperation in Local Public Goods Provision – An Experimental Study
Journal of Public Economics
forthcoming
2018
Behavioral spillovers in local public good provision: an experimental study
Journal of Economic Psychology
67
116-134
2018
Modeling a Satisficing Judge
Rationality and Society
30
2
220-246
2018
Abstract
Judges and juries frequently must decide, knowing that they do not know everything that would be relevant for deciding the case. The law uses two related institutions for enabling courts to nonetheless decide the case: the standard of proof, and the burden of proof. In this paper, we contrast a standard rational choice approach with a satisficing approach. Standard theory would want judges to rationally deal with the limitations of the evidence. We posit that this is not only descriptively implausible, but also normatively undesirable. We propose a theoretical framework for a judge who only considers scenarios that "she does not dare to neglect", and aims at decisions that are "good enough", given the undissolvable limitations of the evidence. We extend this approach to parties who strategically exploit the limited factual basis, and to judges who have to allocate limited resources for fact finding to more than one case.