Search results for: Author=Goerg [32]

Pages

2018
If the Worst Comes to the Worst. Dictator Giving When Recipient’s Endowments are Risky
European Economic Review
105
51-70
2018
Abstract
Donors may often not be sure whether a recipient really deserves their help. Does this uncertainty deter generosity? In an experiment we find that, to the contrary, under most specifications of uncertainty, dictators give more, compared with the donation the same dictator makes to a recipient they know to have the expected value of the endowment with certainty. They are particularly concerned about the possibility that a recipient leaves the lab with no payoff from the game.
2017
Endowments, Perceived Similarity and Dictator Giving
Economic Inquiry
55
2
1130-1144
2017
2016
Do direct-democratic procedures lead to higher acceptance than political representation? Experimental survey evidence from Germany
Public Choice
167
1
47-65
2016
Do teams procrastinate? Strategic procrastination in a dynamic environment
Experiments in Organizational Economics, Research In Experimental Economics
19
229-250
Emerald Group Publishing
2016
Experiments in Organizational Economics
Research in Experimental Economics
19
Emerald Group Publishing
2016
Impulse Response Dynamics in Weakest Link Games
German Economic Review
17
3
284-197
2016
In Wrong anticipation - Miscalibrated beliefs between germans, israelis, and palestinians
PLoS ONE
11
6
2016
Natural groups and economic characteristics as driving forces of wage discrimination
European Economic Review
90
178-200
2016
Priming the charitable pump: an experimental investigation of two-stage raffles
Economic Inquiry
54
1
508-519
2016
Abstract
We experimentally study two-stage self-financing raffles in which participants can buy tickets in two stages. In all raffles, one half of the proceeds are donated to a local charity and the raffle winner wins the other half. The mechanisms differ by what happens to the tickets purchased in the first stage. In the complete draw down two-stage raffle, the first stage tickets are eliminated from the active pool of tickets, while in the no draw down raffle they remain in the active pool. We find that both two-stage raffles initially perform better than the standard one-stage 50–50 raffle. Over time, the aggregate contribution level in the complete draw down raffle declines and approaches that of the one-stage raffle, while in the no draw down raffle contributions are stable and remain higher than those in the other two mechanisms. In both two-stage raffles, we observe a positive correlation between the proceeds of the first stage and the number of tickets bought in the second stage. Our results are at odds with a standard warm glow model of giving, and also cannot be explained by the joy of winning or learning about bidders' types.
Symmetric vs. Asymmetric Punishment Regimes for Collusive Bribery
American Law and Economics Review
18
506-556
2016