Search results for: Author=Hellwig, Martin [244]

Pages

2018
Bargeld, Giralgeld, Vollgeld: zur Diskussion um das Geldwesen nach der Finanzkrise
Zeitschrift für das gesamte Kreditwesen
8
37-41
2018
Bargeld, Giralgeld, Vollgeld: Zur Diskussion um das Geldwesen nach der Finanzkrise
2018/10
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
Bonn
2018
Abstract
Der Aufsatz setzt sich kritisch mit verschiedenen Vorschlägen zur Reform des Geldwesens seit der Finanzkrise und mit den zugrundeliegenden Vorstellungen von „Geld“ auseinander. Das Wort „Geld“ wird in dieser Diskussion für verschiedene Dinge und in verschiedenen Bedeutungen gebraucht. Als paradox erweist es sich, dass die Diskussion um die Geldpolitik, auch die Rechtsprechung des Bundesverfassungsgerichts, geprägt ist von der Vorstellung, dass die Ausgabe von Bargeld eine Verbindlichkeit der Zentralbank darstellt, ebenso die Einlagen der Geschäftsbanken bei der Zentralbank, während gleichzeitig die Diskussion um die Rolle der Geschäftsbanken im Geldwesen geprägt ist von der Vorstellung, dass diese durch ihre Kreditvergabe „Geld“ schöpfen und somit die Einlagenfinanzierung von Geschäftsbanken keine Schuldenfinanzierung ist. Beide Vorstellungen sind falsch, die eine, weil die Geldschöpfung der Zentralbank diese zu nichts verpflichtet, die andere, weil die Geldschöpfung der Geschäftsbanken sehr wohl Verpflichtungen schaffen, die Liquiditäts- und Solvenzrisiken mit sich bringen. Der zweite Teil des Aufsatzes geht kritisch auf radikale Reformvorschläge zur Abschaffung des Bargelds und zur Abschaffung der Geldschöpfung der Geschäftsbanken (Vollgeld-Initiative) ein. Erstere unterschätzen die Rolle des Bargelds als Grundlage aller auf Nominalwerte gerichteten Forderungen, u.a. der Forderungen an Geschäftsbanken, letztere unterschätzen die Möglichkeiten und die Risiken einer Substitution von Sichteinlagen durch andere „geldnahe“ Titel, z.B. Geldmarktfondsanteile. Die Vorstellung, man könne durch solche Änderungen die Komplexität der Interdependenz von Geldsystem und Banksystem reduzieren und die Aufgabe der Geldpolitik vereinfachen, ist unrealistisch.
Competition Policy and Sector-Specific Regulation in the Financial Sector
2018/07
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
Bonn
2018
Abstract
Reforms of financial regulation after the crisis of 2007-2009 raise the question of what is the relation between financial regulators and competition authorities. Should competition authorities play a role in financial regulation? Should they co-operate with financial regulators? Or should they keep at a distance? The paper gives an overview over some of the issues that are involved in the discussion. Drawing on the experience of the network industries, the first part of the paper discusses the relation between competition authorities and sector-specific regulators more generally. Whereas competition policy involves the application of legal norms involving prohibitions that are formulated in abstract terms, sector-specific regulation involves authorities actually prescribing desired modes of behavior. The ongoing nature of relations makes regulators more prone to capture than competition authorities. In the financial sector, the potential for capture is particularly great because everyone is tempted by the idea that banks should fund their pet projects. Following an overview over the evolution of regulation and competition in the financial industry, the paper discusses various issues that are relevant for competition policy: Technological and regulatory barriers to entry, distortions of competition by explicit or implicit government guarantees, distortions of competition by bailouts making for artificial barriers to exit. Guarantees and bailouts in particular pose special challenges for merger control and for state aid control.
Risks grow as reform resolve disappears
Global Public Investor
78
2018
The Leverage Ratchet Effect
Journal of Finance
LXXIII
1
145-198
2018
Valuation reports in the context of banking resolution: What are the challenges?
2018/06
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
Bonn
2018
Abstract
The paper discusses the problem of valuation in bank resolution. In an overview over the most relevant principles of valuation theory, the paper notes the difficulties inherent in valuing risks and illiquidity in holding non-traded assets. Subsequently, the paper briefly reviews the resolution of Banco Popular Español, and then discusses the need for clarification of the no-investor-worse-off principle, the relation between the price in a sale of business and the presumed outcome in an insolvency procedure, and the difficulties attached to assessing the value of an illiquid asset that is held. The paper concludes with a discussion of the need for time, for valuation and in resolution, warns against a moratorium on withdrawals and payouts, and argues that time pressures would be much reduced if funding in resolution was provided for.
Zehn Jahre nach der Lehman-Pleite – Finanzmärkte stabil?
Wirtschaftsdienst
98
8
539-557
2018
2017
Bitte nicht großdeutsch
FAZ
2017
Carving out legacy assets: a successful tool for bank restructuring?
2017/03
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
Bonn
2017
Abstract
Beginning with the proposal by Enria (2017), the paper discusses the scope for successful bank restructuring through a carveout of impaired assets and a transfer of these assets to a government-sponsored asset management company. The paper argues that the success of such an operation requires a use of public funds, either outright or through contingent commitments. Clawback provisions are problematic because they create contingent liabilities that merely shift risks from the assets side to the liabilities sides of banks’ balance sheets. The paper distinguishes between asset impairments coming from considerations of prospective returns and asset impairments coming from frictions in the markets in which these assets are traded. It also distinguishes between threats to bank solvency and threats to bank funding/liquidity. In each case, the success of bank restructuring from asset carveouts depends on the extent to which threats to the bank’s solvency is eliminated. If these threats concern bank funding and asset liquidations at depressed prices, public funds may eventually not be needed. If threats to bank solvency come from nonperforming loans, taxpayer support may be essential. The notion of “real economic value” as the price at which assets should be transferred is problematic and leaves ample room for hidden subsidies. The success of restructuring of the individual bank may itself come at a risk to financial stability as the preservation of existing capacities maintains competitive pressure and depresses bank profitability. Additional risks may come from the burden on the government’s fiscal stance.
Deutschland und die Finanzkrise(n)
Wirtschaftsdienst
97
9
606-607
2017