Search results for: Author=Hillenbrand [7]

2018
Cooperation with lists
2018/01
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
Bonn
2018
Abstract
Group tasks are often organized by a list: group members state their willingness to contribute by entering their names on a publicly visible, empty list. Alternatively, one could organize the group task by starting with a full list: every group member is already entered on the list and non-cooperators have to cross out their names. Indeed, strong behavioral differences are observed when comparing (otherwise identical) environments with empty and full lists in a laboratory experiment with repeated interaction. Cooperation in the empty list is high in early periods, but is decreasing. In the full list, cooperation starts low, but is actually increasing, surpassing cooperation in the empty list treatment in later periods. Two factors, diffusion of responsibility and unraveling of cooperation seem to drive the results.
Volunteering under Population Uncertainty
Games and Economic Behavior
109
65-81
2018
2017
Beyond Information: Disclosure, Distracted Attention, and Investor Behavior
Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance
16
14-21
2017
Strategic Inattention in Product Search
2017/21
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
Bonn
2017
Abstract
Online platforms provide search tools that help consumers to get better-fitting product offers. But this technology makes consumer search behavior also easily traceable and allows for real-time price discrimination. Consumers face a trade-off: Search intensely and receive a better fit at a potentially higher price or restrict search behavior – be strategically inattentive – and receive a worse fit, but maybe a better deal. We study the resulting strategic buyer-seller interaction theoretically as well as experimentally. Our experimental results show that it is the sellers and not the buyers who profit from these search tools.
Volunteering under Population Uncertainty
2017/12
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
Bonn
2017
Abstract
There is ample evidence that the number of players can have an important impact on the cooperation and coordination behavior of people facing social dilemmas. With extremely few exceptions, the literature on cooperation assumes common knowledge about who is a player and how many players are involved in a certain situation. In this paper, we argue that this assumption is overly restrictive, and not even very common in real-world cooperation problems. We show theoretically and experimentally that uncertainty about the number of players in a Volunteer's Dilemma increases cooperation compared to a situation with a certain number of players. We identify additional behavioral mechanisms amplifying and impairing the effect.
2016
Leadership effectiveness and institutional frames
Experimental Economics
19
4
842-863
2016
Abstract
Leadership mechanisms provide a potential means to mitigate social dilemmas, but empirical evidence on the success of such mechanisms is mixed. In this paper, we explore the institutional frame as a relevant factor for the effectiveness of leadership. We compare subjects’ behavior in public-goods experiments that are either framed positively (give-some game) or negatively (take-some game). We observe that leader and follower decisions are sensitive to the institutional frame. Leaders contribute less in the take-some game, and the correlation between leaders’ and followers’ contribution is weaker in the take-some game. Additionally, using a strategy method to elicit followers’ reactions at the individual level, we find evidence for the malleability of followers’ revealed cooperation types. Taken together, the leadership institution is found to be less efficient in the take- than in the give-frame, both in games that are played only once and repeatedly.
2015
Beyond Information: Disclosure, Distracted Attention, and Investor Behavior
2015/20
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
Bonn
2015
Abstract
Financial disclosure documents provide investors with product details to facilitate informed investment decisions. We investigate whether the appearance – the visual frame – of disclosure documents impacts risk and return expectations and investment behavior. In our experiment, subjects decide about investments into real-life mutual funds. We nd that subjects expect a smaller return variance, invest more and gather less correct information if visual distractors are present in the visual frame. Results are in line with the distracted attention mechanism and suggest that disclosure policies should take the visual frame into account.