Search results for: Author=Langenbach, Pascal [8]

Forthcoming
Der Anhörungseffekt: Verfahrensfairness und Rechtsbefolgung im allgemeinen Verwaltungsverfahren
Beiträge zum Verwaltungsrecht
Mohr Siebeck
Tübingen
forthcoming
2017
How Voice Shapes Reactions to Impartial Decision-Makers: An Experiment on Participation Procedures
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
2017
Abstract
This paper studies how participation in decision procedures affects people’s reactions to the deciding authority. In our economic experiment, having voice, i.e., the opportunity to state one’s opinion prior to a decision, significantly increases subordinates’ subsequent kindness towards the authority. These positive effects occur irrespectively of the decisions’ content. The experimental findings stress the positive effects of voice when subordinates and authorities interact. Our results suggest that in organizations, but also in the legal and political arena, participative decision-making can be used to guide people’s actions after decisions have been made.
How Voice Shapes Reactions to Impartial Decision-makers: An Experiment on Participation Procedures
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
143
241-253
2017
Abstract
This paper studies how participation in decision procedures affects people’s reactions to the deciding authority. In our economic experiment, having voice, i.e., the opportunity to state one’s opinion prior to a decision, significantly increases subordinates’ subsequent kindness towards the authority. These positive effects occur irrespectively of the decisions’ content. The experimental findings stress the positive effects of voice when subordinates and authorities interact. Our results suggest that in organizations, but also in the legal and political arena, participative decision-making can be used to guide people’s actions after decisions have been made.
Inherited Institutions: Cooperation in the Light of Democratic Legitimacy
2017/01
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
Bonn
2017
Abstract
We experimentally investigate whether the procedural history of a sanctioning institution affects cooperation in a social dilemma. Subjects inherit the institutional setting from a previous generation of subjects who either decided on the implementation of the institution democratically by majority vote or were exogenously assigned a setting. In order to isolate the impact of the voting procedure, no information about the cooperation history is provided. In line with existing empirical evidence, we observe that in the starting generation cooperation is higher (lower) with a democratically chosen (rejected) institution, as compared to the corresponding, randomly imposed setting. In the second generation, the procedural history only partly affects cooperation. While there is no positive democracy effect when the institution is implemented, the vote-based rejection of the institution negatively affects cooperation in the second generation. The effect size is similar to that in the first generation.
2016
Fairness and Persuasion. How Stakeholder Communication Affects Impartial Decision Making
Economics Letters
141
173-176
2016
2014
Fairness and Persuasion. How Stakeholder Communication Affects Impartial Decision Making
2014/03
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
Bonn
2014
Abstract
We study experimentally whether and to what extent impartial decision makers are influenced by stakeholders’ fairness opinions in an allocation decision. The setting allows for different focal fairness rules to be considered. We compare communication treatments, in which one of the stakeholders states his or her opinion prior to the allocation decision, to a baseline without communication opportunities. We find that stakeholders who state their opinion in the communication treatments are allocated significantly less money than their counterparts in the baseline. Asymmetric reactions to the statements appear to be the driving force behind this result: impartial decision makers deviate from their initial fairness judgment and follow stakeholders’ opinions only if the requests are moderate; they largely ignore high monetary claims. Our results contribute to understanding the underlying processes that may affect the decisions of judges, juries, arbitrators, referees, or other impartial decision makers in interaction with stakeholders.

See also:
The values of ex-ante and ex-post communication in dictator games
2014/07
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
Bonn
2014
Abstract
In the dictator game, the recipient’s opportunity to send a message to the dictator increases giving. This paper reports two experiments which study how the timing of messages affects dictators’ decisions (experiment 1) and which value recipients attach to communication opportunities (experiment 2). The first experiment shows that the effect of communication on dictator giving is equally strong when the recipient can send a message before or after the dictator has decided. However, recipients in a second experiment reveal a strong preference for pre-decision messages: Their willingness to pay for pre-decision messages is higher than for post-decision messages.
2013
How Voice Shapes Reactions to Impartial Decision-Makers: An Experiment on Participation Procedures
2013/11
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
Bonn
2013
Abstract
This paper studies how participation in decision procedures affects people’s reactions to the deciding authority. In our economic experiment, having voice, i.e., the opportunity to state one’s opinion prior to a decision, significantly increases subordinates’ subsequent kindness towards the authority. These positive effects occur irrespectively of the decisions’ content. The experimental findings stress the positive effects of voice when subordinates and authorities interact. Our results suggest that in organizations, but also in the legal and political arena, participative decision-making can be used to guide people’s actions after decisions have been taken.