Search results for: Author=Schmelzer, André [2]

2016
Single versus Multiple Randomization in Matching Mechanisms
2016/08
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
Bonn
2016
Abstract
This paper experimentally studies an essential institutional feature of matching markets: Randomization of allocation priorities. I compare single and multiple randomization in the student assignment problem with ties. The Gale-Shapley deferred acceptance algorithm is employed after indifferences in school priorities are resolved by either random procedure. The main result is that a significant fraction of individuals prefers multiple to single randomization, although both are equivalent in expectation. Multiple randomization is perceived to be fairer. One theoretical explanation is the failure to disregard compound lotteries. These results show that random procedures are not inherently neutral with respect to preferences and fairness perceptions.
2015
Beyond Information: Disclosure, Distracted Attention, and Investor Behavior
2015/20
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
Bonn
2015
Abstract
Financial disclosure documents provide investors with product details to facilitate informed investment decisions. We investigate whether the appearance – the visual frame – of disclosure documents impacts risk and return expectations and investment behavior. In our experiment, subjects decide about investments into real-life mutual funds. We nd that subjects expect a smaller return variance, invest more and gather less correct information if visual distractors are present in the visual frame. Results are in line with the distracted attention mechanism and suggest that disclosure policies should take the visual frame into account.