Search results for: Author=Sutter [170]

Pages

Forthcoming
Endogenous role assignment and team performance
International Economic Review
forthcoming
2017
Die Entdeckung der Geduld. Ausdauer schlägt Talent. (in Turkish: Sabrın Keşfi – Yetenek Karşısında Sebatın Zaferi)
Kaknus
2017
Gender differences in discrimination emerge early in life: Evidence from primary school children in a bilingual city
Economics Letters
152
15-18
2017
How social preferences shape incentives in (experimental) markets for credence goods
Economic Journal
127
393-416
2017
How uncertainty and ambiguity in tournaments affect gender differences in competitive behavior
2017/18
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
Bonn
2017
Abstract
Tournament incentives prevail in labor markets, in particular with respect to promotions. Yet, it is often unclear to competitors how many winners there will be or how many applicants compete in the tournament. While it is hard to measure how this uncertainty affects work performance and willingness to compete in the field, it can be studied in a controlled lab experiment. We present a novel experiment where subjects can compete against each other, but where the number of winners is either uncertain (i.e., unknown numbers of winners, but known probabilities) or ambiguous (unknown probabilities for different numbers of winners). We compare these two conditions with a control treatment with a known number of winners. We find that ambiguity induces a significant increase in performance of men, while we observe no change for women. Both men and women increase their willingness to enter competition with uncertainty and ambiguity, but men react slightly more than women. Overall, both effects contribute to men winning the tournament significantly more often than women under uncertainty and ambiguity. Hence, previous experiments on gender differences in competition may have measured a lower bound of differences between men and women.
Market versus Residence Principle: Experimental Evidence on the Effects of a Financial Transaction Tax
The Economic Journal
127
F610-F631
2017
Measuring Indirect Effects of Unfair Employer Behavior on Worker Productivity – A Field Experiment
2017/22
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
Bonn
2017
Abstract
We present a field experiment in which we set up a call-center to study how the productivity of workers is affected if managers treat their co-workers in an unfair way. This question cannot be studied in long-lived organizations since workers may change their career expectations (and hence effort) when managers behave unfairly towards co-workers. In order to rule out such confounds and to measure productivity changes of unaffected workers in a clean way, we create an environment where employees work for two shifts. In one treatment, we lay off parts of the workforce before the second shift. Compared to two different control treatments, we find that, in the layoff treatment, the productivity of the remaining, unaffected workers drops by 12 percent. We show that this result is not driven by peer effects or altered beliefs about the job or the managers’ competence, but rather related to the workers’ perception of unfair behavior of employers towards co-workers. The latter interpretation is confirmed in a survey among professional HR managers. We also show that the effect of unfair behavior on the productivity of unaffected workers is close to the upper bound of the direct effects of wage cuts on the productivity of affected workers. This suggests that the price of an employer’s unfair behavior goes well beyond the potential tit-for-tat of directly affected workers.
On the nature of guilt aversion: Insights from a new methodology in the dictator game
Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance
13
1
9-15
2017
Second degree moral hazard in a credence goods market
Economic Journal
127
599
1-8
2017
The economics of credence goods – A survey of recent lab and field experiments
CESifo Economic Studies
63
1
1-23
2017