Search results for: Author=Tausch [8]

2017
A Must Lie Situation: Avoiding Giving Negative Feedback
Games and Economic Behavior
102
445-454
2017
Abstract
We examine under what conditions people provide accurate feedback to others. We use feedback regarding attractiveness, a trait people care about, and for which objective information is hard to obtain. Our results show that people avoid giving accurate face-to-face feedback to less attractive individuals, even if lying in this context comes at a monetary cost to both the person who gives the feedback and the receiver. A substantial increase of these costs does not increase the accuracy of feedback. However, when feedback is provided anonymously, the aversion to giving negative feedback is reduced.
Inherited Institutions: Cooperation in the Light of Democratic Legitimacy
2017/01
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
Bonn
2017
Abstract
We experimentally investigate whether the procedural history of a sanctioning institution affects cooperation in a social dilemma. Subjects inherit the institutional setting from a previous generation of subjects who either decided on the implementation of the institution democratically by majority vote or were exogenously assigned a setting. In order to isolate the impact of the voting procedure, no information about the cooperation history is provided. In line with existing empirical evidence, we observe that in the starting generation cooperation is higher (lower) with a democratically chosen (rejected) institution, as compared to the corresponding, randomly imposed setting. In the second generation, the procedural history only partly affects cooperation. While there is no positive democracy effect when the institution is implemented, the vote-based rejection of the institution negatively affects cooperation in the second generation. The effect size is similar to that in the first generation.
2016
Institutional Endogeneity and Third-party Punishment in Social Dilemmas
2016/06
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
Bonn
2016
Abstract
This paper studies experimentally how the endogeneity of sanctioning institutions affects the severity of punishment in social dilemmas. We allow individuals to vote on the introduction of third-party-administered sanctions, and compare situations in which the adoption of this institution is endogenously decided via majority voting to situations in which it is exogenously imposed by the experimenter. Our experimental design addresses the self-selection and signaling effects that arise when subjects can vote on the institutional setting. We find that punishment is significantly higher when the sanctioning institution is exogenous, which can be explained by a difference in the effectiveness of punishment. Subjects respond to punishment more strongly when the sanctioning institution is endogenously chosen. As a result, a given cooperation level can be reached through milder punishment when third-party sanctions are endogenous. However, overall efficiency does not differ across the two settings as the stricter punishment implemented in the exogenous one sustains high cooperation as subjects interact repeatedly.
Predicting aggressive collective action based on the efficacy of peaceful and aggressive actions
European Journal of Social Psychology
46
529-543
2016
Stability of risk attitudes and media coverage of economic news
2016/02
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
Bonn
2016
Abstract
This paper investigates the impact of exogenous changes in individuals' perceived economic environment on their self-stated risk attitudes by exploiting changes in media coverage of economic news. We use information on risk attitudes from the German Socioeconomic Panel and combine it with data on the average daily frequency of economic news reports during the year and the month preceding the date of the risk attitude elicitation. Using fixed effects regressions we observe effects of both long and short term changes in the media. We find that an increase in economic news in the previous year, irrespective of whether the news are bad or good, is negatively related to individuals' willingness to take risks. An increase in news that are aggregated over the previous month, however, relates to a decrease in risk aversion if the news are predominantly good. The strength of the relations depends on individuals' personal characteristics and personality traits. A positive correlation between bad news coverage and individuals' worries suggests that changes in risk perception may mediate the relation between news coverage and risk attitudes.
JEL-Codes: D80 - General, D03
2015
Risk taking and risk sharing. Does responsibility matter?
Journal of Risk and Uncertainty
50
3
229-248
2015
Abstract
Risk sharing arrangements diminish individuals’ vulnerability to probabilistic events that negatively affect their financial situation. This is because risk sharing implies redistribution, as lucky individuals support the unlucky ones. We hypothesize that responsibility for risky choices decreases individuals’ willingness to share risk by dampening redistribution motives, and investigate this conjecture with a laboratory experiment. Responsibility is created by allowing participants to choose between two different risky lotteries before they decide how much risk they share with a randomly matched partner. Risk sharing is then compared to a treatment where risk exposure is randomly assigned. We find that average risk sharing does not depend on whether individuals can control their risk exposure. However, we observe that when individuals are responsible for their risk exposure, risk sharing decisions are systematically conditioned on the risk exposure of the sharing partner, whereas this is not the case when risk exposure is random.
2014
An experimental investigation of risk sharing and adverse selection
Journal of Risk and Uncertainty
48
167-186
2014
2013
Preferences for redistribution and pensions. What can we learn from experiments?
Journal of Pension Economics and Finance
12
298-325
2013