Search results for: Author=Winter [19]

Pages

Forthcoming
Diffusion of Responsibility in Norm Enforcement: Evidence from an N-Person Ultimatum Bargaining Experiment
Social dilemmas, institutions and the evolution of cooperation
XI
303-326
Berlin/Boston
forthcoming
2018
Dynamic Bargaining and Normative Conflict
Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics
74
112-126
2018
Normative change and culture of hate: An experiment in online environments
2018/03
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
Bonn
2018
Abstract
We present an online experiment in which we investigate the impact of perceived social acceptability on online hate speech, and measure the causal effect of specific interventions. We compare two types of interventions: counter-speaking (informal verbal sanctions) and censoring (deleting hateful content). The interventions are based on the belief that individuals infer acceptability from the context, using previous actions as a source of normative information. The interventions are based on the two conceptualizations found in the literature: 1) what do others normally do, i.e., descriptive norms; and 2) what happened to those who violated the norm, i.e., injunctive norms. Participants were significantly less likely to engage in hate speech when prior hate content had been moderately censored. Our results suggest that normative behavior in online conversations might, in fact, be motivated by descriptive norms rather than injunctive norms. With this work we present some of the first experimental evidence investigating the social determinants of hate speech in online communities. The results could advance the understanding of the micro-mechanisms that regulate hate speech. Also, such findings can guide future interventions in online communities that help prevent the spread of hate.
Normative change and culture of hate: An experiment in online environments
European Sociological Review
2018
Abstract
We present an online experiment in which we investigate the impact of perceived social acceptability on online hate speech, and measure the causal effect of specific interventions. We compare two types of interventions: counter-speaking (informal verbal sanctions) and censoring (deleting hateful content). The interventions are based on the belief that individuals infer acceptability from the context, using previous actions as a source of normative information. The interventions are based on the two conceptualizations found in the literature: 1) what do others normally do, i.e., descriptive norms; and 2) what happened to those who violated the norm, i.e., injunctive norms. Participants were significantly less likely to engage in hate speech when prior hate content had been moderately censored. Our results suggest that normative behavior in online conversations might, in fact, be motivated by descriptive norms rather than injunctive norms. With this work we present some of the first experimental evidence investigating the social determinants of hate speech in online communities. The results could advance the understanding of the micro-mechanisms that regulate hate speech. Also, such findings can guide future interventions in online communities that help prevent the spread of hate.
Volunteering under Population Uncertainty
Games and Economic Behavior
109
65-81
2018
2017
Types of Normative Conflicts and the Effectiveness of Punishment
Social dilemmas, institutions and the evolution of cooperation
XI
239-257
Berlin, Boston
2017
Vernetzung und Positionierung der Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie (KZfSS) in der länder-, disziplinen- und sprachübergreifenden Diskussion
Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie
69
1
61-74
2017
Volunteering under Population Uncertainty
2017/12
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
Bonn
2017
Abstract
There is ample evidence that the number of players can have an important impact on the cooperation and coordination behavior of people facing social dilemmas. With extremely few exceptions, the literature on cooperation assumes common knowledge about who is a player and how many players are involved in a certain situation. In this paper, we argue that this assumption is overly restrictive, and not even very common in real-world cooperation problems. We show theoretically and experimentally that uncertainty about the number of players in a Volunteer's Dilemma increases cooperation compared to a situation with a certain number of players. We identify additional behavioral mechanisms amplifying and impairing the effect.
2016
In Wrong anticipation - Miscalibrated beliefs between germans, israelis, and palestinians
PLoS ONE
11
6
2016
2014
Can higher rewards lead to less effort? Incentive reversal in teams
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
97
72-83
2014