Search results for: Author=gizatulina [9]

2017
The Generic Possibility of Full Surplus Extraction in Models with Large Type Spaces
2017/02
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
Bonn
2017
Abstract
McAfee and Reny (1992) have given a necessary and sufficient condition for full surplus extraction in naive type spaces with a continuum of payoff types. We generalize their characterization to arbitrary abstract type spaces and to the universal type space and show that in each setting, full surplus extraction is generically possible. We interpret the McAfee-Reny condition as a much stronger version of injectiveness of belief functions and prove genericity by arguments similar to those used to prove the classical embedding theorem for continuous functions. Our results can be used to also establish the genericity of common priors that admit full surplus extraction.
The Generic Possibility of Full Surplus Extraction in Models with Large Type Spaces
Journal of Economic Theory
170
385-416
2017
2016
Selling Money on Ebay: A Field Study of Surplus Division
2016/20
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
Bonn
2016
Abstract
We study the division of trade surplus in a competitive market environment by conducting a natural field experiment on German eBay. Acting as a seller, we offer Amazon gift cards with face values of up to 500 Euro. Randomly arriving buyers, the subjects of our experiment, make price offers according to eBay rules. Using a novel decomposition method, we infer offered shares of trade surplus and find that the average share proposed to the seller amounts to 29%. Additionally, we document: (i) insignificant effects of stake size; (ii) poor use of strategically relevant public information; and (iii) behavioural differences between East and West German subjects.
2015
The Genericity of the McAfee-Reny Condition for Full Surplus Extraction in Models with a Continuum of Types
2015/08
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
Bonn
2015
Abstract
McAfee and Reny (1992) have given a necessary and sufficient condition for full surplus extraction in models with a continuum of types. We interpret their condition as significantly stronger version of the requirement of injectiveness of the function mapping abstract types into beliefs and prove that their condition is satisfied by a generic set of model specifications. Our analysis involves an extension of the classical embedding theorem for continuous functions. Our proof does not rely on finite approximations and the topology on beliefs that we use is compatible with strategic continuity.
2014
Beliefs, Payoffs, Information: On the Robustness of the BDP Property in Models with Endogenous Beliefs
Journal of Mathematical Economics
51
136-153
2014
2013
Wondering How Others Interpret It: Social Value of Public Information
2013/08
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
Bonn
2013
Abstract
This paper studies the social value of public information in environments without common knowledge of the data-generating process. We show that the stronger the coordination motive behind agents’ behaviour is, the more they use private or public signals in the way that they suspect others are doing it. Consequently, the negative impact of public communication noted by Morris and Shin (2002) can be amplified if agents suspect that others take the public signal too literally and/or are too inattentive to their private signals. Social welfare, if measured as in Morris and Shin (2002), always increases in the precision of the public signal when each agent evaluates its precision correctly, but believes that others did not understand the public signal at all, which suggests that there is a scope to “obliterate” public communication in a specific way, by making it, e.g., sophisticated and technical. By contrast, measuring welfare as in Woodford (2005) reverses, in general, desirability for such obliteration and non-commonality of signals’ understanding.
2011
Beliefs, Payoffs, Information: On the Robustness of the BDP Property in Models with Endogenous Beliefs
2011/28
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
Bonn
2011
Abstract
Neeman (2004) and Heifetz and Neeman (2006) have shown that, in auctions with incomplete information about payoffs, full surplus extraction is only possible if agents’ beliefs about other agents are fully informative about their own payoff parameters. They argue that the set of incomplete-information models satisfying this so-called BDP property ("beliefs determine preferences") is negligible, in a geometric and a measure-theoretic sense. In contrast, we show that, in models with finite-dimensional type spaces, this property is topologically generic if the set of objects about which beliefs are formed is sufficiently rich and beliefs are derived by conditioning on the available information; for any agent, this information includes his own payoff parameters.
2010
Informational Smallness and the Scope for Limiting Information Rents
Journal of Economic Theory
145
2260-2281
2010
2009
Informational Smallness and the Scope for Limiting Information Rents
2009/28
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
Bonn
2009
Abstract
For an incomplete-information model of public-good provision with interim participation constraints, we show that efficient outcomes can be approximated, with approximately full surplus extraction, when there are many agents and each agent is informationally small. The result holds even if agents' payoffs cannot be unambiguously inferred from their beliefs, i.e., even if the so-called BDP property ("Beliefs Determine Preferences") of Neeman (2004) does not hold. The contrary result of Neeman (2004) rests on an implicit uniformity requirement that is incompatible with the notion that agents are informationally small because there are many other agents who have information about them.