Search results for: Author_id=persons183107 [18]

Pages

2017
At the Mercy of a Prisoner. Three Dictator Experiments
Applied Economics Letters
24
774-778
2017
Abstract
We test male juvenile prisoners on a dictator game with another anonymous co-prisoner as recipient. Prisoners give more than students, but less than nonstudents of their age. They give more to a charity than to another prisoner. In one of two experiments, those convicted for violent crime give more than those convicted for property crime.
2015
Behavioral law and economics
Economic methods for lawyers
177-204
Edward Elgar Publishing
Cheltenham
2015
Economic Methods for Lawyers (revised and extended English edition of Ökonomische Methoden im Recht)
Edward Elgar International Academic Publisher
Cheltenham
2015
2013
Die Datenkrake als Nutztier der Strafverfolgung – Zum strafprozessualen Zugriff auf Facebook-Profile
Rechtswissenschaft
4
326-359
2013
Selfishness As a Potential Cause of Crime. A Prison Experiment
2013/05
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
Bonn
2013
Abstract
For a rational choice theorist, the absence of crime is more difficult to explain than its presence. Arguably, the expected value of criminal sanctions, i.e. the product of severity times certainty, is often below the expected benefit. We rely on a standard theory from behavioral economics, inequity aversion, to offer an explanation. This theory could also explain how imperfect criminal sanctions deter crime. The critical component of the theory is aversion against outperforming others. To test this theory, we exploit that it posits inequity aversion to be a personality trait. We can therefore test it in a very simple standard game. Inequity averse individuals give a fraction of their endowment to another anonymous, unendowed participant. We have prisoners play this game, and compare results to findings from a meta-study of more than 100 dictator games with non-prisoners. Surprisingly, results do not differ, not even if we only compare with other dictator games among close-knit groups. To exclude social proximity as an explanation, we retest prisoners on a second dictator game where the recipient is a charity. Prisoners give more, not less.
2012
Jetzt ist Pandoras Büchse offen
ÄrzteZeitung
2012
The Legal Status of Religious Circumcision in Germany
Juriste International
4
161-163
2012
2010
At the Mercy of the Prisoner Next Door. Using an Experimental Measure of Selfishness as a Criminological Tool
2010/27
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
Bonn
2010
Abstract
Do criminals maximise money? Are criminals more or less selfish than the average subject? Can prisons apply measures that reduce the degree of selfishness of their inmates? Using a tried and tested tool from experimental economics, we cast new light on these old criminological questions. In a standard dictator game, prisoners give a substantial amount, which calls for more refined versions of utility in rational choice theories of crime. Prisoners do not give less than average subjects, not even than subjects from other closely knit communities. This speaks against the idea that people commit crimes because they are excessively selfish. Finally those who receive better marks at prison school give more, as do those who improve their marks over time. This suggests that this correctional intervention also reduces selfishness.
Der beschränkt rationale Verbrecher – Behavioral Economics in der Kriminologie (Dissertation)
Kriminalwissenschaftliche Schriften
28
LIT Verlag
Münster
2010
Verhaltensökonomie – eine Einführung mit strafrechtlichen Beispielen
Ökonomische Methoden im Recht – Eine Einführung für Juristen
165-199
Mohr Siebeck
Tübingen
2010