Search results for: Author=Engel, Christoph [405]

Pages

2016
Non-Compete Clauses, Employee Effort and Spin-off Entrepreneurship: A Laboratory Experiment
Research Policy
45
2113-2124
2016
Risk and punishment revisited. Errors in variables and in the lab
2016/11
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
Bonn
2016
Abstract
We provide an example for an errors in variables problem which might be often neglected but which is quite common in lab experimental practice: In one task, attitude towards risk is measured, in another task participants behave in a way that can possibly be explained by their risk attitude. How should we deal with inconsistent behaviour in the risk task? Ignoring these observations entails two biases: An errors in variables bias and a selection bias. We argue that inconsistent observations should be exploited to address the errors in variables problem, which can easily be done within a Bayesian framework.
Symmetric vs. Asymmetric Punishment Regimes for Collusive Bribery
American Law and Economics Review
18
506-556
2016
The Hog Cycle of Law Professors. An Econometric Time Series Analysis of the Entry-level Job Market in Legal Academia
PLOS One
11
7
2016
Abstract
The (German) market for law professors fulfils the conditions for a hog cycle: In the short run, supply cannot be extended or limited; future law professors must be hired soon after they first present themselves, or leave the market; demand is inelastic. Using a comprehensive German dataset, we show that the number of market entries today is negatively correlated with the number of market entries eight years ago. This suggests short-sighted behavior of young scholars at the time when they decide to prepare for the market. Using our statistical model, we make out-of-sample predictions for the German academic market in law until 2020.
The Solidarity Motive
2016/14
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
Bonn
2016
Abstract
For decades, experimental economics has been very interested in behavior that could be characterized as practicing solidarity (although the term is rarely used). Solidarity is a key concept in Catholic Social Teaching. This paper builds a bridge between these two endeavors that, thus far, had little contact with each other. Catholic Social Teaching is essentially normative. People are informed what they should do if they are good Christians. Experimental Economics is descriptive. Experimenters want to learn how much solidarity experimental participants exhibit when this is costly. But from a Catholic perspective it is interesting how strongly their norms are reflected in actual behavior. The many distinctions uncovered by behavioral economics may also help refine Catholic thinking. And behavioral economics is confronted with new questions, in particular regarding deontological motives.
Unpacking Negligence Liability: Experimentally Testing the Governance Effect
Journal of Empirical Legal Studies
13
1
116-152
2016
Abstract
Arguably, if a court holds a defendant liable for negligently inflicting harm on the plaintiff, this intervention combines three effects: (1) the court specifies the normative expectation, (2) the court expresses dissatisfaction with the plaintiff's behavior, for example, her level of activity, and (3) the court obliges the defendant to compensate the plaintiff. In the field, it would be close to impossible to disentangle the three effects, or to investigate how they interact with intrinsic reticence to inflict harm on a passive outsider. We therefore go to the lab. We do not find an effect of intrinsic morality. However, the intervention has a separate significant effect on each of the three channels.
When is the Risk of Cooperation Worth Taking? The Prisoner’s Dilemma as a Game of Multiple Motives
Applied Economics Letters
23
16
1157-1161
2016
You Are In Charge – Experimentally Testing the Motivating Power of Holding a Judicial Office
2016/15
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn
Bonn
2016
Abstract
Apparently judges’ decisions are not motivated by maximizing their own profit. The literature uses two strategies to explain this observation: judges care about the long-term monetary consequences for themselves, or individuals who are more strongly motivated by the common good self-select into the profession. We suggest that there is an additional explanation, the "office motive". In a lab experiment, we rule out both traditional explanations by design. Nonetheless authorities do a reliable job at overcoming a social dilemma. Calling the authorities "public official" or "judge" increases their sensitivity towards the degree by which individuals are selfish, and it reduces the effect of their social value orientation (making them more neutral). This suggests that the socially desirable effect is not driven by anger or sympathy with the victims, but follows from the desire to fulfill the expectations that come with the assigned task. We test three extensions: When given an opportunity to announce an explicit policy, judges become less sensitive to the objective degree of reproach, and more sensitive to their social value orientation. If judges are elected or experienced, they react more intensely to norm violations. Experienced judges are more affected by their social value orientation.
2015
§ 6 Aufgaben
Leitgedanken des Rechts zu Staat und Verfassung
57-69
C. F. Müller
Heidelberg
2015
Bargaining in the Absence of Property Rights: An Experiment
2015/19
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
Bonn
2015
Abstract
The Coase theorem posits: If [1] property rights are perfect, [2] contracts are enforceable, [3] preferences are common knowledge, and [4] transaction costs are zero, then the initial allocation of property rights only matters for distribution, not for efficiency. In this paper we claim that condition [1] can be dropped and show experimentally that this is also empirically true. This also holds when we frame taking as “stealing”, and when the initial possessor has to work for the good.