Search results for: Author=Engel, Christoph [405]

Pages

2015
Das legitime Ziel in der Praxis des Bundesverfassungsgerichts. Eine quantitative Analyse der Entscheidungen des Jahres 2011
Verhältnismäßigkeit
97-128
Tübingen
2015
Does the Law Deliver?
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (32th International Seminar on the New Institutional Economics)
171
1
1-5
2015
Has The World Changed? My Neighbor Might Know Effects of Social Context on Routine Deviation
Journal of Behavioral Decision Making
28
1
50-66
2015
If the Worst Comes to the Worst. Dictator Giving When Recipient’s Endowments are Risky
2015/15
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
Bonn
2015
Abstract
Donors may often not be sure whether a recipient really deserves their help. Does this uncertainty deter generosity? In an experiment we find that, to the contrary, under most specifications of uncertainty, dictators give more, compared with the donation the same dictator makes to a recipient they know to have the expected value of the endowment with certainty. They are particularly concerned about the possibility that a recipient leaves the lab with no payoff from the game.
Insuring Your Donation – An Experiment
2015/16
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
Bonn
2015
Abstract
An increasing fraction of donations is channeled through donation intermediaries. These enti-ties serve multiple purposes, one of which seems to be providing donors with greater certainty: that the donation reaches its intended goal, and that the donor may be sure to get a tax ben-efit. We interpret this function as insurance and test the option to insure donations in the lab. Our participants indeed have a positive willingness to pay for insurance against either risk. Yet the insurance option is only critical for their willingness to donate to a charity if the un-certainty affects the proper use of their donation.
Modeling a Satisficing Judge
2015/14
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
Bonn
2015
Abstract
Judges and juries frequently must decide, knowing that they do not know everything that would be relevant for deciding the case. The law uses two related institutions for enabling courts to nonetheless decide the case: the standard of proof, and the burden of proof. In this paper, we contrast a standard rational choice approach with a satisficing approach. Standard theory would want judges to rationally deal with the limitations of the evidence. We posit that this is not only descriptively implausible, but also normatively undesirable. We propose a theoretical framework for a judge who only considers scenarios that "she does not dare to neglect", and aims at decisions that are "good enough", given the undissolvable limitations of the evidence. We extend this approach to parties who strategically exploit the limited factual basis, and to judges who have to allocate limited resources for fact finding to more than one case.
Keywords: D82, C72, D81, K41, D03
On Probation. An Experimental Analysis
Journal of empirical legal studies
12
2
252-288
2015

See also:
Privacy as a Public Good
Duke Law Journal
65
3
385-457
2015
Randomized Information about the Law as an Instrument
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics
171
171-175
2015
Scientific Disintegrity as a Public Bad
Perspectives on Psychological Science
10
361-379
2015