Search results for: Author=Engel, Christoph [406]

Pages

2015
Scientific Disintegrity as a Public Bad
Perspectives on Psychological Science
10
361-379
2015
Tacit Collusion – The Neglected Experimental Evidence
Journal of Empirical Legal Studies
12
3
537-577
2015
Tacit Collusion – The Neglected Experimental Evidence
2015/04
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
Bonn
2015
Abstract
Both in the US and in Europe, antitrust authorities prohibit merger not only if the merged entity, in and of itself, is no longer sufficiently controlled by competition. The authorities also intervene if, post merger, the market structure has changed such that "tacit collusion" or "coordinated effects" become disturbingly more likely. It seems that antitrust neglects the fact that, for more than 50 years, economists have been doing experiments on this very question. Almost any conceivable determinant of higher or lower collusion has been tested. This paper standardises the evidence by way of a meta-study, and relates experimental findings as closely as possible to antitrust doctrine.

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The Jurisdiction of the Man Within – Introspection, Identity, and Cooperation in a Public Good Experiment
2015/01
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
Bonn
2015
Abstract
According to Adam Smith (1790), human selfishness can be restrained by introspection. We test the effect of introspection on people’s willingness to cooperate in a public good game. Drawing on the concept of identity utility (George A. Akerlof and Rachel E. Kranton, 2000), we show theoretically that introspection may enhance cooperation by increasing the relative cost of deviating from one’s self-image. Experimentally, we induce introspection through the elicitation of (normative) expectations. Our results show that introspection causally increases cooperation. Both home-grown idealism and the experiences with the cooperativeness of the environment predict individual cooperativeness throughout the game.
The People’s Hired Guns? Experimentally Testing the Motivating Force of a Legal Frame
International Review of Law and Economics
43
67-82
2015
Who Is Afraid of Pirates? An Experiment on the Deterrence of Innovation by Imitation
Research Policy
44
1
20-33
2015
Abstract
In the policy debate, intellectual property is often justified by what seems to be a straightforward argument: if innovators are not protected against others appropriating their ideas, incentives for innovation are suboptimally low. Now, in most industries and for most potential users, appropriating a foreign innovation is itself an investment decision fraught with cost and risk. Nonetheless, standard theory predicts too little innovation. Arguably the problem is exacerbated by the sensitivity of innovators to fairness; imitators do get a free lunch, after all. We model the situation as a game and test it in the lab. We find more appropriation, but also more innovation than predicted by standard theory. In the lab, the prospect of giving imitators a free lunch does not have a chilling effect on innovation. This even holds if innovation automatically spills over to an outsider and if successful imitation reduces the innovator's profit. Beliefs and the analysis of experiences in the repeated game demonstrate that participants are sensitive to the fairness problem. But this concern is not strong enough to outweigh the robust propensity to invest even more in innovation than predicted by standard theory. The data suggest that this behavior results from the intention not to be outperformed by one's peers.
Who is Afraid of the Stick? Experimentally Testing the Deterrent Effect of Sanction Certainty
Review of Behavioral Economics
2
4
405-434
2015
Abstract
The empirical literature on deterrence tends to find stronger and more consistent evidence in support of the deterrent effect of the certainty than for the severity of punishment. Three distinct explanations have been advanced: (1) risk preferences of potential criminals, (2) the present orientation of potential criminals, and (3) stigma. We report an experiment that rules out the second and third explanations by design, and that provides a direct test of the first explanation. We find that risk averse participants are more deterred by severity, as predicted by theory. Yet risk seeking participants are not more deterred by certainty if the offense has a positive expected value, or if its expected value is zero. The theory is only supported if the sanction is so severe and frequent that committing the offense has a negative expected value.
2014
A Dynamic View on Justification: Comment
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE)
170
189-192
2014
Assuring Civil Damages Adequately Deter: A Public Good Experiment
Journal of Empirical Legal Studies
11
301-349
2014
Behavioral Law and Economics: Empirical Methods
The Oxford Handbook of Behavioral Economics and the Law
125-142
Oxford
2014