Search results for: Author=Engel, Christoph [405]

Pages

2014
dhreg, xtdhreg, bootdhreg: Programs to Implement Double Hurdle Regression
Stata Journal
14
778-797
2014
First Impressions are More Important than Early Intervention. Qualifying Broken Windows Theory in the Lab
International Review of Law and Economics
37
126-136
2014
Give Everybody a Voice! The Power of Voting in a Public Goods Experiment with Externalities
2014/16
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
Bonn
2014
Abstract
We study the effect of voting when insiders’ public goods provision may affect passive outsiders. Without voting insiders’ contributions do not differ, regardless of whether outsiders are positively or negatively affected or even unaffected. Voting on the recommended contribution level enhances contributions if outsiders are unaffected and internalizes the negative externality by lowering contributions when outsiders are negatively affected. Remarkably, voting does not increase contributions when it would be most desirable, i.e. with a positive externality. Here, participants vote for high contributions, yet compliance is poor. Unfavorable payoff comparisons to the outsiders that gain a windfall profit drive contributions down.
Social Preferences Can Make Imperfect Sanctions Work: Evidence from a Public Good Experiment
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
108
343-353
2014
What Does "Clean" Really Mean? The Implicit Framing of Decontextualized Experiments
Economics Letters
122
386-389
2014
What Makes Intervention Legitimate?
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE) (31st International Seminar on the New Institutional Economics)
170
Mohr Siebeck
2014
What Makes Intervention Legitimate? Editorial Preface
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE)
170
1-4
2014
2013
Aufgaben
Leitgedanken des Rechts. FS Paul Kirchhof
1
57-69
Müller
Heidelberg
2013
Behavioral Law and Economics: Empirical Methods
2013/01
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
Bonn
2013
Abstract

Originally, behavioral law and economics was an exercise in exploring the implications of key findings from behavioral economics (and psychology) for the analysis and reform of legal institutions. Yet as the new discipline matures, it increasingly replaces foreign evidence by fresh evidence, directly targeted to the legal research question. This chapter surveys the key methods: field evidence, survey data, vignette and lab experiment, discusses their pros and cons, illustrates them with key publications, and concludes with methodological paths for fu-ture development. It quantifies statements with descriptive statistics about the 77 behavioral papers that have been published in the Journal of Empirical Legal Studies since its foundation until the end of 2012.

Deterrence by Imperfect Sanctions – A Public Good Experiment
2013/09
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
Bonn
2013
Abstract
Sanctions are often so weak that a money maximizing individual would not be deterred. In this paper I show that they may nonetheless serve a forward looking purpose if sufficiently many individuals are averse against advantageous inequity. Using the Fehr/Schmidt model (QJE 1999) I define three alternative channels: (a) identical preferences are common knowledge, but inequity is not pronounced enough to sustain cooperation; (b) heterogeneous preferences are common knowledge; (c) there is preference uncertainty. In a linear public good with punishment meted out by a disinterested participant, I test two implications of the model: (a) participants increase contributions in reaction to imperfect punishment; (b) imperfect punishment helps sustain cooperation if participants experience free-riding