Search results for: Author=Hellwig [244]

Pages

2013
The Parade of the Bankers’ New Clothes Continues: 28 Flawed Claims Debunked
Rock Center for Corporate Governance at Stanford University Working Paper Series
2013
2012
A contribution from the Chair and Vice-Chairs of the Advisory Scientific Committee to the discussion on the European Commission’s banking union proposals. Second Report of the Advisory Scientific Committee of the European Systemic Risk Board
2012
Comments on: Enhanced prudential standards under section 165, and early remediation requirements under section 166 of the Dodd-Frank Act
2012
Debt Overhang and Capital Regulation
2012/05
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
Bonn
2012
Forbearance, resolution, and deposit insurance. First Report of the Advisory Scientific Committee of the European Systemic Risk Board
2012
The Problem of Bank Resolution Remains Unsolved: A Critique of the German Bank Restructuring Law
Too Big To Fail – Brauchen wir ein Sonderinsolvenzrecht für Banken?
35-63
De Gruyter Verlag
Berlin/Boston
2012
2011
Beliefs, Payoffs, Information: On the Robustness of the BDP Property in Models with Endogenous Beliefs
2011/28
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
Bonn
2011
Abstract
Neeman (2004) and Heifetz and Neeman (2006) have shown that, in auctions with incomplete information about payoffs, full surplus extraction is only possible if agents’ beliefs about other agents are fully informative about their own payoff parameters. They argue that the set of incomplete-information models satisfying this so-called BDP property ("beliefs determine preferences") is negligible, in a geometric and a measure-theoretic sense. In contrast, we show that, in models with finite-dimensional type spaces, this property is topologically generic if the set of objects about which beliefs are formed is sufficiently rich and beliefs are derived by conditioning on the available information; for any agent, this information includes his own payoff parameters.
From Posteriors to Priors via Cycles: An Addendum
2011/07
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
Bonn
2011
Abstract
Rodrigues-Neto (2009) has shown that a given specification of posteriors of different players in an incomplete-information setting is compatible with a common prior if and only if the posteriors satisfy the so-called cycle equations. This note shows that, if, for any player, any element of the partition of the this player has a nonempty intersection with any element of the partition of any other player, then it suffices to verify the cycle equations for all cycles of length 4 or less.
Incomplete-Information Models of Large Economies with Anonymity: Existence and Uniqueness of Common Priors
2011/08
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
Bonn
2011
Abstract
The paper provides a speci…cation of belief systems for models of large economies with anonymity in which aggregate states depend only on cross-section distributions of types. For belief systems satisfying certain conditions of mutual absolute continuity, the paper gives a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a common prior. Under the given conditions, the common prior is unique.
Mechanism Design and Voting for Public-Good Provision
2011/31
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
Bonn
2011
Abstract
We propose a new approach to the normative analysis of public-good provision. In addition to individual incentive compatibility, we impose conditions of robust implementability and coalition proofness. Under these additional conditions, participants' contributions can only depend on the level of public-good provision. For a public good that comes as a single indivisible unit, provision can only depend on the population share of people in favour of provision. Robust implementability and coalition proofness thus provide a foundation for the use of voting mechanisms. The analysis is also extended to a specifi cation with more than two public-good provision levels.