Search results for: Author=Engel, Christoph [405]

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2012
Conditional Cooperation With Negative Externalities – An Experiment
2012/02
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
Bonn
2012
Abstract
Empirically, the commons are not as tragic as standard theory predicts. The predominant explanation for this finding is conditional cooperation. Yet many real life situations involve insiders, who are directly affected by a dilemma, and outsiders, who may be harmed if the insiders overcome the dilemma. The quintessential illustration is oligopoly. If insiders overcome their dilemma and collude, this inflicts harm on the opposite market side. In our experiment, harm on outsiders significantly reduces conditional cooperation of insiders. We can exclude that this result is driven by inequity aversion, reciprocity or efficiency seeking. Only guilt aversion can rationalize our findings, with guilt being most pronounced if the active insiders not only inflict harm on the outsider, but increase their own payoff at the expense of the outsider.
Effort and Redistribution: Better Cousins Than One Might Have Thought
2012/10
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
Bonn
2012
Abstract
In this paper, we analyze the link between effort and preferences for redistribution. If individuals hold standard preferences, those with higher ability exert more effort. Higher effort leads to a higher income. Individuals with a higher income oppose redistribution. Yet, under non-standard preferences, the link between effort and redistribution is not clear-cut. If aversion to inequity is sufficiently strong, even individuals with high ability may support redistribution. In a lab experiment, we indeed find that participants with higher ability are willing to help the needy if earning income becomes more difficult for everybody. To check whether this finding is externally valid, we use data from the World Value Survey. We do not find a significant positive effect of preferences for effort on preferences for redistribution, but we also do not find the significant negative effect predicted by standard theory. Also, in the field, those who have to pay for redistribution are not more likely to be opposed than the recipients.
Estimation of the House Money Effect Using Hurdle Models
2012/13
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
Bonn
2012
Abstract
Evidence from an experiment investigating the “house money effect” in the context of a public goods game is reconsidered. Analysis is performed within the framework of the panel hurdle model, in which subjects are assumed to be one of two types: free-riders, and potential contributors. The effect of house money is seen to be significant in the first hurdle: specifically, house money makes a subject more likely to be a potential contributor. Hence we find that the effect of house money is more than just an effect on behaviour; it has the effect of changing a subject from one type to another. This result is potentially important in the external validity debate.
Fair Exclusion
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics
168
171-175
2012
Low Self-Control As a Source of Crime. A Meta-Study
2012/04
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
Bonn
2012
Abstract
Self-control theory is one of the best studied criminological paradigms. Since Gottfredson and Hirschi published their General Theory in 1990 the theory has been tested on more than a million subjects. This meta-study systematizes the evidence, reporting 717 results from 102 different publications that cover 966,364 original data points. The paper develops a methodology that makes it possible to standardize findings although the original papers have used widely varying statistical procedures, and have generated findings of very different precision. Overall, the theory is overwhelmingly supported, but the effect is relatively small, and is sensitive to adding a host of moderating variables.
Neglect the Base Rate: It’s the Law!
2012/23
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
Bonn
2012
Abstract
If accurate prediction is the goal, and if information about the unconditional probability of the predicted event is available, a strong case can be made for using this information, i.e. for a Bayesian approach to inference. Not so rarely, the law calls for accurate prediction, e.g. if a bailing decision hinges on an estimate of recidivism risk. Yet for other questions of law, and for the law of evidence in particular, accuracy is not the exclusive goal. Substantive law determines who should bear the risk that doubt cannot be removed. These rules decide whether several individuals, or several acts for that matter, shall be treated as members of a class. Applying Bayes’ rule also implicitly treats the person or the action in question as a member of a class. If in conflict, the normative decision of substantive law overrides Bayes’ rule, and forces judges and administrators to neglect the base rate.
Öffentliches Wirtschaftsrecht aus der Sicht der ökonomischen Theorie
Besonders Verwaltungsrecht I
I
40-62
2012
Symmetric vs. Asymmetric Punishment Regimes for Bribery
2012/01
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
Bonn
2012
Abstract
In major legal orders such as UK, the U.S., Germany, and France, bribers and recipients face equally severe criminal sanctions. In contrast, countries like China, Russia, and Japan treat the briber more mildly. Given these differences between symmetric and asymmetric punishment regimes for bribery, one may wonder which punishment strategy is more effective in curbing corruption. For this purpose, we designed and ran a lab experiment in Bonn (Germany) and Shanghai (China) with exactly the same design. The results show that, in both countries, with symmetric punishment recipients are less likely to grant the socially undesirable favor, while bribers are more likely to report to the authorities with asymmetric punishment. In addition, when punishment was asymmetric, corrupt offers were significantly more likely in Shanghai, but not in Bonn. Our results suggest a tradeoff between deterrence and law enforcement. In a forward-looking perspective, lawmakers must decide which aim carries more weight.
Testing Contracts
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE) (29th International Seminar on the New Institutional Economics)
168
Mohr Siebeck
2012
The Hog-Cycle of Law Professors
2012/08
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
Bonn
2012
Abstract
The market for law professors fulfils the conditions for a hog cycle: in the short run, supply cannot be extended or limited; future law professors must be hired soon after they first present themselves, or leave the market; demand is inelastic. Using a comprehensive German dataset, we show that the number of market entries today is significantly negatively correlated with the number of market entries 8 years ago. This is quite precisely the time young scholars on average take to prepare for the market. To get this estimate, we detrend the data, and we control for the size of student cohorts when these candidates enter university. This control variable mediates the effect of birth cohorts when candidates are born, which themselves exhibit negative autocorrelation, with a lag of some 20 years. Using our statistical model, we make out of sample predictions for the German academic market in law until 2020.

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