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Too Much Information Sharing? Welfare Effects of Sharing Acquired Cost Information in Oligopoly,
Journal of Industrial Economics, In Press.
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Beyond the Need to Boast: Cost Concealment and Exit in Cournot Oligopoly,
Research in Economics, vol. 66, issue 2009/32, no. 3, Bonn, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, pp. 239-245, 2012.
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On Competition and the Strategic Management of Intellectual Property in Oligopoly,
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, vol. 20, no. 4, pp. 1043-1071, 2011.
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On Competition and the Strategic Management of Intellectual Property in Oligopoly,
Discussion Paper Series, issue 339, Mannheim, University of Mannheim / Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15, 2010.
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Strategic Information Disclosure and Competition for an Imperfectly Protected Innovation,
Journal of Industrial Economics, vol. 58 , no. 2, pp. 349–372, 2010.
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Too Much Information Sharing? Welfare Effects of Sharing Acquired Cost Information in Oligopoly, issue 2010/40, Bonn, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, 2010.
Abstract Full text![]()
forthcoming in: Journal of Industrial Economics, In Press.
Beyond the Need to Boast: Cost Concealment Incentives and Exit in Cournot Duopoly, issue 2009/32, Bonn, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, 2009.
Abstract Full text![]()
published in: Research in Economics, vol. 66, issue 2009/32, no. 3, Bonn, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, pp. 239-245, 2012.
On Competition and the Strategic Management of Intellectual Property in Oligopoly, issue 2009/13, Bonn, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, 2009.
Abstract Full text![]()
published in: Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, vol. 20, no. 4, pp. 1043-1071, 2011.
Share to Scare: Technology Sharing in the Absence of Intellectual Property Rights, issue 2009/36, Bonn, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, 2009.
Abstract Full text![]()
Strategic Information Disclosure and Competition for an Imperfectly Protected Innovation, issue 2009/06, Bonn, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, 2009.
Abstract Full text![]()
published in: Journal of Industrial Economics, vol. 58 , no. 2, pp. 349–372, 2010.