MPI Econ Workshop

May 18, 2005 - 12:00
Elena Carletti
cfs Frankfurt
Bank Competition and the Design of Regulation
May 25, 2005 - 12:00
Christa Hainz
LMU München
Quality of Institutions, Credit Markets, and Bankruptcy
May 31, 2005 - 14:00
Felix Bierbrauer
MPI Bonn
Public Goods Provision in a Large Economy
June 1, 2005 - 12:00
Ehud Menirav
Tel-Aviv University
Direct Prime Ministerial Elections in a Parliamentary System
June 6, 2005 - 12:00
Hendrik Hakenes
Max Planck Institute
Money Market Derivatives and the Allocation of Liquidity Risk in the Banking Sector
June 14, 2005 - 13:00
Philippe Aghion
Harvard University
Volatility and Growth: Implications for Macropolicy
July 13, 2005 - 12:00
Nicola Fuchs-Schündeln
Harvard University
Good bye Lenin (or not?): The effect of Communism on people’s preferences
July 14, 2005 - 08:00
Peter Funk
Cologne University
Competition and Growth in a Vintage Knowledge Model
July 19, 2005 - 12:00
Felix Höffler
Max Planck Institute
Netting of transmission capacity in interconnector auctions
July 20, 2005 - 12:00
Christian Hellwig
Bubbles and Private Liquidity
August 17, 2005 - 11:00
Lutz Arnold
Universität Regensburg
On the Possibility of Credit Rationing in the Stiglitz-Weiss Model
August 17, 2005 - 14:00
Hendrik Hakenes and Isabel Schnabel
Why Do We Need Public Banks? A Theoretical Perspective.
October 19, 2005 - 12:00
Stephan Lauermann
Uni Bonn
The Efficiency of Decentralized Trading
October 26, 2005 - 12:00
Marco Sahm
LMU München
Public Good Provision in a Continuum Economy with Aggregate Uncertainty
November 9, 2005 - 13:00
Ingrid Ott
Uni Lüneburg
Excludable and Non-Excludable Public Inputs: Consequences for Economic Growth
November 30, 2005 - 13:00
Johannes Münster
WZB Berlin
Selection Tournaments, Sabotage and Participation
December 14, 2005 - 13:00
Andreas Nicklisch
MPI Bonn
Pricing in endogenously structured oligopolies
January 19, 2006 - 10:00
Jürgen Bitzer / Philipp Schröder
FU Berlin / Aarhus School of Business
On the Private Provision of Open Source Software
January 25, 2006 - 13:00
Lydia Mechtenberg
TU Berlin
The Curse of Ideology - Why only ideological disagreements can induce informed policy
January 30, 2006 - 15:00
Felix Höffler
MPI Bonn
Demand for storage of natural gas in North Western Europe - A simulation based forecast
February 1, 2006 - 13:00
Karl-Hermann Fischer / Hannah Hempell
Hochschule für Bankwirtschaft / Deutsche Bundesbank
Regional Markets, Oligopoly and Market Power in Banking
February 8, 2006 - 13:00
Reint Gropp
European Central Bank
Stale Information, Shocks and Volatility
February 15, 2006 - 13:00
Ulrike Neyer
Martin-Luther-Universität Halle-Wittenberg
The Flexibility of Monetary Policy in the Euro Area and the Remuneration of Required Reserves
February 21, 2006 - 13:00
Guido Friebel
University of Toulouse
Earnings Manipulation and Incentives in Firms
February 22, 2006 - 13:00
Karsten Neuhoff
University of Cambridge
Long Term vs. Short Term Contracts: A European Perspective on Natural Gas
March 22, 2006 - 13:00
Felix Höffler
MPI Bonn
Mobile Termination and Collusion, Revisited
May 17, 2006 - 12:00
Elena Carletti
cfs Frankfurt
Stakeholder Capitalism, Corporate Governance and Firm Value
June 7, 2006 - 12:00
Johannes Becker
Uni Köln
Corporate Taxation and Foreign Direct Investment – A Replication Study and New Evidence
June 14, 2006 - 12:00
Felix Bierbrauer
MPI Bonn
Collectively Incentive Compatible Tax Systems
June 21, 2006 - 12:00
Christina Bannier
Universität Frankfurt
Modelling the role of credit rating agencies – Do they spark off a virtuous circle?
June 28, 2006 - 12:00
Timothy Guinnane
Yale University
Business Organization in the Long Run: Private Limited Companies Rule!
June 29, 2006 - 12:00
Elisabeth Schulte
Mannheim University
Information Aggregation and Preference Heterogeneity
July 19, 2006 - 12:00
Stefan Bechtold and Felix Höffler
MPI Bonn
Economic Analysis of Trade Secret Laws
July 26, 2006 - 12:00
Thomas Mertens
Harvard University
The social cost of near-rational investment
September 13, 2006 - 12:00
Mark Hahmeier
Bielefeld University
Comments on the Implementation in Environments with Limited Outcome Enforcement Capabilities
September 20, 2006 - 14:30
Isabel Schnabel
MPI Bonn
Competition, Risk-Shifting, and Public Bail-out Policies
October 4, 2006 - 12:00
Hendrik Hakenes
MPI Bonn
The Politician and his Banker
October 25, 2006 - 12:00
Ralph Ossa
London School of Economics
A Gold Rush Theory of Economic Development
November 15, 2006 - 13:00
Marcel Fratzscher
Risk Sharing, Finance and Institutions in International Portfolios
November 22, 2006 - 13:00
Felix Höffler
MPI Bonn
Resale and Price Competition with Horizontally Differentiated Products
December 6, 2006 - 10:00
Stephan Lauermann
MPI Bonn
Dynamic Matching and Bargaining Games: A General Approach
December 6, 2006 - 13:00
Stefan Niemann
University of Bonn
Inflation, Investment Composition and Total Factor Productivity
January 10, 2007 - 13:00
Wolf Wagner
University of Tilburg
Performance Evaluation and Financial Markets Runs
January 24, 2007 - 13:00
Philipp Weinschenk
MPI Bonn
Who Researches? A Three Stage Model with Exogenous Success Probabilities
January 31, 2007 - 13:00
Ingrid Stein
Deutsche Bundesbank
Relationship Banking – Empricial Evidence for Germany
February 7, 2007 - 13:00
Michał Kowalik
Mannheim University and CEMFI
Implementation Cost of Bank Capital Regulation
February 14, 2007 - 12:00
Jürg Blum
Swiss National Bank
Why 'Basel II' may Need a Leverage Ratio Restriction
February 28, 2007 - 13:00
Alexander Stremitzer
Bonn University
Opportunistic Termination
March 21, 2007 - 13:00
Hendrik Hakenes and Isabel Schnabel
MPI Bonn
Bank Competition and Capital Regulation
April 18, 2007 - 12:00
Stefan Behringer
Frankfurt University
The Provision of a Public Good with a direct Provision Technology and a Large Number of Agents
April 23, 2007 - 14:00
Dezső Szalay
Warwick University
Taxes and Employment Subsidies in Optimal Redistribution Programs
May 2, 2007 - 12:00
Andreas Niklisch
MPI Bonn
Inequity, Reciprocity, and Efficiency-Preferences in the Ultimatum-Revenge Game
May 8, 2007 - 12:00
Jörg Stoye
Axiomatizing Minimax Regret
May 16, 2007 - 12:00
Christoph Moser
Mainz University
The Impact of Political Risk on Sovereign Bond Spreads – Evidence from Latin America
June 6, 2007 - 12:00
Guntram Wolff
Deutsche Bundesbank
Moral Hazard and Bail-out in Fiscal Federations: Evidence for the German Länder
June 13, 2007 - 12:00
Jos Jansen
MPI Bonn
Share to Scare: Technology Sharing Incentives in the Absence of Intellectual Property Rights
July 4, 2007 - 12:00
Ingrid Ott
Lüneburg University
Governmental Activity, Integration, and Agglomeration
July 11, 2007 - 12:00
Steven Ongena
Tilburg University
The Economic Impact of Merger Control: What Is Special About Banking?
July 14, 2007 - 08:00
Stefanie Brilon
Mannheim University
The Good, the Bad, and the Lazy: Labor Management in Non-Profit Organizations
July 18, 2007 - 12:00
Michael Evers
Bonn University
Optimum Policy Domains in an Interdependent World
July 25, 2007 - 12:00
Marc Schiffbauer
Bonn University
Distributional Effects of Capital and Labor on Economic Growth
August 1, 2007 - 12:00
Ernesto Crivelli
Bonn University
Horizontal and Vertical Tax Externalities in a Multicountry World
August 14, 2007 - 12:30
Christian Traxler
Measuring Deterrence: Micro Evidence on Detection and Self-Reporting
August 15, 2007 - 08:00
Christian Lorenz
European Economic Marketing Consultants
Marktscreening nach Kartellstrukturen mittels KMD-Kartellaudit
September 19, 2007 - 12:00
Monia Manaa
University of Münster
Schutz der Interessen von Aktionären und Gläubigern bei der Verschmelzung von Aktiengesellschaften - Eine analytische und rechtshistorische Betrachtung.
September 26, 2007 - 12:00
Felix Bierbrauer
MPI Bonn
Robust and Coalition-Proof Mechanisms for Public Good Provision and Income Taxation
November 7, 2007 - 14:00
Ralph Ossa
London School of Economics
A ‘New Trade’ Theory of GATT/WTO Negotiations
November 14, 2007 - 13:00
Tri Vi Dang
University of Mannheim
Information Sellers in Financial Markets
November 21, 2007 - 13:00
Felix Höffler
WHU Vallendar
Legal unbundling can be a golden mean between vertical integration and separation
November 28, 2007 - 13:00
Philipp Weinschenk
MPI Bonn
Turning a Blind Eye: Moral Hazard and Loss Aversion
December 5, 2007 - 13:00
Martin Salm
University of Mannheim
The effect of pensions on longevity: Evidence from union army veterans
December 12, 2007 - 13:00
Ulrich Woitek (with Timo Boppart, Josef Falkinger, Volker Grossmann, Ulrich Woitek, and Gabriela Wüthrich)
University of Zurich
Qualifying the Impact of Religion: The Role of Plural Cultural Identities for Educational Production
December 18, 2007 - 13:00
Marcus Opp
University of Chicago
Expropriation Risk and Technology
December 19, 2007 - 13:00
Dirk Drechsel
University of Zurich
Macroeconomic Effects of Swiss Banking Crises, 1930-2005
December 20, 2007 - 13:00
Hendrik Hakenes and Isabel Schnabel
MPI Bonn and Uni Mainz
Credit Risk Transfer in Banking Markets with Hard and Soft Information
January 16, 2008 - 14:30
Susanne Ohlendorf
Bonn University
Expectation Damages, Divisible Contracts, and Bilateral Investment
January 23, 2008 - 13:00
Carsten Burhop (with Jos Jansen and Thorsten Lübbers)
MPI Bonn
Licensing in high-tech markets during the industrial revolution: Evidence from Germany
January 30, 2008 - 13:00
Robert Möllenberg
Universität Hohenheim
Marktmacht und Preisdiskriminierung: Die ökonomischen Aktivitäten der beiden eigenständigen Netzwerkbetreiber WLAG und WÜSAG in der Elektrizitätsindustrie von Württemberg 1924-1933
February 13, 2008 - 13:00
Alexander Stremitzer
Uni Bonn
Standard Breach Remedies, Quality Thresholds, and, Cooperative Investments
February 20, 2008 - 13:00
Laure Durand-Viel
Paris School of Economics
Strategic storage and Market power in the Natural Gas market
February 20, 2008 - 13:00
Laure Durand-Viel
Paris School of Economics
Strategic storage and Market power in the Natural Gas market
March 12, 2008 - 13:00
Thorsten Lübbers
MPI Bonn
Risk and Return Effects of Collusive Arrangements: The Rhenish Westphalian Coal Syndicate, 1893-1913
March 18, 2008 - 13:00
Mark Hahmeier
MPI Bonn
Prices versus Quantities in Electricity Generation
March 19, 2008 - 13:00
Stefania Albanesi
Columbia University
Intertemporal Distortions in the Second Best
March 26, 2008 - 13:00
Jos Jansen
MPI Bonn
April 30, 2008 - 12:00
Thomas Gall
Uni Bonn
A Tale of Markets and Jungles in a Simple Model of Growth
October 1, 2008 - 12:00
Christian Traxler
MPI Bonn
Tax Evasion and Occupational Choice: A Political Economy Analysis
October 15, 2008 - 12:00
Sibylle Lehmann
MPI Bonn
Parties in the Weimar Republic: Voting Behaviour in the German Parliament 1920-1933
October 29, 2008 - 13:00
Carsten Burhop
MPI Bonn
On the relative conditions of the working classes in Britain and Germany, 1871-1913
November 5, 2008 - 13:00
Tom Truyts
Katholieke Universiteit Leuven
Costly Signaling and Indirect Taxation
November 12, 2008 - 13:00
Adriaan Soetevent
University of Amsterdam
The Effects of Payment Instruments on Charitable Giving: Evidence from a Field Experiment
November 19, 2008 - 13:00
Andreas Nicklisch
MPI Bonn
Auctions with price-value interdependency: Theory and experimental results
December 3, 2008 - 13:00
Guntram Wolff
European Commission, Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs
Current accounts, real exchange rates and the role of non-tradable goods' and services' prices: is there a euro area dimension?
December 10, 2008 - 13:00
Felix Bierbrauer
MPI Bonn
On the legitimacy of coercion for the financing of public goods
January 8, 2009 - 09:00
Valeska Grönert
Vanderbilt University, Nashville
Competition over Standards and Taxes
January 14, 2009 - 13:00
Nick Netzer
University of Zürich
Competitive Markets without Commitment
February 4, 2009 - 13:00
Mark Spoerer
DHI Paris
The Imposed Gift of 'Versailles': The Fiscal Effects of Restricting the Size of Germany's Armed Forces, 1924-1929
February 6, 2009 - 13:00
Felix Bierbrauer
MPI Bonn
The political economy of early elections
February 17, 2009 - 13:00
Sophie Bade
Pennsylvania State University
Political Advocacy with Collective Decision Making
February 25, 2009 - 13:00
Philipp Weinschenk
MPI Bonn
The Optimality of Simple Contracts – Moral Hazard and Loss Aversion
March 11, 2009 - 13:00
Susanne Prantl
WZB Berlin
How Does Entry Regulation Influence Entry Into Self-Employment and Occupational Mobility?
March 25, 2009 - 13:00
Johannes Binswanger
Tilburg University
Policy Reforms: Beliefs, Political Institutions, and the Societal Learning Process
April 8, 2009 - 12:00
Pierre Boyer
Toulouse School of Economics
Government Organization and Public Goods Provision
April 22, 2009 - 12:00
Davide Cantoni
Harvard University
Testing the Weber Hypothesis - The Economic Effects of the Protestant Reformation in the German Lands
May 6, 2009 - 12:00
Felix Bierbrauer
MPI Bonn
Optimal Income Taxation and Public Goods Provision with Aggregate Uncertainty
May 20, 2009 - 08:00
Nora Szech
Bonn University
A Simple Auction Model Where Allocating Costly Information Equally is Worst
May 26, 2009 - 13:00
John Boyd
University of Minnesota
Banking Crises and Crisis Dating: Theory and Evidence
May 27, 2009 - 12:00
Ferdinand von Siemens
Amsterdam University
Negative Externalities and Equilibrium Existence in Competitive Markets with Adverse Selection
June 16, 2009 - 13:00
Xiaojian Zhao
Mannheim University
Strategic Mis-Selling and Pre-Contractual Cognition
June 23, 2009 - 12:00
Sebastian Köhne
Mannheim University
Repeated Moral Hazard Under Habit Formation
July 8, 2009 - 12:00
Sophie Bade
MPI Bonn
Information in Problems of Housing Allocation
July 15, 2009 - 14:30
Daisuke Oyama
Hitotsubashi University and Paris School of Economics
On the Strategic Impact of an Event under Non-Common Priors
July 22, 2009 - 12:00
Jochen Streb
Hohenheim University
Negotiating Contract Types and Contract Clauses in the German Construction Industry during the "Third Reich"
September 16, 2009 - 12:00
Marco M. Sorge
Bonn University
The Role of Judiciary in Public Decision Making Process
October 1, 2009 - 12:00
Francesco Cinnirella
CES ifo Munich
The Trade-off between Fertility and Education: Evidence from before the Demographic Transition
October 7, 2009 - 12:00
Johannes Gierlinger
Toulouse School of Economics and Oxford University
Restoring Optimal Risk Bearing Under Knightian Uncertainty
October 21, 2009 - 12:00
Frédéric Koessler
Paris School of Economics
Advertising Heterogeneous Products to Heterogeneous Consumers
October 28, 2009 - 13:00
Lars Börner
Free University of Berlin
The Economics of Debt-Clearing Mechanisms in Europe from the 13th to the 18th Century
November 11, 2009 - 13:00
Emanuel Hansen
University of Bonn
Political Competition with Citizen Activists and Endogenously Formed Parties
November 25, 2009 - 13:00
Kaj Thomsson
Yale University
Legislative Vetoes and Efficiency-Enhancing Reform: Evidence from the History of US Labor Regulation
December 8, 2009 - 13:00
Felix Bierbrauer
MPI Bonn
The Theory of Incentive Mechanisms and the Samuelson Critique of a Contractarian Approach to Public-Good Provision
December 15, 2009 - 13:00
Olivier Tercieux
Paris School of Economics
Subgame-Perfect Implementation Under Value Perturbations and the Hold-Up Problem
December 21, 2009 - 13:00
Pierre Boyer
Toulouse School of Economics
Two-Tier Governments, Redistributive Policies and Public Good Provision
January 13, 2010 - 13:00
Matthias Lang
MPI Bonn and University of Bonn
The Fog of Fraud - Mitigating Fraud by Strategic Ambiguity
January 27, 2010 - 13:00
Carsten Burhop
MPI Bonn and University of Cologne
Transaction costs at the Berlin Stock Exchange, 1892-1913
February 3, 2010 - 13:00
Philipp Weinschenk
MPI Bonn
On Economics of Procrastination
February 10, 2010 - 13:00
Jens Prüfer
Tilburg Universtiy
A Theory of Contract Enforcement Institutions: Courts and Social Networks
February 17, 2010 - 13:00
Hendrik Hakenes
University of Hannover
The Birth and Burst of Asset Prices Bubbles
February 24, 2010 - 13:00
Rudolf Müller
University of Maastricht
Path-Monotonicity and Truthful Implementation
March 10, 2010 - 13:00
Jos Jansen
MPI Bonn
On Competition and the Strategic Management of Intellectual Property in Oligopoly
March 17, 2010 - 13:00
Jo Seldeslachts
Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB)
Research Networks as a Collusive Tool: An Empirical Assessment
March 31, 2010 - 12:00
Felix Bierbrauer
MPI Bonn
Optimal Income Taxation and Public-Goods Provision with Preference and Productivity Shocks
April 13, 2010 - 12:00
Mikhail Drugov
University Carlos III of Madrid
Bias, Noise and Litigation
April 28, 2010 - 12:00
Christian Traxler
MPI Bonn
Beer, [Booze] and Brawls: Preliminary Evidence on the Causal Effect of Alcohol on Crime for Prussia, 1882-1913
May 5, 2010 - 12:00
Emanuele Tarantino
EUI Florence and Tilburg University
Vertical Integration and Market Foreclosure with Complementary Inputs
May 19, 2010 - 12:00
Dezsö Szalay
University of Bonn
Regulating a Multi-Product and Multi-Type Monopolist
June 17, 2010 - 12:00
Julien Daubanes
ETH Zürich
Optimum Commodity Taxation with a Non-Renewable Resource
June 23, 2010 - 12:00
John Weymark
Vanderbilt University
How Optimal Nonlinear Income Taxes Change When the Distribution of the Population Changes
June 30, 2010 - 12:00
Johannes Becker
ETH Zürich
Debt-Sensitive Majority Rules
July 7, 2010 - 12:00
Stefanie Brilon
MPI Bonn
The Economics of Maritime Piracy
July 14, 2010 - 12:00
Felix Höffler
WHU - Otto Beisheim School of Management
Asymmetric Bidders in Discriminatory Multi-unit Auctions. Evidence From Reserve Electricity Auctions
August 4, 2010 - 12:00
Elena Panova
Wisdom of the Crowd
September 14, 2010 - 12:00
Alexey Kushnir
University of Zürich
Prefence Signaling in Matching Markets
October 8, 2010 - 12:00
Thomas Gaube
University of Osnabrück
Taxation of Annual Income as a Commitment Device
October 20, 2010 - 12:00
Thomas Braendle
University of Basel
Political Selection of Public Servants and Parliamentary Oversight
October 27, 2010 - 12:00
Ludovic Renou
University of Leicester
Mechanism Design and Communication Networks
November 2, 2010 - 13:00
Olivier Bos
University Paris II Panthéon-Assas
Charitable Asymmetric Bidders
November 10, 2010 - 13:00
Matthias Lang
MPI Bonn
Communication as a Way to Contract on Unverifiable Information
November 16, 2010 - 13:00
Ziv Hellman
Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Almost Common Priors
November 24, 2010 - 13:00
Philipp Weinschenk
MPI Bonn
On the (Non-)Use of Money
December 1, 2010 - 13:00
Gregor Schwerhoff
University of Bonn
The Global Dimension of the Global Disinflation
December 16, 2010 - 13:00
Niklas Potrafke
University of Konstanz
Political Ideology and Economic Freedom in the US States
January 20, 2011 - 13:00
Susanne Prantl
University of Cologne
Patent Protection and the Effect of Product Market Reforms on R&D
January 26, 2011 - 13:00
Ksenia Panidi
ECARES, Université Libre de Bruxelles
Ostrich Effect in Health Care Decisions
February 23, 2011 - 13:00
Olga Gorelkina
MPI Bonn
A Collusion-Proof Second Price Auction
March 9, 2011 - 13:00
Sophie Bade
MPI Bonn
Eliciting Ambiguity-Averse Preferences
March 30, 2011 - 12:00
Wolfgang Kuhle
MPI Bonn
Dynamic Efficiency and 2-Parts Golden Rule with Heterogeneous Agents
April 6, 2011 - 12:00
Stefan Behringer
University of Bonn
Price Wars in Two-Sided Markets: The case of the UK Quality Newspapers
April 12, 2011 - 12:00
Rafael Aigner
MPI Bonn and University of Bonn
Investing Your Vote -- The Emergence of Small Parties
May 12, 2011 - 12:00
Christian Traxler
MPI Bonn
Reminders and Dental Check-Ups
May 18, 2011 - 12:00
Oliver Himmler
MPI Bonn
Self-Esteem and Human Capital Formation
June 16, 2011 - 12:00
Marco Maria Sorge
University of Bonn
Strategic Appointments and Legislative Delegation under Bureaucratic Lobbying
June 28, 2011 - 12:00
Christina Gathmann
University of Mannheim
Germany's New Family Policy, Childcare and Labour Supply
July 7, 2011 - 12:00
Philipp Weinschenk
MPI Bonn
The Provision of Perks, Moral Hazard and Limited Liability
October 25, 2011 - 12:00
Sergei Izmalkov
New Economic School, Moscow
Informed Seller in a Hotelling Market
November 2, 2011 - 13:00
Philipp Weinschenk
MPI Bonn
Discrimination, Moral Hazard and Welfare
November 16, 2011 - 13:00
Heiko Karle
Université Libre de Bruxelles
Advertising Content when Consumers are Loss Averse
November 22, 2011 - 13:00
Marek Weretka
University of Wisconsin-Madison
Competition in Financial Innovation
November 30, 2011 - 13:00
Ailsa Röell
Columbia University
Managerial Incentives and Stock price Manipulation
December 14, 2011 - 13:00
Felix Bierbrauer
University of Cologne
On the Incidence of a Financial Transactions Tax in a Model with Fire Sales
December 21, 2011 - 13:00
Lev Ratnovski
Bailouts, Contagion, and Bank Risk-Taking
January 11, 2012 - 13:00
Andrea Attar
University of Roma Tor Vergata
Multiple Lenders, Strategic Default and the Role of Debt Covenants
January 18, 2012 - 13:00
Markus Peter Fels
University of Bonn
Product Design and Limited Attention
February 8, 2012 - 09:00
Matthias Lang
MPI Bonn
The Distinction between Smooth and Non-Smooth Ambiguity Aversion
February 23, 2012 - 13:00
Özgür Yilmaz
Koç University
A Characterization of the Extended Serial Correspondence
March 13, 2012 - 13:00
Nicolas Serrano-Velarde
Saïd Business School, Oxford
The Causal E ffect of Bankruptcy Law on the Cost of Finance
March 20, 2012 - 13:00
Raphaël Lévy
University of Mannheim
Humouring Both Parties: A Model of Two-Sided Reputation
March 29, 2012 - 07:30
Ester Faia
University of Frankfurt
Endogenous Banks' Networks, Cascades and Systemic Risk
April 4, 2012 - 12:00
Theodoros Diasakos
Collegio Carlo Alberto
Efficient Nash Equilibrium under Adverse Selection
April 10, 2012 - 12:00
Philipp Weinschenk
MPI Bonn
Working Conditions and Regulation
April 24, 2012 - 12:00
Ron Lavi
Technion, Israel Institute of Technology, Tel-Aviv
Side-Communication Yields Efficiency of Ascending Auctions: The Two-Items Case
May 9, 2012 - 12:00
Roland Strausz
Humboldt University Berlin
Who Should Pay For Certification?
May 15, 2012 - 13:00
Bartosz Maćkowiak
European Central Bank
Inattention to Rare Events
May 23, 2012 - 12:00
Filip Matejka
CERGE, Charles University, Prague
Rational Inattention (general lecture)
May 24, 2012 - 07:30
Filip Matejka
CERGE, Charles University, Prague
Rational Inattention to Discrete Choices: A New Foundation for the Multinomial Logit Model
May 30, 2012 - 12:00
Antonio Miralles
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona
All About Priorities: No School Choice Under the Presence of Bad Schools
June 6, 2012 - 12:00
Ziv Hellman
Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Deludedly Agreeing to Agree
June 27, 2012 - 12:00
Tobias König
Leibniz University of Hannover
Public Provision of Private Goods with Status Concerns
July 4, 2012 - 12:00
Fabian Herweg
Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich
A Theory of Ex post Inefficient Renegotiation
July 10, 2012 - 12:00
Malin Arve
University of Mannheim
Procurement Under Uncertainty
July 12, 2012 - 12:00
André Veiga
Toulouse School of Economics
Multidimensional Platform Design
September 19, 2012 - 12:00
Matthias Efing
Swiss Finance Institute and University of Geneva
Bank Capital Regulation with an Opportunistic Rating Agency
September 25, 2012 - 12:00
Mark Le Quement
University of Bonn
Contrarian Corroboration
October 1, 2012 - 09:00
Matthias Thiemann
In the Shadow of Basel - How Competitive Politics Bred the Crisis
October 18, 2012 - 12:00
Ulrich Berger
Vienna University of Economics and Business
Learning to Trust, Learning to Be Trustworthy
October 23, 2012 - 12:00
Jana Friedrichsen
University of Mannheim
Image Concerns and the Provision of Quality
November 14, 2012 - 13:00
Wolfgang Gick
Harvard University and Tufts University
Persuasion by Stress-Testing: Optimal Disclosure of Supervisory Information in the Banking Sector
November 20, 2012 - 13:00
Paul Schempp
University of Bonn
Bank Bailouts and the Reluctance to Recapitalize
December 5, 2012 - 13:00
Ctirad Slavik
Goethe University of Frankfurt
Machines, Buildings, and Optimal Dynamic Taxes
December 11, 2012 - 13:00
Florian Hett
University of Mainz
Do Bank Bailouts hurt market discipline? Evidence from the recent Financial Crisis
January 9, 2013 - 13:00
Markus Reisinger
Either or Both Competition: A "Two-Sided" Theory of Advertising with Overlapping Viewerships
January 22, 2013 - 13:00
Florian Scheuer
Stanford University
Optimal Taxation with Rent Seeking
January 31, 2013 - 13:00
Charles Angelucci
Harvard University
Managing Persuasion
February 19, 2013 - 13:00
Wolfgang Kuhle
MPI Bonn
March 6, 2013 - 10:00
Nicholas Lawson
Princeton University
Fiscal Externalities and Optimal Unemployment Insurance
March 6, 2013 - 13:00
Anna Kochanova
CERGE Prague
The Impact of Bribery on Firm Performance: Evidence from Central and Eastern European Countries
March 15, 2013 - 09:00
Nicolas Roux
Paris School of Economics
Polarization in a Model of Information Aggregation
March 15, 2013 - 13:00
Nadide Banu Olcay
Rutgers University and Isik University
Dynamic Incentive Contracts with Termination Threats
March 18, 2013 - 09:00
Rei Sayag
Erasmus University Rotterdam
Paying is Believing: The Effect of Costly Information on Bayesian Updating
March 20, 2013 - 09:00
Simone Meraglia
Toulouse School of Economics and New York University
Violence, Trade and Institutions
March 20, 2013 - 13:00
Stephan Luck
University of Bonn and the MPI
Sovereign Default, Bank Runs, and Contagion
April 3, 2013 - 12:00
Bo Yang
MPI Bonn
How Sovereign Rating Affects Liquidity Management of Commercial Banks under European Debt Crisis
April 17, 2013 - 12:00
Timo Ehrig
Max Planck Institute for Mathematics in the Sciences, Leipzig
Expectation Formation and Coordination in a World of Incomplete Knowledge
April 24, 2013 - 12:00
Dominik Grafenhofer
MPI Bonn
Giving Advice with Endogenous Information Acquisition
May 2, 2013 - 13:00
Joel J. Van der Weele
Goethe University of Frankfurt
Self-Image and Strategic Ignorance in Moral Dilemmas
May 16, 2013 - 12:00
Andreas Kleiner
University of Bonn
Why Voting? A Welfare Analysis
May 22, 2013 - 12:00
Felix Bierbrauer
University of Cologne
Political Competition and Mirrleesian Income Taxation: A Second and Third Pass
May 29, 2013 - 12:00
Galina Zudenkova
University of Mannheim
A Rationale for Decentralized Political Parties
June 4, 2013 - 12:00
Wolfgang Kuhle
MPI Bonn
A Global Game with Heterogenous Priors
June 11, 2013 - 12:00
Anastasios Dosis
University of Warwick
Strategic Foundations for Efficient Competitive Markets with Adverse Selection
June 13, 2013 - 12:00
Ioanna Grypari
MPI Bonn
From Campaigns to Policy: Evidence from US Presidential Elections
July 2, 2013 - 12:00
Alia Gizatulina
MPI Bonn
On Genericity of Full Surplus Extraction in Models with a Continuum of Types
July 4, 2013 - 12:00
Sophie Bade
Royal Holloway University of London
Random Serial Dictatorship - the One and Only
July 24, 2013 - 12:00
Christian Bruns
Universität Göttingen
Incumbent Performance, Elections and the Market for Information
August 21, 2013 - 12:00
Klaus-Peter Hellwig
New York University
Intermediaries in a Decentralized Market with Information Frictions: Facilitators or Bottlenecks?
September 5, 2013 - 12:00
Georgy Egorov
Northwestern University
Political Economy in a Changing World
September 17, 2013 - 12:00
Francesc Dilme
University of Bonn
Building (and Milking) Trust: Reputation as a Moral Hazard Phenomenon
October 16, 2013 - 12:00
Daniel Marszalec
Comparing Allocation Rules for Complements - an Experimental Investigation
October 22, 2013 - 12:00
Alia Gizatulina
MPI Bonn
Betting on Others' Bets: Generalized Crémer-McLean Mechanism
October 30, 2013 - 13:00
Andrew Clausen
University of Edinburgh
A General and Intuitive Envelope Theorem
November 7, 2013 - 13:00
Konrad B. Burchardi
Institute for International Economic Studies, Stockholm
Testing the Marshallian Hypothesis: Experimental Evidence from Share-Cropping Contracts
November 13, 2013 - 13:00
Vincent Anesi
University of Nottingham
Bargaining in Standing Committees
November 26, 2013 - 13:00
Francisco J. Pino
ECARES, Université Libre de Bruxelles
Guns and Votes
December 10, 2013 - 13:00
Linda Schilling
MPI Bonn
Give and Take in the German Health Insurance System
December 19, 2013 - 13:00
Tymofiy Mylovanov
University of Pittsburgh
Formation of Mass Opinion (joint with Andriy Zapechelnyuk)
January 28, 2014 - 13:00
Isis Durrmeyer
Universität Mannheim
Automobile Prices in Market Equilibrium with Unobserved Price Discrimination
February 5, 2014 - 13:00
Sebastian Pfeil
Goethe Universität Frankfurt
An "Image Theory" of RPM
February 13, 2014 - 09:30
Christian Eufinger
Goethe Universität Frankfurt
Interbank Network and Bank Bailouts: Insurance Mechanism for non-insured Creditors?
February 19, 2014 - 13:00
Alexander Kohlhas
University of Cambridge
CANCELLED (Learning-by-Sharing: Monetary Policy and the Information Content of Aggregate Variables)
March 5, 2014 - 13:00
Rafael Aigner
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
Taxing Wall Street: The Case of Boring Banking
March 21, 2014 - 13:00
Paul Schempp
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
Rollover Risk and the Private and Public Supply of Liquidity
March 25, 2014 - 13:00
Lucie Ménager, Université Paris II et Univesité de Lille
Strategic observation in exponential bandit models
April 2, 2014 - 12:00
Albin Erlanson
Universität Bonn
Strategy-proof package assignment
April 9, 2014 - 12:00
Rainer Haselmann, Universität Bonn
The limits of model based regulation
April 15, 2014 - 12:00
Philipp Weinschenk, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
Sharecropping and performance: A reexamination of the Marshallian hypothesis
April 30, 2014 - 12:00
Dominik Sachs
University of Cologne
Designing efficient education and tax policies
May 9, 2014 - 12:00
Stephan Luck
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
Banks, Shadow Banking, and Fragility
May 14, 2014 - 09:00
Hitoshi Tsujiyama
Goethe Universität Frankfurt
Optimal Income Taxation: Mirrlees meets Ramsey
May 21, 2014 - 12:00
Pierre Fleckinger
Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne
Incentives for Quality in Friendly and Hostile Informational Environments
May 30, 2014 - 12:00
Jan Werner
University of Minnesota
Speculative trade under ambiguity
June 17, 2014 - 08:00
Ioanna Grypari
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
Political Campaigning and Policy Implementation: Evidence from US Presidential Elections
June 27, 2014 - 12:00
Tilman Börgers
University of Michigan
Mechanism Design and Voting Rules
September 3, 2014 - 12:00
Anna Kochanova
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
Does money buy credit? Firm-level evidence on bribery and bank debt
September 9, 2014 - 12:00
Ansgar Walther
University of Oxford
Interbank monitoring, liquidity and systemic risk (with Alan D. Morrison)
September 17, 2014 - 12:00
Jan-Peter Siedlarek, Mannheim University
The Impact of Merger Legislation on Bank Mergers
October 1, 2014 - 12:00
Dominik Grafenhofer
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
Observing Each Other's Observations in the Electronic Mail Game (with Wolfgang Kuhle)
October 8, 2014 - 12:00
Marina Dodlova
GIGA Hamburg
Exogenous Shocks and Political Polarization: Theory and Evidence
October 21, 2014 - 12:00
Benjamin Bachi
Tel Aviv University
Buridanic Competition (with Ran Spiegler)
October 29, 2014 - 13:00
Florian Schuett
Tilburg University
Net neutrality and inflation of traffic (with Martin Peitz)
November 19, 2014 - 13:00
Ayca Ozdogan
TOBB University of Economics and Technology, Ankara
Occurence of deception under the oversight of a regulator having reputation concerns
November 26, 2014 - 13:00
Thomas Hettig
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
Fiscal policy coordination in currency unions (at the zero lower bound)
December 2, 2014 - 08:00
Jon de Quidt
IIES Stockholm
Your Loss Is My Gain: A Recruitment Experiment With Framed Incentives
December 11, 2014 - 13:00
Linda Schilling
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
Capital Structure, Bank Runs and Coordination
January 14, 2015 - 12:00
Heiko Karle
ETH Zürich
The Structure of Negotiations: Incomplete Agreements and the Focusing Effect (with Andrea Canidio)
January 22, 2015 - 13:00
George Lukyanov
Toulouse School of Economics
Public Communication with Coordination Frictions
January 28, 2015 - 13:00
Ronny Freier
Freie Universität Berlin and DIW Berlin
Regression Discontinuity Designs Based on Population Thresholds: Cautionary Tales from France, Germany, and Italy (with Andrew Eggers, Tommaso Nannicini, and Veronica Grembi)
February 4, 2015 - 13:00
Philipp König
DIW Berlin
Too Much of a Good Thing? A Theory of Bank Debt Maturity Structure
February 17, 2015 - 13:00
Mathieu Parenti
Université Catholique de Louvain
Large and small firms in a global economy: David vs. Goliath
February 25, 2015 - 13:00
Wolfgang Kuhle
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
The Dynamics of Utility in the Neoclassical Overlapping Generations Model II
March 18, 2015 - 13:00
Olga Gorelkina
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
Congressional Gridlock: The Effects of the Master Lever
March 24, 2015 - 13:00
Stephan Luck
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
Predatory Arbitrage Capital and Endogenous Illiquidity Risk
April 9, 2015 - 12:00
Nikita Roketskiy
University College London
Competition and Networks of Collaboration
April 15, 2015 - 12:00
Stefan Behringer
Universität Duisburg-Essen
Public good provision with many agents: the k-success technology (with Yukio Koriyama)
April 24, 2015 - 12:00
Anna Kochanova
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
Conyism and Competition in Indonesian Manufacturing: Pre and Post Suharto (with Bob Rijkers and Mary Hallward-Driemeier)
May 8, 2015 - 12:00
Nicolas Roux
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
Biased Supervision
May 13, 2015 - 12:00
Olivier Darmouni
Princeton University
Asymmetric Information and the Reallocation of Bank Credit
May 27, 2015 - 12:00
Emanuele Tarantino
Universität Mannheim
Lending Standards over the Cycle
June 2, 2015 - 12:00
Olivier Tercieux
Paris School of Economics
The Design of Teacher Assignment: Theory and Evidence
June 9, 2015 - 12:00
Jean-Edouard Colliard
HEC Paris
Strategic Selection of Risk Models and Bank Capital Regulation
June 16, 2015 - 12:00
Paul Schempp
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
Regulatory Arbitrage and Liquidity Crises (with Stephan Luck)
This paper studies a banking model of maturity transformation in which regulatory arbitrage induces the coexistence of unregulated shadow banking and regulated commercial banking. Regulatory arbitrage may set the stage for runs in the shadow banking sector. We emphasize a novel channel through which these runs are contagious, affecting the regulated banking sector: Because a run on shadow banks induces fire-sales, the wholesale funding conditions for regulated banks may also deteriorate. We use our model to argue that regulatory arbitrage poses a threat to the stability of regulated banks, even in the absence of explicit or implicit contractual linkages between regulated and non-regulated banking. We discuss regulatory implications, particularly restrictions on wholesale funding, and indicate limitations of the Basel III liquidity regulation.
June 24, 2015 - 12:00
Rohit Lamba
University of Cambridge
Efficiency with(out) Intermediation in Repeated Bilateral Trade
This paper analyzes repeated version of the bargaining model with two sided asymmetric information where the independent payoff relevant private information of the buyer and the seller is correlated across time. Using this setup it makes the following three contributions. First, it derives necessary and sufficient conditions on the primitives of the model as to when efficiency can be attained under ex post budget balance and participation constraints. Second, in doing so, it introduces an intermediate notion of budget balance called interim budget balance that allows for the extension of credit lines but with participation constraints for the issuing authority. Third, it provides a foundation for the role of an intermediary in a dynamic mechanism design model under credit and informational constraints.
June 30, 2015 - 12:00
Narly Dwarkasing
Universität Bonn
The Economic Impact of a Banking Oligopoly: Britain at the turn of the 20th century (with Fabio Braggion and Lyndon Moore)
We investigate the impact of increasing bank concentration on the real economy in the lightly regulated British environment between 1885 and 1925. We find that borrowers in counties with higher concentration received smaller loans, posted more collateral, and obtained shorter duration loans. In high concentration counties, the quality of loan applicants had improved, which suggests that banks restricted credit, rather than that the quality of loan applicants had worsened. Bank concentration negatively impacted local economies. Counties with a more concentrated banking system had lower tax revenues and lower employment to population ratios.
July 7, 2015 - 12:00
Jos Jansen
Aarhus University
Access Price Regulation and Cross-Subsidization Incentives
I analyze the optimal regulation of access to a network when the vertically integrated incumbent is privately informed about both his cost of access and his cost of a complementary input. If final goods are sufficiently differentiated, the regulator needs to bias prices such that the incumbent has no incentive to cross-subsidize between network services and complementary inputs. In some instances, the second-best prices are such that the regulator discriminates against the entrants. Moreover, I discuss some implications of cross-subsidization incentives for the optimal industry structure.
July 15, 2015 - 12:00
Jan Zapal
Efficiency of Flexible Budgetary Institutions (with Renee Bowen, Ying Chen and Hulya Eraslan)
Which budgetary institutions result in efficient provision of public goods? We analyze a model with two parties bargaining over the allocation to a public good each period. Parties place different values on the public good, and these values may change over time. We focus on budgetary institutions that determine the rules governing feasible allocations to mandatory and discretionary spending programs. Mandatory spending is enacted by law and remains in effect until changed, and thus induces an endogenous status quo, whereas discretionary spending is a periodic appropriation that is not allocated if no new agreement is reached. We show that discretionary only and mandatory only institutions typically lead to dynamic inefficiency and that mandatory only institutions can even lead to static inefficiency. By introducing appropriate flexibility in mandatory programs, we obtain static and dynamic efficiency. An endogenous choice of mandatory and discretionary programs, sunset provisions and state-contingent mandatory programs can provide this flexibility in increasingly complex environments.
September 2, 2015 - 12:00
Stephan Luck
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
Bank Runs with Inside Money (with Paul Schempp)
Canonical bank run models assume that consumers withdraw real goods from the banking system and thus destroy inside money. We provide a banking model in which short-term debt holders can also transfer their claims to other banks when fearing insolvency of their own bank. We show that if there is at least one stable bank in the system, and if there are no interbank frictions, panic-based runs do not occur. Only fundamentally insolvent banks experience an “electronic bank run” in which customers transfer their funds to a solvent bank. If we introduce frictions in interbank trade, panic-based runs on single banks may occur, but no system-wide runs. If there is no fundamentally stable bank, a system-wide run with a complete destruction of inside money becomes possible. We argue that the understanding of these mechanisms is particularly important when considering the effects of liquidity regulation and central bank interventions.
September 15, 2015 - 12:00
Andreas Irmen
Université du Luxembourg
Endogenous Capital- and Labor-Augmenting Technical Change in the Neoclassical Growth Model (with Amer Tabakovic)
The determinants of the direction of technical change and their implications for economic growth and economic policy are studied in the one-sector neoclassical growth model of Ramsey, Cass, and Koopmans extended to allow for endogenous capital- and labor-augmenting technical change. We develop a novel micro-foundation for the competitive production sector that rests on the idea that the fabrication of output requires tasks to be performed by capital and labor. Firms may engage in innovation investments that increase the productivity of capital and labor in the performance of their respective tasks. These investments are associated with new technological knowledge that accumulates over time and sustains long-run growth. We show that the equilibrium allocation is not Pareto-efficient since both forms of technical change give rise to an inter-temporal knowledge externality. An appropriate policy of investment subsidies may implement the efficient allocation.
September 23, 2015 - 12:00
Özlem Bedre-Defolie
European School of Management and Technology Berlin
Contracts as a barrier to entry when buyers are non-pivotal (with Gary Biglaiser)
We analyze whether the use of breakup fees by an incumbent might induce an inefficient allocation of consumers and possibly foreclose efficient entry where buyers are non-pivotal (infinitesimal) and have to pay switching costs if they switch from the incumbent to an entrant. When the entrants are competitive, in the unique equilibrium the incumbent induces the efficient outcome, so there is no inefficient foreclosure. When there is a single entrant, the incumbent cannot deter the entry if it is not allowed to use a breakup fee. In the equilibrium of this case there might be too much or too little entry depending on the entrant’s cost advantage versus the highest level of switching costs. When the incumbent can use a breakup fee in its long-term contract, in the unique equilibrium the incumbent forecloses the entrant by a sufficiently high breakup fee. This result does not depend on the level of switching costs or the entrant’s efficiency advantage. We extend the result to a situation where consumers do not face switching costs, but they get a lower match value from the entrant’s product than the incumbent’s. In this case the results differ only when there is a single entrant. There are no inter temporal effects without breakup fees and if the incumbent is allowed to use breakup fees, it forecloses the entrant if and only if the entrant’s cost advantage is sufficiently low compared to the highest switching cost. All results are robust to allowing the incumbent to offer a spot price.
September 30, 2015 - 12:00
Christoph Bertsch
Sveriges Riksbank
A wake-up call theory of contagion
Empirical evidence in several fields has identified wake-up calls as an important channel of contagion. We propose a theory of contagion based on the information choice of investors after a wake-up call. We study global coordination games of regime change with two regions where local fundamentals have an unobserved common component. A crisis in the first region is a wake-up call to investors in the second region. This wake-up call induces investors to re-assess the local fundamental and to acquire information about the common component. We show that (i) information acquisition occurs only after a wake-up call; and (ii) contagion occurs even if investors learn that the second region has no exposure to the first region. These results do not rely on common investors or balance sheet links across regions. Our theory of contagion applies to currency crises, runs on financial intermediaries, and sovereign debt crises. A policymaker with favorable news about the local fundamental can mitigate contagion by enhancing transparency.
October 6, 2015 - 12:00
Mark T. Le Quement
University of Bonn
Endogenous Ambiguity in Cheap Talk (joint with Christian Kellner)
This paper provides a rationale for ambiguous language, understood as language generated according to an incompletely known communication rule. We consider a cheap talk game in which a (possibly ambiguity averse) sender (S) able to randomize according to unknown probabilities faces an ambiguity averse receiver (R). We show that under fairly general circumstances, there exist equilibria featuring ambiguous (i.e. Ellsbergian) communication strategies that allow both S and R to obtain a higher ex ante payoff than any non-Ellsbergian equilibrium. Ambiguity, by triggering worse-case decision-making, allows to shift R’s response to information towards S’s favorite action. R also benefits because equilibria featuring ambiguous communication strategies involve a larger amount of information transmission.
October 20, 2015 - 12:00
Tobias Gamp
Universität Bonn
Search, Differentiated Products, and Obfuscation
Consumers buy products even if they find it too time-consuming to evaluate products carefully. I present a simple market model with sequential consumer search and differentiated products in which consumers may purchase products without evaluation. In a market with evaluation cost heterogeneity, and endogenous consumer participation, market prices and profits may fall with increasing product diversity. Resulting concerns that the market may fail to provide the welfare optimal variety of products are gratuitous if product diversity is endogenized. Firms find it nonetheless individually rational to offer niche products. I endogenize evaluation costs and interpret this as the firms’ opportunity to aggravate the acquisition of information by obfuscation. A firm’s equilibrium strategy about whether or not it should obfuscate product information is monotonic in product diversity: while obfuscation is individually rational for high product diversity, firms simplify information acquisition if product diversity is low.
October 27, 2015 - 13:00
Martin Salm
Tilburg Universtiy
Biases in individual perceptions of local crime risk
We present a new test for the presence of biases in beliefs about the likelihood of a bad event, using intertemporal variation in beliefs after a change in environment. We study how perceptions of local crime risk change with the time since moving into a new neighborhood. If the crime risk in the new neighborhood is stable, then in the absence of any systematic bias, on average perception of crime risk should not change with time since the move date. Based on four successive waves of a large crime survey, matched with administrative records on household relocations, we find that perceptions of crime risk are severely biased for many years after a move to a new neighborhood. The longer an individual lives in a neighborhood, the higher their perception of the crime rate in the neighborhood. This finding holds irrespective of whether the move is from a relatively low-crime to a relatively high-crime area or vice versa. We find that avoidance behavior adjusts in line with the observed changes in beliefs.
November 3, 2015 - 13:00
Alexis Antoniades
Georgetown University School of Foreign Service, Qatar
Mortgage Market Credit Conditions and U.S. Presidential Elections (with Charles Calomiris)
We find that voters reward or punish incumbent Presidential candidates for changes in the local supply of mortgage credit. Adverse shifts in the supply of mortgage credit within the voter’s county reduce support for the incumbent party’s Presidential candidate, while favorable shifts increase support. Our focus is the Presidential election of 2008, which followed an unprecedented swing from very generous mortgage underwriting standards to a severe contraction of mortgage credit. Voters responded by shifting their support away from the Republican Presidential candidate in 2008. That shift was particularly pronounced in states that typically vote Republican and in swing states. The magnitude of the effect is large. If the supply of mortgage credit had not contracted from 2004 to 2008, McCain would have received half the votes needed to reverse the outcome of the election. The contraction in mortgage credit supply was five times as important as the increase in the unemployment rate; if unemployment had not increased from 2004 to 2008, that improvement in local labor markets would only have given McCain only 9% of the votes needed to win the nine swing states that Bush had won in 2004, but McCain lost in the 2008 election. We extend our analysis to other Presidential elections from 1996 to 2012 and find interesting differences in results, which suggest that the extent to which incumbents are penalized for credit supply tightening depends on the context in which the tightening occurs, as well as perceptions of the candidates’ advocacy of mortgage credit expansion.
November 12, 2015 - 13:00
Krisztina Kis-Katos
Universität Freiburg
The impact of fiscal and political decentralization on local public investment in Indonesia
We investigate the effects of the Indonesian decentralization and democratization process on budget allocation at the sub-national level. Based on panel data for 271 Indonesian districts for the years of 1994 to 2009, we address the determinants of local investment expenditures in public infrastructure in the sectors of education, health, and physical infrastructure. We find that after the dramatic expenditure decentralization of 2001, districts with relatively lower levels of public infrastructure started to invest more in these sectors. In contrast to the marked budgeting changes following fiscal and administrative decentralization, we find no consistent effects of the democratization process on local public investments. Our results reflect initial improvements in local targeting but show no evidence of increasing electoral accountability.
November 17, 2015 - 13:00
Christof Weinmann
Universität zu Köln
The Distributional Effects of Joint Taxation
This paper analyzes the optimal taxation of couples. It compares different tax schedules, namely the case of joint and separate taxation as applied in Germany, and its effect on intra-household decision processes and the resulting intra-household allocation of resources. It does so by assuming that individuals in the household choose their optimal labor supply given the existing tax schedule and bargain over who has to contribute to which degree to the provision of a household public good. The tax schedule chosen by the social planner affects the resulting intra-household allocation to the extent that the bargaining power of each household member is affected by the resulting net share contributed to the household's disposable income. The social planner faces a trade-off between increasing the couple's net income and the distribution of utility among the spouses. A numerical example illustrates a scenario in which, for a social planner with a strong preference for equity, the abolition of joint taxation is welfare increasing since it decreases inequality within the couple.
December 3, 2015 - 14:00
Tobias Berg
Universität Bonn
Got rejected? Real effects of not getting a loan
Using a lender cut-off rule that generates plausibly exogenous variation in credit supply, I analyze real effects of loan rejections in a sample of small and medium-sized enterprises. I find that loan rejections reduce asset growth, investments, and employment, and these effects are concentrated among low liquidity firms. Precautionary savings motives aggravate real effects: firms whose loan applications got rejected increase cash holdings and cut non-cash assets in excess of the requested loan amount. These results point to the amplifying effect of precautionary savings motives in the transmission of credit supply shocks.
December 8, 2015 - 14:00
Maryam Naghsh Nejad
IZA Bonn
Minds for the Market: Non-Cognitive Skills in Post-Soviet Countries
In this paper we analyze the effect of socio-political and economic institutions on the development of non-cognitive skills. We exploit the breakdown of the Soviet Union as a quasi-natural experiment, and apply a difference-in difference strategy. We focus on two post-Soviet countries, Armenia and Georgia, and compare personality traits of individuals that were born at least fifteen years before the collapse of the Soviet Union with those that were born later, relative to other developing countries that had not gone through the same institutional changes. We find significantly lower scores of extraversion, openness, stability, and grit, while hostility is higher for individuals that were born much before the transition. Our findings suggest that institutions play a strong role in shaping the non-cognitive skills of individuals, and highlight one channel through which institutions impact economic development.
December 15, 2015 - 14:00
Jeanne Hagenbach
Ecole Polytechnique, Palaiseau
Communication with Evidence in the Lab
We study communication with evidence in a collection of sender-receiver games in the lab. As suggested by the theory, we find important differences between games with cyclic and acyclic masquerade relations. Overall, receivers take evidence into account and perform better in acyclic games, and with more precise messages. In acyclic games, they tend to be skeptical about vague messages, and more so over time. Sender types whose interests are aligned with those of the receiver fully disclose in all games, and sender types whose interests are not aligned with those of the receiver tend to use vague messages. When partially disclosing, senders tend to use weakly dominated strategies.
January 13, 2016 - 14:00
Socorro Puy
University of Malaga
Identity Voting
This paper analyzes voting behavior in parliamentary elections in which positional and identity issues sustain the party system. We extend the conventional spatial voting model to incorporate identity issues. Identity is tied to the race, language, religion or culture of the voters and both, voters and political parties, may belong to different identity groups. By identity voting we show that voters, who are otherwise centrist, move toward the parties that align with their identities. To illustrate the mechanics of identity voting, we provide an empirical analysis of Parliamentary elections to the Basque Autonomous Community. Besides the two positional issues in the region – left-right ideology and nationalism – , we show that language and Basque sentiment has a significant effect on voting. Our analysis suggests that identity voting polarizes voters and can sustain stable multi-party systems.
January 20, 2016 - 14:00
Nicolas Roux
MPI Bonn
*** CANCELED *** Monitoring, Transparency and Accountability
Directors' reputation suffers from governance failures regardless of whether they are at fault. Because their career prospects strongly depends on their reputation, they have strong incentives to monitor the executives. On the other hand, if their oversight reveals a governance failure, they are tempted to sweep it under the rug. This disclosure issue makes their oversight less deterrent, and in turn undermines their motivation to engage in monitoring. This paper asks whether reducing the ability of directors to hide bad news helps mitigate this problem. We study the question in a standard disclosure model, where the director decides how much information to acquire about an output, and whether to report it to a principal (the shareholders, the market...). The novelty is the presence of an agent, the executive, whose effort controls the value of the output. In this model, reducing the ability of directors to hide bad news means informing the principal about how much the director knows, i.e. making the monitoring effort transparent. We show that it is not always desirable to make monitoring transparent and that it depends on the strength of the director's and the exective's incentives.
February 11, 2016 - 14:00
Olga Popova
Institut für Ost- und Südosteuropaforschung, Regensburg
Suffer for the Faith? Parental Religiosity and Children’s Health
A better understanding of factors that affect the health status of children is a key to improving the children’s well-being and the future labor force. This paper provides a novel evidence on differences in health outcomes of children in religious and non-religious families in Russia. The analyzed health indicators include the subjective health status and the anthropometric outcomes such as the height-for-age and a body mass index. The paper suggests and explores the transmission channel between maternal and paternal religiosity and children’s health. Also, the endogeneity of religiosity is accounted for. The empirical findings uncover that neither maternal nor paternal religiosity affects children’s health outcomes in two-parent households, while children in one-parent (fatherless) families are affected. These results underscore that policies protecting children’s health should target single mothers as a particularly vulnerable social group.
February 17, 2016 - 14:00
Nicolas Roux
MPI Bonn
Monitoring, Transparency and Accountability
Directors' reputation suffers from governance failures regardless of whether they are at fault. Because their career prospects strongly depends on their reputation, they have strong incentives to monitor the executives. On the other hand, if their oversight reveals a governance failure, they are tempted to sweep it under the rug. This disclosure issue makes their oversight less deterrent, and in turn undermines their motivation to engage in monitoring. This paper asks whether reducing the ability of directors to hide bad news helps mitigate this problem. We study the question in a standard disclosure model, where the director decides how much information to acquire about an output, and whether to report it to a principal (the shareholders, the market...). The novelty is the presence of an agent, the executive, whose effort controls the value of the output. In this model, reducing the ability of directors to hide bad news means informing the principal about how much the director knows, i.e. making the monitoring effort transparent. We show that it is not always desirable to make monitoring transparent and that it depends on the strength of the director's and the executive's incentives.
February 24, 2016 - 10:00
Michele Valsecchi
University of Gothenburg
The Political Economy of Corruption in the Bureaucracy
In this paper we ask whether politicians' incentives in office affect their bureaucrats’ corruption behavior. In order to identify the effect of politicians’ incentives in office, we collect data on local government heads across Indonesian districts and exploit variation in their tenure in office, joint with the existence of term limits. Our measure of corruption is the number of corruption offenses, as measured using a novel dataset of corruption prosecutions providing date of offenses and timing of their prosecution. We first test for manipulation of prosecutors’ activity and find no evidence of it. We then estimate the baseline effect of re-election incentives on corruption by type of officer, and find a strong positive effect for low level bureaucrats. We then discuss the mechanisms at work by using a variety of additional data on bureaucrats and bureaucrats’ offenses.
March 16, 2016 - 14:00
Anatoli Segura
Bank of Italy
How Excessive Is Banks’ Maturity Transformation?
We quantify the gains from regulating banks’ maturity transformation in an infinite horizon model of banks which finance long-term assets with non-tradable debt. Banks choose the amount and maturity of their debt trading off investors’ preference for short maturities with the risk of systemic crises. As in Stein (2012), pecuniary externalities make unregulated debt maturities inefficiently short. The assessment is based on thecalibration of the model to Eurozone banking data for 2006. Lengthening the average maturity of wholesale debt from its 2.8 months to 3.3 months would produce welfare gains with a present value of euro 105 billion.
March 23, 2016 - 14:00
Ioanna Grypari
MPI Bonn
One Tick and You're Out: The Effects of the Master Lever on Senator Positions (with Olga Gorelkina)
This paper accounts for the e ffects of the master lever (ML), aka the straight-ticket voting option, on the positions of US senators from 1960 till 2010. The master lever is an option o ffered in ballots in some US states allowing voters to vote for a speci fic party for all offices listed, by selecting a box at the top, as opposed to filling out each one individually. Introducing a master lever leads to more people voting by the party affiliation of the senatorial candidate as opposed to her position. This shifts the groups of voters targeted by the parties and thus the positions of elected senators. We build a theory of multidimensional pre-election competition to understand these incentives. Empirically, we use a triple difference estimator to account for selection into the three treatment groups (ML always, ML never, ML then no ML) and compare the results to the theoretical predictions. We find that the presence of the master lever is a signifi cant determinant of senatorial positions. It leads to more moderate or more extreme senators depending on the partisanship of the state, the preferred policy positions of the average voter and the correlation between the two in the state. Lastly, we use the theoretical and empirical results to examine the counterfactual of all states having a master lever and its hypothetical e ffect on the positions of elected US senators in 2010.
April 6, 2016 - 14:00
Pierre Boyer
École Polytechnique, Palaiseau
Regulatory arbitrage and the efficiency of banking regulation (with Hubert Kempf)
We study the efficiency of banking regulation under financial integration. Banks freely choose the jurisdiction where to locate their activities and have private information about their efficiency level. Regulators non-cooperatively offer any regulatory contract that satisfies information and participation constraints of banks. We show that the unique Nash equilibrium of the regulatory game is a simple pooling contract: financial integration is characterized by the inability for regulators to discriminate between banks with different efficiency levels. This result is driven by the endogenous restriction caused by regulatory arbitrage on the capacity of regulators to use several regulatory instruments.
April 13, 2016 - 14:00
Robert Scherf
MPI Bonn
Voting over Public Good Provision and Nonlinear Income Tax Schedules
I investigate political competition over public good provision and nonlinear income taxation. Public goods enhance the income earning ability of individuals. I show that individuals have single-peaked preferences over policies that consist of a nonlinear income tax schedule and a share of tax revenue to be invested into the public good. Hence the median voter's favorite policy is the Condorcet winner in election. Further, the level of public good provision is increasing in the ability type of the median voter.
April 20, 2016 - 14:00
Baptiste Massenot
Goethe Universität Frankfurt
Compensation Schemes, Liquidity Provision, and Asset Prices: An Experimental Analysis
In an experimental setting in which investors can entrust their money to traders, we investigate how compensation schemes affect liquidity provision and asset prices, two outcomes that are important for financial stability. Compensation schemes can drive a wedge between how investors and traders value the asset. Limited liability makes traders value the asset more than investors. To limit losses, investors should thus restrict liquidity provision to force traders to trade at a lower price. By contrast, bonus caps make traders value the asset less than investors. This should encourage liquidity provision and increase prices. In contrast to these predictions, we find that under limited liability investors increase liquidity provision and asset price bubbles are larger. Bonus caps have no clear effect on liquidity provision and they fail to tame bubbles. Overall, giving traders skin in the game fosters financial stability.
April 27, 2016 - 14:00
Jonas Sobott
MPI Bonn
Underreporting of Market Risk
The paper examines potential under-reported of risk in trading books. Namely, the co-movement of the VaR Diversification and the equity ratio is studied. Banks report – even after controlling for the composition of the VaR and observable correlation – a higher diversification and a lower VaR if equity is scarce. I exploit a discontinuity in the expected benefit of under-reporting present in Basel regulations to provide further support for a causal link between capital-saving incentives and under-reporting. Overall, this paper suggests that banks actively use the diversification component in their VaR Models to manage the reported market risk.
May 3, 2016 - 14:00
Agnese Leonello
European Central Bank
Government Guarantees and Financial Stability (with F. Allen, E. Carletti and I. Goldstein)
Government guarantees to financial institutions are intended to reduce the likelihood of runs and bank failures, but are also usually associated with distortions in banks' risk taking decisions. We build a model to analyze these trade-offs based on the global-games literature and its application to bank runs. We derive several results, some of which against common wisdom. First, guarantees reduce the probability of a run, taking as given the deposit contract set by the bank, but lead banks to take more liquidity risk, which in turn might lead to an increase in the probability of a run. Second, guarantees against fundamental-based failures and panic-based runs may lead to greater efficiency than guarantees against panic-based runs alone. Finally, there are cases where following the introduction of guarantees banks take less liquidity risk (and more solvency risk) than would be optimal.
May 11, 2016 - 14:00
Stefan Penczynski
Universität Mannheim
Disclosure of Verifiable Information under Competition
This study investigates experimentally the revelation of verifiable information in a market setting. We find that sellers often choose to report a selected set of information and buyers on average compensate for this by bidding less. A higher level of competition has a positive and significant effect on the revelation of information on the seller side. In both the monopoly and the competition setting, the buyers do on average not fully compensate the seller's selection of evidence. The bids significantly exceed the values of the good in both treatments, leading to a payoff difference in favor of the sellers. 25\% of the buyer's bids do not account for the selection in evidences.
May 18, 2016 - 14:00
Orestis Troumpounis
Lancaster University
Downsian competition with primaries and valence asymmetries (with Bernard Grofman and Dimitrios Xefteris)
We introduce primaries -both closed and open- in a Downsian model of electoral competition allowing candidates to differ in valence. Unlike the standard model with valence asymmetries and no primaries that never admits a pure strategy equilibrium, we identify a stabilizing effect of primaries on electoral competition by showing the existence of a unique pure strategy equilibrium. By characterizing this equilibrium several interesting properties arise: a) within each party, the high valence candidate wins the primary and candidates propose differentiated platforms: primary winners locate closer to the ideal policy of the society's median than primary losers who locate on their party's median; and b) the winner of the general election need not be the candidate with the highest valence : a high valence candidate who went through a competitive primary may lose the general election to a lower valence candidate if that candidate faced a primary opponent of significantly lower valence. While all previous properties are valid when both parties hold the same type of primaries, it turns out that the choice of one system over the other can crucially affect the winner of the general election when a party in opposition aims at replacing an incumbent.
June 1, 2016 - 14:00
Stephan Luck
MPI Bonn
On the financing of TLAC: Financial markets, short-term debt, and information contagion (with Paul Schempp and Tanju Yorulmazer)
This paper studies the optimal capital structure of financial intermediaries in the presence of frictions such as information contagion via financial markets. We propose a model in which excessive maturity mismatch and inefficient runs in a financial institution can be mitigated by a requirement on the total loss-absorbing capacity (TLAC). While the debate has been focused on the level and the composition of TLAC, we analyze the effect of the financing of TLAC on fragility. Under imperfect information, financial markets provide valuable information for the intermediaries' short-term debt holders. When financial markets are sufficiently noisy, the optimal TLAC requirements becomes stricter. Moreover, we show that noise in financial markets arises endogenously when TLAC itself is financed by short-term debt. Hence, optimal regulation requires to ensure that loss absorbing claims are financed long-term. If such regulation is not feasible, a stricter TLAC requirement becomes necessary.
June 7, 2016 - 14:00
Matthias Fahn
Relational Contracts with Non-Persistent Private Information: The Upside of Implicit Downsizing Costs (with Nicolas Klein)
Although downsizing is supposed to reduce organizational slack, it often triggers additional turmoil in firms. At least in the short run, this can render an adjustment to efficient production impossible, and short term savings often seem to be wiped out by subsequent indirect costs. We show that these distortions can foster a firm's commitment in relational contracts formed with its employees: If a firm has some private information about the future value of the relationship, it is tempted to reduce bonus payments by claiming that the value of the future relationship was lower than it actually is. To induce truth-telling, the optimal relational contract may introduce distortions after a bad report. For some levels of the discount factor, output is reduced by more than would be sequentially optimal. This distortion is attenuated over time even if prospects remain bad, hence the relational contract is not stationary.
June 22, 2016 - 14:00
Matan Tsur
University of Vienna
Financial Contracts, Bargaining and Security Design
We explore how a firm optimally finances multiple projects when profits depend on subsequent negotiations with buyers, a common situation in procurement projects and vertical industries. A tension arises because the agreements reached with buyers depend on how the proceeds from the sales will be divided with investors. A financial contract determines the division rule. Should the proceeds from different projects be bundled together and divided jointly or separated and divided independently? What is the optimal division rule? The optimal contract in some common conditions takes a remarkably simple form. The firm finances each project separately with debt.
June 29, 2016 - 14:00
Raphael Flore
Cologne Graduate School
Bankruptcy Risk in Intermediation Chains
This paper studies economic differences between two systems of financial intermediation: 'Traditional banking', which performs maturity and credit risk transformations in one step on a single balance sheet, and 'securitized banking'/'shadow banking', which performs these transformations in a sequence of steps on separated balance sheets. It is shown that, for given assets and given amounts of equity in the system, the bankruptcy probability of financial intermediaries increases as consequence of, first, the separation of maturity transformations from credit risk transformations, and second, the division of these transformations into smaller sequential steps. Despite this disadvantage, financial firms might choose to operate in a separated or divided system, because it can allow for a better diversification and a reduction of idiosyncratic risk. The consequence, however, is an increased fragility with respect to aggregate risk.
July 6, 2016 - 14:00
Alexandra Fedorets
DIW Berlin
Compensating Wage Differentials, Sorting into Occupations and Job Tasks
The theory of wage premia for job disamenities exhibits mixed evidence in empirical analysis. In the current study, I employ a rich data set of workplace attributes for 1979-2012 in Germany to provide novel evidence on the relation between job disamenities and tasks. I show that only those disagreeable workplace characteristics that are related to non-routine cognitive tasks receive a positive payoff. Moreover, sorting in occupations and job tasks explains a substantial part of both positive and negative returns to disamenities. Thus, the mixed evidence on returns to job disamenities can be explained by sorting in particular types of jobs and by the magnitude by which technological progress has affected these jobs.
July 12, 2016 - 14:00
Olga Gorelkina
MPI Bonn
Selling Money on EBay: A Field study of surplus division
To measure the prevalence of social preferences in a competitive environment, we conduct a natural field experiment on German eBay. Acting as a seller, we offer Amazon gift cards with values from 5 to 500 euros. The randomly arriving buyers, unaware of the experiment, make us price offers according to the platform's rules. Using a novel estimation technique, we extract from the observed distribution of offers two underlying distributions: offered shares of the trade surplus and beliefs about the seller's outside option. Once we net out the effect of competition this way, we observe that the prevalence of social preferences in the field is comparable to the laboratory. Our experiment also demonstrates: (i) the amount of money at stake has no significant effect on offers; (ii) the subjects make poor use of public information; (iii) the behaviour of East and West German subjects follows two separate patterns, likely due to the remaining cultural differences.
September 20, 2016 - 14:00
Wolfgang Kuhle
MPI Bonn
An Equilibrium Model with Computationally Constrained Agents
September 28, 2016 - 14:00
Nan Zhang
MPI Bonn
Legibility and the Informational Foundations of State Capacity (with Melissa Lee)
Recent research in political science has stressed the importance of the state in curbing violence and promoting social and economic development, resulting in an explosion of scholarly interest in the foundations of state capacity. This paper argues that state capacity depends in part on “legibility” - the breadth and depth of the state’s knowledge about its citizens and their activities - and that legibility is crucial to effective, centralized governance. We illustrate the importance of legibility through a novel argument linking legibility to the state’s role in curbing free-riding in collective action dilemmas. We then demonstrate this argument in the context of tax contributions to public goods using an original measure of legibility based on national population censuses. The paper concludes by discussing how future research may leverage our indicator’s exceptional temporal and geographic coverage to advance new avenues of inquiry in the study of the state.
October 5, 2016 - 14:00
Gregor Schwerhoff
Mercator Research Institute on Global Commons and Climate Change (MCC)
Optimal Rent Taxation
Economic rents have long been identified as an efficient base for taxation. In addition, the recent literature documents that rent yielding assets are highly concentrated among the rich. Rent taxation thus seems attractive for both efficiency and equity reasons. Nevertheless, rent taxation remains a marginal topic in academic economics and for policy makers. We suggest bridging this gap by subjecting economic rents to an optimal taxation analysis. When considering that households can be heterogeneous both with respect to their wealth and with respect to their portfolio composition (regarding shares of capital and rent yielding assets) we find that equity considerations may require rents to be taxed at less than 100%. When the portfolio composition among households is similar, however, rent taxation is much more desirable than labor taxation under a standard social welfare function.
October 12, 2016 - 14:00
Oleg Rubanov
University of Bonn
Ownership and Incentives (with Emre Ozdenoren, LBS)
How many owners should a firm have? Should it be a partnership entirely owned by its workers, or should it allow the outsiders own some of its shares? This paper models a firm the production process of which requires efforts of several agents. The efforts of the agents are not perfectly observable, which creates a moral hazard problem for every agent, unless this agent owns the entire firm. Giving an agent more shares of the company relaxes the moral hazard problem for this agent, but worsens it for other agents. We derive the optimal incentive contracts and ownership structure. We show that the firm does not always require outside owners, but as the size of the firm increases, it is optimal for the firm to sell some of its shares to outsiders. More productive agents whose performance is only poorly observable (as in professional organizations, like law firms) are more likely to be partially motivated with shares, rather than just a contract.
October 26, 2016 - 14:00
Vahagn Jerbashian
University of Barcelona
On the Industry Specificity of Human Capital and Business Cycles (joint with Sergey Slobodyan and Evangelia Vourvachaki)
We define specific (general) human capital as the set of occupations whose use is spread in a limited (wide) set of industries. Using the EU Labor Force Survey database, we identify these human capital types and analyze their employment and education. This exercise yields a persistent assignment of occupations into specific and general human capital types. The share of specific human capital varies across countries and has declined over time almost everywhere. We consider a stylized two-sector model where one of the sectors uses both types of human capital and the other specializes on general human capital. We show that an increase in the share of specific human capital, which preserves the mean of final output, reduces (increases) the contribution of shocks in non-specialized sector and increases (reduces) the contribution of shocks in specialized sector to the variance of final output, when sectoral outputs are gross complements (substitutes).
November 2, 2016 - 14:00
Yair Antler
University of Essex
Multilateral Contracting with Manipulation
We study multilateral reallocation of risk when the state of nature is unverifiable, such that contracts are conditioned on a state-dependent signal (e.g., net earnings in a financial report). A subset of the agents can manipulate the signal’s realization at some cost (e.g., by performing financial acrobatics) and as a result Pareto-optimal reallocation of risk is precluded. The agents can write additional bilateral side-contracts without withdrawing from existing risk-sharing or risk-bearing agreements. Such side-contracts can be used to incentivize one of the parties to manipulate the signal. We introduce a novel extension of pairwise stability that takes into account agents’ beliefs about contemporaneous deviations initiated by their counter-parties, and show that stable contracts are not constrained-Pareto-optimal. We derive closed-form solutions to upper bounds on the level of risk-sharing and the volume of speculative trade in various settings.
November 8, 2016 - 14:00
Petros Milionis
University of Groningen
Value Diversity and Regional Economic Development
We investigate the nature of the link between culture and regional economic development by assessing how the prevalence of specific values and the degree of diversity in these values at the regional level influence economic performance within countries in Europe. Considering multiple groups of values, which have received attention in the literature, we provide evidence that the effect of culture on economic development at the regional level is primarily linked with diversity in cultural values. In particular we show that greater value diversity has a negative effect on regional economic performance. This adverse effect of value diversity appears to operate by weakening institutional quality and public goods provision and is shown to be robust even when diversity is measured based on values expressed by emigrants residing outside of their region of origin.
November 16, 2016 - 14:00
Dominik Grafenhofer
MPI Bonn
Thinking Ourselves into Recession (with Wolfgang Kuhle)
November 30, 2016 - 14:00
Zhengqing Gui
Hong Kong University of Science and Technology
Incentive-Compatibility in Financial Contracting with Limited Liability
In the presence of limited liability, the incentive compatibility constraints in financial contracting models with asymmetric information are weaker than assumed in much of the literature. In this paper, we identify the problem that has been overlooked in the literature and provide a rigorous proof of optimality of debt contracts under fairly general assumptions.
December 7, 2016 - 14:00
Vardges Levonyan
ETH Zurich, Center for Law and Economics
What Led to the Ban on Same-Sex Marriage in California?: Structural Estimation of Voting Data on Proposition 8
The voting literature has largely analyzed voter turnout and voter behavior separately, with a focus on individual election outcomes. This is in spite of the fact that multiple elections are on one ballot, and turnout is determined by participation in all elections. I present a model of voter turnout and behavior in multiple elections. The assumptions are consistent with individual election preferences and decision is derived from utility maximization. I also provide necessary moment conditions for identification. The framework is applied to analyze turnout and voting choices in the 2008 California elections for the US presidential election and Proposition 8 ballot initiative. The exit polls and initial election results made national headlines by linking the historic turnout of African-Americans for Presidential candidate Obama in helping pass Proposition 8. I structurally estimate the demographic preferences for each of the election choices. I find that the African-American turnout and voting share for Proposition 8 was lower than predicted by the exit polls. As a counterfactual, I use the estimated model to look at the turnout and outcome of Proposition 8, without the presidential race on the ballot. As predicted by the model and estimates, I find lower voter turnout that are on par with midterm elections. I also find a lower share of Yes votes on Proposition 8 – enough that the referendum would not have passed.
January 11, 2017 - 14:00
Alia Gizatulina
University of St. Gallen
Designer Uncertainty and Bet-On-The-Liar Mechanism
January 17, 2017 - 14:00
Ioanna Grypari
MPI Bonn
One Tick and You're Out: The Effects of the Master Lever on Senators' Positions (joint with Olga Gorelkina)
This paper accounts for the effects of the master lever (ML), aka the straight-ticket voting option, on elected US senators from 1960 till 2012. The ML, still present in some states, allows voters to select a specific party for all elections listed on a ballot, as opposed to filling out each office individually. Introducing it leads to an increase in the number of partisan votes, and thus changes the groups of voters targeted by parties and shifts the positions of senatorial candidates. Theoretically, we examine this change in tradeoffs by building a model of pre-election competition. Empirically, we use a triple-difference estimator to account for selection into treatment and find that, controlling for party trends, the ML leads to a right-wing shift of senatorial positions; an effect that is larger for the Republican party. We use the theory to explain how the political climate, as observed in the data, implies the specific result.
January 25, 2017 - 14:00
Rafael Aigner
DIW Econ
The Fehmarn Belt Duopoly – Can the Ferry Compete with a Tunnel? (with Katharina Weber)
The Fehmarn Belt is a strait between Denmark and Germany, currently served by a ferry operator. We analyse competition between the ferry service and a planned tunnel, the Fehmarn Belt Fixed Link. We develop a differentiated duopoly model to addresses two questions: 1. Will the tunnel induce the ferry to exit the market, once it operates? 2. Will the tunnel’s toll revenue suffice to cover its cost? Using real-world data and traffic forecasts, we show that it should not be taken for granted that the ferry exits the market, and that if the ferry competes, the tunnel project will make a loss.
February 1, 2017 - 14:00
Valentin Wagner
University of Düsseldorf
Seeking Risk or Answering Smart? Framing in Elementary Schools
This paper investigates how framing manipulations affect the quantity and quality of decisions. In a field experiment in elementary schools, 1,377 pupils are randomly assigned to one of three conditions in a multiple-choice test: (i) gain frame (Control), (ii) loss frame (Loss), and (iii) gain frame with a downward shift of the point scale (Negative). On average, pupils in both treatment groups answer significantly more questions correctly compared to the \traditional grading". This increase is driven by two different mechanisms. While pupils in the Loss Treatment increase significantly the quantity of answered questions---seek more risk---pupils in the Negative Treatment seem to increase the quality of their answers---answer more accurately. Moreover, differentiating pupils by their initial ability shows that a downward shift of the point scale is superior to loss framing. High-performers increase performance in both treatment groups, but motivation is significantly crowded out for low-performers only in the Loss Treatment.
February 8, 2017 - 14:00
Francesco Cerigioni
Universitat Pompeu Fabra and Barcelona Graduate School of Economics
Stochastic Choice and Familiarity: Inertia and the Mere Exposure Effect
Inertia is a key component of human decision making as the endowment effect or the status-quo bias have shown, but what is its source? Is it possible to incorporate the dynamic effect of experiences on behavioral inertia in a still tractable model? In this paper we propose an answer to these questions. We model a decision maker that experiences the mere exposure effect. The more he chooses an alternatives the higher is the probability he chooses it again. We show that the model allows us not only to give a more general description of the well-known phenomenon of the status-quo bias, and hence to obtain the endowment effect, loss aversion and present bias as a consequence, but also to quantify the behavioral inertia that affects our decision maker choices. In particular, we show that it is possible to have accurate forecasts of the kind of heterogeneity we should expect to emerge from an homogeneous population of individuals exposed to different choices. Finally, we provide a choice theoretical foundation of the model and we discuss some possible extensions.
February 15, 2017 - 14:00
Nikita Zakharov
University of Freiburg, Institute for Economic Research
Does Independent Media Matter in Non-Democratic Election? Experimental Evidence from Russia (with Ruben Enikolopov, Michael Rochlitz and Koen Schoors)
We conducted two parallel field experiments to test how exposure to independent online media affects voting behavior in a non-democratic election. Both experiments took part during Russian Parliamentary Election in September 2016, and were organized across cities of average size in European part of Russia by providing free access to an independent Russian channel „TV-Rain“ which normally charges fees for subscription. In the first experiment we randomly distributed free monthly subscriptions to the channel during a telephone survey of 1211 respondents in 12 random cities 10 day before the election and then we collected data on their voting behavior during the second wave of the telephone survey after the election. We find that respondents who used free subscription were more likely to cast their ballot and less likely to vote for the incumbent party on average and as compared to respondents who intended to use the subscription but were unsuccessful due to technical problems with activation codes. The perception of Parliamentary Election being unfair has been also significantly influenced by the exposure to the independent TV channel. The second experiment established a free access to the channel at the city level: population of 15 randomly chosen cities were offered a free monthly subscription which was supplemented with an advertisement campaign through Russian social network (Vkontakte). The treatment has significantly increased the consumption of the independent channel as measured by the growth in number of visitors of the website. The increase in consumption of the media resulted in 3 percent higher turnout rate at the level of the electoral districts in treated cities, but we find no results for change in the vote share of the incumbent party. Because “TV-Rain” did not participate in electoral campaign and abstained from any political advertisement, we attribute the effect purely to the independent provision of the news and the absence of the censorship.
February 21, 2017 - 14:00
Alex Smolin
University of Bonn
Evaluation Theory of Wage Growth
A principal owns a firm, hires an agent of uncertain productivity, and designs a policy of evaluating his performance. The agent observes ongoing evaluations and decides whether to quit. His wage at firm evolves proportionally to perceived productivity, his outside option is fixed. Both parties are risk-neutral. I show that all equilibria are Pareto-efficient and leave no rents to the agent. In a minimally informative equilibrium, the agent's wage deterministically grows with tenure for a broad class of parameters. The resulting wage profile can be explicitly calculated and may exhibit discontinuities.
March 22, 2017 - 14:00
Milena Nikolova
IZA - Institute for the Study of Labor
Your Spouse is Fired! How much do you care?
This study is the first to provide a causal estimate of the subjective well-being effects of spousal unemployment at the couple level. Using German panel data on married and cohabiting partners for 1991-2013 and information on exogenous job termination induced by workplace closure, we show that spousal unemployment reduces the life satisfaction of indirectly-affected spouses. The impact is equally pronounced among female and male partners. Importantly, the results are not driven by an income effect, but likely reflect the psychological costs of unemployment. Our findings are robust to a battery of sensitivity checks and imply that public policy programs aimed at mitigating the negative consequences of unemployment need to consider within-couple spillovers.
March 29, 2017 - 14:00
Paul Schempp
MPI Bonn
Liquidity Creation, Capital Requirements and Regulatory Arbitrage (joint with Stephan Luck)
We present a model in which bank can create liquid claims by issuing equity as well as by relying on sales of risky assets in downturns, i.e., market-based liquidity creation. In the constrained-efficient allocation, liquidity creation partially relies on market-based liquidity creation, which necessarily induces fire sales in downturns. However, the inability of banks to contract future financing terms gives rise to a pecuniary externality, and there is a tendency for leverage to be excessive. In equilibrium, each single bank relies too much on market-based liquidity creation and fire sale effects are too strong. A natural way to address the pecuniary externality is to impose a uniform capital requirement, which acts like a tax on short-term debt. However, if regulatory arbitrage is possible, the inefficiency re-emerges: while regulated banks are not excessively leveraged, a shadow banking sector emerges and grows too large, inducing excessively high costs of fire sales. We argue that if regulatory arbitrage cannot be addressed directly, capital requirements need to be complemented by a Pigouvian subsidy for bank equity.
April 19, 2017 - 14:00
Martin Obradovits
University of Innsbruck, Department of Economics
The Loss-Leading Puzzle" (with Roman Inderst)
Why do manufacturers oppose “loss leading” of their products by retailers and why do their protests receive support from consumer interest groups and policymakers? We provide a solution to this puzzle when consumers are salient thinkers, showing how in this case loss leading shifts profits from manufacturers of high-quality (branded) products to retailers and how, when the extent of one-stop shopping is sufficiently large and retail competition sufficiently intense, this crowds out high quality. We identify conditions for when a prohibition of loss leading enhances consumer and overall welfare and for when such a policy backfires.
April 26, 2017 - 14:00
Emilio Calvano
University of Bologna
Can We Trust the Algorithms that Recommend Products Online? A Theory of Biased Advice with No Pecuniary Incentives and Lab Evidence
We study the incentives of an agent (call him ‘RS’ - ‘Recommendation System’) which owns a technology that predicts the suitability of a finite set of options for another agent needs (call her ‘C’ - ‘Consumer’). We consider a model in which RS chooses an object from a finite set which is then consumed by C. Furthermore we assume that the ‘ability’ of RS is unknown to C. We show that if RS’s objective is to persuade C that he is good then ‘Recommendation Bias’ arises. That is RS’s choice is suboptimal from C’s perspective. Next, we bring the theory to the lab to test if consumers learn about accuracy from experience and if biasing recommendations pays off for the RS.
May 3, 2017 - 14:00
Marie Lalanne
Goethe University of Frankfurt - SAFE Research Center
Do Social Ties Lead to Job Referrals: Evidence from US Board Appointments
A growing number of empirical papers are investigating the effects of referrals on labor market outcomes by proxying referrals with social network information. By combining data on professional networks and actual referrals, this paper investigates whether individuals do refer others they share a work history with, therefore providing empirical support for the proxies extensively used in the literature. I use data on board appointments to US publicly listed firms between 2004 and 2008. I first estimate the effect of having social ties with incumbent board members on the probability to be hired on a board and find a positive effect as in the literature. I then relate the existence of social ties to the actual occurrence of referrals. Because unobservable individual characteristics might be driving both labor market outcomes and social networks, I control for the type of firms individuals worked for through placebo networks. When an incumbent and an entrant board members have worked together in the past (real social tie), the incumbent is significantly more likely to refer the entrant. When the incumbent and the entrant board members have worked in the same firm in the past but not at the same time (placebo tie), the incumbent is also more likely to refer the entrant but to a much lower extent or in a non-significative way. This evidence shows that social networks do matter beyond their work history signaling and, importantly, provides empirical support for using social networks as a proxy for referrals.
May 11, 2017 - 14:00
Martin Guzi
Masaryk University
Unstable Political Regimes and Wars as Drivers of International Migration (joint with Alicia Adsera, Carles Boix, and Mariola Pytlikova)
This paper contributes to literature on the determinants of international migration by focusing on whether migration flows respond to political conditions in origin and destination and to political violence, armed conflict and wars. Within standard migration theory, political instability acts as push factors in origins. We expect that people are more likely to emigrate from authoritatian regimes and origins affected by ethnic conflicts and wars in search for a better life. To investigate these hypotheses, we combine: (1) annual data on international migration flows and stocks in 42 destination countries from 223 countries of origin for the period 1980-2010 and UN/world Bank migration data obtained from changes in stocks of foreign population across (decennial) censuses from 160 origin/destinations; (2) data on wars, coup d’etat, revolutions and democratic regimes from different sources; (3) controls of socio- cultural-economic conditions in origins and destinations, and political rights and naturalization regimes for the years 1965-2010. Preliminary findings confirm that political instability in the sending countries triggers the outflow of people and the effect of violence varies with the kind and intensity of war and internal conflicts. These outcomes are robust to the choice of indicators -- particularly for long-lasting and high intense ethnic conflicts.
May 30, 2017 - 14:00
Ctirad Slavik
Wage Risk and the Skill Premium (joint with Hakki Yazici)
The skill premium has gone up significantly in the United States in the last five decades. During the same period, individual wage volatility has also increased. By incorporating the technology-education race model of Tinbergen (1974) into a standard incomplete markets model, this paper proposes a mechanism through which a rise in individual wage risk leads to an increase in skill premium. In our benchmark quantitative exercise, the rise in individual wage risk observed between 1967 and 2010 accounts for about 1/3 of the overall increase in skill premium during the same period.