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**TRUMP ANTE PORTAS:
POLITICAL POLARIZA-
TION UNDERMINES
RULE-FOLLOWING
BEHAVIOR**

Trump ante Portas: Political Polarization Undermines Rule-Following Behavior

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Abstract

In a democracy, it is essential that citizens accept rules and laws, regardless of which party is in power. We study why citizens in polarized societies resist rules implemented by political opponents. This may be due to the rules' specific content, but also because of a general preference against being restricted by political opponents. We develop a method to measure the latter channel. In our experiment with almost 1,300 supporters and opponents of Donald Trump, we show that polarization undermines rule-following behavior significantly, independent of the rules' content. Subjects perceive the intentions behind (identical) rules as much more malevolent if they were imposed by a political opponent rather than a political ally.

Keywords: Political polarization, Social identity, Outgroup, Economic preferences, Experiment

JEL: C91, D90, D91

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1. Introduction

Contrary to hopes and predictions that arose after the Cold War, liberal democracy has not established itself as the end of history (Fukuyama, 1992). Events like the capitol attack in the US in 2021 illustrate that the willingness to adhere to democratic principles and to accept the possibility that a political opponent can govern the country should not be taken for granted (Iyengar and Westwood, 2015; Nunn, Qian, and Wen, 2018; Finkel et al., 2020; Graham and Svobik, 2020; Alsan et al., 2023; Boxell, Gentzkow, and Shapiro, 2024). In this article we study why people in polarized environments resist rules imposed by a political opponent, or more generally by an outgroup. Our results have direct implications for efforts aimed at preventing the further erosion of democratic principles.

Of course, one could easily imagine that the willingness to adhere to rules and regulations imposed by a political opponent may be low because those rules may have a *specific content* that is at odds with a person’s own views and preferences (like when a supporter of abortion rights lives in a state that forbids it). However, there is also another potential reason for resistance: This may be a person’s *general aversion against accepting outgroup-made restrictions*, independent of their specific content. Until now, it has been unclear whether and to what extent this second reason may generate resistance against rules and restrictions imposed by an outgroup. However, it is important to learn about this, because both potential reasons carry different policy implications. If the resistance against outgroup-made restrictions stems solely from their content, then finding a compromise on the content may do the trick to smooth social interactions across political divides. If resistance against outgroup-made restrictions stems from a general dislike against accepting outgroup-made restrictions, however, then compromising on the content or trying to convince the other side of the merits of certain rules or restrictions may not be sufficient to reach acceptance, and might possibly even backfire. Rather, in such a case it may be much more promising to strengthen shared identities to improve the acceptance of rules and regulations imposed by political opponents.

We present a novel method to identify the extent to which subjects have a general preference against accepting outgroup-made restrictions. Holding the content of the choice restrictions constant, we measured with a total of 1,298 experimental participants whether the political identity of the creator of a choice restriction had a causal impact on the resistance against otherwise *identical* restrictions. We ran our experiments on Prolific with supporters and opponents of Donald Trump as natural groups. Participants had to

make choices among a restricted set of options. The restrictions had been imposed either by a Trump supporter or a Trump opponent. Lifting the restrictions was possible, but costly, and so we could measure the willingness to lift identical restrictions, contingent on whether the participant shared the political preference of the person imposing the restriction or not. Choices had to be made in three different contexts, regarding prosociality, risk preferences and time preferences. The three contexts were selected to cover a broad range of important domains of decision making that are also prone to many political issues and regulation. The altruism context relates to issues of redistribution and social fairness that affect, for instance, taxation policies (e.g., Cappelen et al., 2013; Fehr and Charness, 2024). The risk context is relevant for health-related choices, or environmental policies (e.g., Allcott et al., 2020; Pink et al., 2021; Alsan et al., 2023). The intertemporal context applies, for example, to educational or investment policies (e.g., Laibson, 1997; Thaler and Benartzi, 2004; Hanushek et al., 2022).

Our results show that participants lifted the same choice restrictions significantly more often (by around 15%) if someone with an opposing attitude towards Trump imposed them than when they were imposed by someone sharing the same attitude towards Trump. We find this stronger resistance against outgroup-made restrictions across all contexts (with very strong results regarding prosocial and intertemporal choices, and weaker results for risk taking). This indicates that an aversion against outgroup-generated choice restrictions is not domain-specific. Running two experiments demonstrates the robustness of our results.

Digging into the mechanisms driving our results through an in-depth analysis of our survey data reveals that participants perceive the motives of the interventionist as much more malevolent if the restriction is imposed by an outgroup member (with opposing views on Trump) rather than an ingroup member (with the same views on Trump). Subjects with an interventionist from the outgroup believe that it is more likely that the restrictions were imposed in order to harm them, less likely that the restrictions were imposed in order to help them and more likely that the interventionist made the restrictions in order to feel powerful. If we control for these three beliefs, the treatment effect on the likelihood of accepting or lifting restrictions vanishes completely, suggesting that beliefs about motives of the interventionist are driving our results.

Our study contributes to several streams of literature. First, we contribute to a literature on the effects of common group identity on economic behavior. In our study, we show how the restrictions imposed by an ingroup or an outgroup member affect people's willingness to resist the restriction whereas previous literature mainly studied the importance of

a joint identity for people’s behavior towards another person. This literature shows that individual behavior is crucially affected by group identity. For example, people are more altruistic, more likely to reciprocate positively, more likely to forgive, more willing to coordinate efficiently and more likely to maximize overall efficiency when they interact with people with whom they share an identity (Akerlof and Kranton, 2000; Goette, Huffman, and Meier, 2006; Charness, Rigotti, and Rustichini, 2007; Chen and Li, 2009; Sutter, 2009; Ockenfels and Werner, 2014; Dimant, 2024). We contribute to this literature as we are the first to show that a joint group identity also affects people’s willingness to accept choice restrictions imposed by others. Note that this observation cannot be explained by models assuming more altruism towards a person with whom one shares an identity (Chen and Li, 2009) or by models that assume different expectations conditional on the identity of the other person (Ockenfels and Werner, 2014).

Second, our study relates to the literature on the intrinsic value of decision rights, a concept in the economics and psychology literature that refers to the value of having the ability to make decisions per se, regardless of the outcome of the decision (e.g., Bartling, Fehr, and Herz, 2014; Ferreira, Hanaki, and Tarroux, 2020; Buffat, Praxmarer, and Sutter, 2023). Freundt and Herz (2024) have shown that subjects are more likely to delegate decisions over lotteries to a person sharing their political preferences (as either being Republican or Democrat) than to a person identifying with the opposite party. Our study contributes to this literature by showing that the willingness to pay for removing a choice restriction imposed by another person depends on the political attitude of the person who restricts one’s choice set. Rather than studying delegation, we focus on re-claiming decision rights (as it seems that in the political realm the issue is more about the laws and rules passed by opponents, and thus restricting one’s choice, than whether someone wants to delegate a decision to a political opponent). Additionally, our study considers a much broader set of economic choice domains, while the literature in this area has so far been limited to decision making under risk.

Third, our study relates to a literature on political polarization, partisan animosity, and people’s willingness to accept political restrictions of civil liberties (e.g., Iyengar and Westwood, 2015; Finkel et al., 2020; Boxell, Gentzkow, and Shapiro, 2024; Alsan et al., 2023). In highly politically polarized countries such as the US, scholars have argued that democracy is under threat if groups fail to accept if the political opponent is in power and can set the restrictions (Graham and Svobik, 2020), but that restrictions to civil liberties are more accepted if they are due to current circumstances such as health-insecurity reasons

(Alsan et al., 2023). We contribute to this literature by presenting causal evidence that resistance against (identical) restrictions is actually stronger if they are imposed by the political outgroup, which could amplify the effect of diverging views on policy.¹

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the first experiment and the corresponding results. Section 3 presents the second experiment and its results. Section 4 concludes.

2. First Experiment

2.1. Sample

In August 2022, we conducted the first experiment on Prolific with an initial sample size of 700 participants. We ordered 350 subjects who indicated in the Prolific database that they voted for Trump in the 2020 US presidential election and 350 subjects who indicated that they voted for Biden. We excluded subjects who failed the attention check and reported to have a neutral stance on Trump from the following analyses, leaving us with 604 subjects, of which 339 indicated to hate Trump and 265 to love Trump.

2.2. Experimental Design

In the following, we explain the design in chronological order. First, following Dimant (2024), we elicited opinions on Donald Trump on a 5-point scale (Extreme Love, Moderate Love, Indifference, Moderate Hate and Extreme Hate). Then, subjects were informed that another subject would intervene in their decision making in the course of the experiment. We varied in a between-subjects design whether the intervening subject (henceforth called “the interventionist”) was a Trump lover or a Trump hater.² This created two treatments: an *ingroup* treatment where the subject and the interventionist had the same attitude towards Trump, and an *outgroup* treatment where the subject and the interventionist had opposing views (one loved Trump, the other hated him). After receiving the information about the interventionist, subjects were informed that they had to make decisions in three contexts.

¹Our paper is also somewhat related to a nascent literature on paternalism and people’s willingness to intervene in others’ choices (e.g., Ambuehl, Bernheim, and Ockenfels, 2021; Ackfeld and Ockenfels, 2021; Kiessling et al., 2021). Yet, here we are not interested in what type of restrictions paternalists are choosing, but rather on what determines subjects’ willingness to take costly action against a paternalist’s restrictions.

²Note that we pooled subjects indicating extreme love and moderate love for Trump as Trump lovers, and those responding to moderately or extremely hating Trump as Trump haters.

These contexts were i) a dictator game (the ‘altruism context’), ii) a choice between different lotteries (the ‘risk context’) and iii) a choice between payoffs at two different points in time (the ‘time context’). The choice sets and restrictions in the three different contexts are shown in Table 1. In the dictator game, the subject had to split \$1 between herself and another random subject (not the interventionist). We implemented two restrictions that varied between subjects. In the prosocial restriction, the interventionist forbade the subject to share less than \$0.60. In the antisocial restriction, the interventionist ruled out to share anything. In the risk context, the unrestricted choice set contained three options: In option A, the subject got \$1 with 50% probability and 0\$ with 50% probability. In option B, the subject received \$0.75 with 50% probability and 0.25\$ with 50% probability. In option C, the subject got \$0.5 for sure, meaning that all three options were identical with respect to their expected value. The interventionist forbade the subject to take options A and C. In the time context, the subject got \$0.30 right after the study (option A) or \$1 one month later (option B). The interventionist ruled out option B.

Subjects had received an initial endowment of \$0.10 which they could use to lift the restriction imposed by the interventionist. This endowment could be used in each of the three contexts, as only at the end of the experiment it was randomly decided which of the three contexts was actually paid out to subjects. The willingness to pay \$0.10 to lift a restriction is our main outcome variable.

Table 1: Choice Sets and Restrictions in Each Context

	Altruism	Risk	Time
Choice Set	Splitting \$1	A: 50% for \$1; 50% for \$0 B: 50% for \$0.75; 50% for \$0.25 C: \$0.50 for sure	A: \$0.30 right after study B: \$1 one month later
Restriction	Giving <\$0.60 forbidden (Prosocial) or Giving >\$0 forbidden (Antisocial)	Options A and C are forbidden	Option B is forbidden

After having made their decisions, we asked subjects whether they were surprised about the interventionist imposing restrictions (Yes/No) and how reasonable they found the re-

restrictions, on a scale from 1 (very unreasonable) to 10 (very reasonable). Then, we asked about subjects' beliefs whether the interventionist made the restrictions i) to harm a subject, ii) to protect a subject from bad decisions, and iii) to feel powerful. The exact wording is available in [Appendix A.3](#). We also present in [Appendix A.2](#) some further results about subjects' motives for lifting or accepting restrictions, but we concentrate in the main text on the beliefs about the interventionist's motives.

At the end of the experiment, we asked subjects whether they wanted to impose the restrictions they had faced on i) future participants, without mentioning their political opinions, ii) future participants who love Trump and iii) future participants who hate Trump. We selected subjects who imposed restrictions on others as interventionists with whom other subjects were confronted.


The median duration of the experiment was 9 minutes and 15 seconds. The baseline payment was \$1.75, resulting in average hourly wages of \$11.97 (excluding bonuses).

2.3. Results

I. Likelihood of Lifting the Restrictions

Figure 1 presents the relative frequencies with which subjects lifted the interventionist's restrictions. It starts with the overall average frequency across all three contexts, and then shows the results for the time, risk and altruism context. The blue bars always refer to the ingroup-treatment (meaning that the decision-making subject and the interventionist had the same attitude towards Donald Trump), and the red bars to the outgroup-treatment (where the subject and interventionist had opposing views). The pattern emerging from Figure 1 shows that subjects were always more likely to lift the interventionist's restrictions in the outgroup-treatment.

Figure 1: Share of Subjects who Lifted Restrictions




Looking at the overall averages, lifting the restrictions happened in 52.3% of cases in the ingroup-treatment, but in 61.5% of cases in the outgroup-treatment. The difference of 9.2 percentage points translated into an 18% higher likelihood to lift restrictions if the interventionist had an opposing political preference. This treatment effect is highly significant ($p=0.001$), as shown in Tables A.1 and A.2 in the Appendix. Looking at the three contexts separately, we see that the treatment differences in the time context and the altruism context are also significant (accounting for a 21% to 27% higher likelihood to lift the restrictions; $p<0.01$; see Table A.1).³ For the risk context, we also see a larger likelihood to lift the restriction in the outgroup-treatment, but the difference fails significance (as can

³In columns (5) and (6) of Table A.1 we report the results separately for the prosocial and the antisocial restriction in the altruism context and note that in both cases we also see a strong and significant treatment effect such that restrictions were much more often lifted if the interventionist had an opposing view on Trump. Not surprisingly, restrictions were more often lifted in the prosocial case (in 75% on average) than in the antisocial case (in 51% of cases only), which is in line with a self-serving bias.

be seen both in Figure 1 and Table A.1 in the Appendix).

II. Beliefs and Interventionist Behavior

Figure 2: Beliefs about Motives of Interventionist



Notes: The wording of the questions was as follows: Harming: “The {Trump lover/Trump hater} made the restrictions to harm me”. Protecting: “The {Trump lover/Trump hater} made the restrictions to protect me and others against bad decisions”. Power: “The {Trump lover/Trump hater} made the restrictions because he/she likes to feel powerful”. A value of 1 corresponds to “Strongly disagree”, 2 corresponds to “Somewhat disagree”, 3 corresponds to “Somewhat agree”, and 4 corresponds to “Strongly agree”.

Figure 2 shows that subjects expected interventionists to have much more malevolent motives for imposing (the same) restrictions if the interventionist had an opposite view on Trump. The first two bars refer to the question whether the interventionist wanted to harm the subject, with response options from 1 (strongly disagree) to 4 (strongly agree). The dashed line in Figure 2 represents the expected value in case of random responses. For an outgroup interventionist, subjects largely agreed that the interventionist wanted to

harm them (average response of 2.93), while for an ingroup interventionist, they largely disagreed (average response of 2.10; $p < 0.001$ in comparison to the outgroup-value of 2.93). The same pattern can be seen with regards to the other two beliefs. Subjects strongly disagreed that an outgroup interventionist wanted to protect them from making bad decisions (average response of 1.41 for outgroup interventionists, but 2.00 for ingroup interventionists; $p < 0.001$). Moreover, subjects agreed more to the statement that the interventionist wanted to feel powerful if the interventionist was an outgroup member (average response of 3.43, but 2.62 for an ingroup interventionist; $p < 0.001$). Table A.9 in the Appendix shows regression results confirming the visual inference from Figure 2.

In line with the finding that interventionists were perceived to have more malevolent motives for restricting choices, we also note that subjects found restrictions more reasonable if an ingroup member had imposed them rather than an outgroup member (on a scale from 1 to 10, the difference was 0.68, $p = 0.001$, see Table A.10). In addition, subjects were much less surprised (in only 17.3% of cases) when an outgroup member implemented the restrictions than when this was done by an ingroup member. In the latter case, subjects expressed fairly frequently surprise about the restriction (in 52.6% of cases; $p < 0.001$ against the 17.3%, see Table A.10 in the Appendix). Despite this surprise, subjects ascribed relatively more benevolent motives to ingroup interventionists, as shown in Figure 2.

The beliefs about an interventionist’s motives are key to understand subjects’ choices to pay \$0.10 to lift an interventionist’s restriction. In Table A.11 in the Appendix we see in column (1) that subjects were significantly less likely to lift a restriction if they believed the interventionist wanted to protect them from bad decisions, and significantly more likely to lift the restriction if they felt the interventionist wanted to feel powerful. In column (2) of that table we reproduce the first column of Table A.1, showing that lifting the restriction was 9 percentage points more likely in case of an outgroup interventionist. Column (3) then reveals what happens to the dummy “Outgroup interventionist” once we also control for a subject’s beliefs about the interventionist’s motives. Importantly, this shows that the effect of the outgroup-treatment dummy becomes insignificant and vanishes completely, while the beliefs remain significant. This indicates that the treatment effect is driven by beliefs about the (bad) motives of an interventionist from the outgroup.

Finally, recall that we asked subjects at the end of the experiment whether they wanted to impose the restrictions they had faced on others. 16.2% of the subjects imposed the restrictions on ingroup members, 22.4% on others whose political affiliation was unclear, and 32.1% on outgroup members. Thus, subjects imposed restrictions almost twice as often

(98% more) on outgroup members than on ingroup members (with the three means being mutually significantly different at the 1% level). This shows that restrictions are much more actively implemented when a group with opposite views can be restrained, implying that subjects are much more liberal towards ingroup members than outgroup members. Still, we observe that subjects who were more willing to accept choice restrictions are themselves more likely to restrict others which may indicate that restrictions are often implemented in good faith.

3. Second Experiment

3.1. Sample and Experimental Design

The second experiment served two purposes. First, it was intended as a robustness check of our findings from the first experiment. Second, by varying the risk context, we wanted to examine whether different lotteries (with different expected values) would yield similar findings as in the altruism and time context. A potential reason why we did not observe a significant effect in the risk context in the first experiment is that all the available lottery options had the same expected value, leaving less leeway to perceive restrictions imposed by outgroup members as particularly malevolent. Moreover, in the first experiment the restriction in the risk context forbade to take the lottery with the highest risk and the lottery with the lowest risk which further limits the scope to assume malevolent motives behind the restriction.

The design of the second experiment was identical to the first one, with two minor modifications only. First, we used only two lotteries in the risk context. In option A, subjects got \$1 with 50% probability and 0\$ with 50% probability. In option B, they received \$0.8 for sure. The interventionist forbade the subject to take option B which had a higher expected value than option A without any risk. Second, we elicited the beliefs about the motives of the interventionist to impose the restrictions for each context separately rather than as an aggregate as in the first experiment to investigate whether the relation between beliefs and behavior is similar across contexts.

We conducted the second experiment on Prolific and ordered a sample size of 800 subjects. The data collection took place in January 2023. 694 subjects passed the attention check and reported either hate or love for Donald Trump and thus remain for the analysis. The median duration of the second experiment was 10 minutes and 18 seconds. The baseline payment was \$1.90, resulting in average hourly wages of \$11.85 (excluding bonuses).

3.2. Results

I. Likelihood of Lifting the Restrictions

Figure 3: Share of Subjects who Lifted Restrictions in Experiment 2





Figure 3 presents the relative frequencies with which subjects lifted the interventionist’s restrictions. It shows a very similar pattern to the one from the first experiment in Figure 1. Subjects were always more likely to lift the same restriction when it was imposed by an interventionist with the opposite view on Donald Trump. Overall, this likelihood was 12% higher in the outgroup-treatment than the ingroup-treatment, and this difference is highly significant ($p < 0.001$; see Tables B.1 and B.2 in the Appendix). Looking at the three different contexts, we note that for the time context and altruism context the share of subjects who lifted the restriction is statistically indistinguishable from the first experiment (time: $p = 0.805$; altruism: $p = 0.813$; Chi²-tests), thus supporting our previous results. Recall that for the risk context we had chosen a different parameterization in the second experiment. Here, we observe a substantial change in behavior in the second

experiment (83% of subjects lifted the restriction) in comparison to the first experiment (48%; $p < 0.001$; Chi²-test). More importantly, we find in the second experiment that the likelihood to lift the restriction is in each context significantly larger with an outgroup interventionist than an ingroup interventionist. For the risk context, the effect was weakly significant at $p = 0.060$, for the time context we have $p = 0.031$, and for the altruism context $p = 0.005$ (see Table B.1 in the Appendix). In relative terms, subjects paid money to lift the restrictions imposed by an outgroup interventionist between 7% (risk context) and 18% (altruism context) more often than if an ingroup member had imposed these restrictions.

II. Beliefs and Interventionist Behavior

Figure 4 presents subjects' beliefs about the interventionist's motives for imposing restrictions. Here, we present the average beliefs across the three different contexts. In Figure B.1 in the Appendix we show the beliefs for each context separately, and note that they look almost identical, not only qualitatively, but also quantitatively. From all these figures, the same pattern as shown in Figure 2 for the first experiment emerges: Subjects ascribed significantly more malevolent motives to an interventionist who had the opposite preference towards Donald Trump, relative to an interventionist who shared the same opinion towards Trump. Moreover, as in the first experiment, the treatment effect vanishes completely if we control for beliefs about the motives of the interventionist (see Table B.9 in the Appendix). Finally, we note that, similar to the first experiment, subjects impose restrictions 135% more often on outgroup members than on ingroup members.

Figure 4: Beliefs about Motives of Interventionist - Aggregated across all Three Contexts



Notes: The wording of the questions was as follows: Harming: “The {Trump lover/Trump hater} made this restriction to harm me”. Protecting: “The {Trump lover/Trump hater} made this restriction to protect me against bad decisions” (In the altruism context: “...protect me and others...”). Power: “The {Trump lover/Trump hater} made this restriction because he/she likes to feel powerful”. A value of 1 corresponds to “Strongly disagree”, 2 corresponds to “Somewhat disagree”, 3 corresponds to “Somewhat agree”, and 4 corresponds to “Strongly agree”.

4. Conclusion

We have shown that subjects resisted identical restrictions in a variety of contexts much more if those restrictions were imposed by someone with opposing political views (i.e., an outgroup member) than by someone with identical political preferences (an ingroup member). This is mainly driven by perceiving identical restrictions imposed by an outgroup member as much more malevolent.

Our findings might help to explain real-world conflicts where people resist restrictions

imposed by political rulers (e.g., when it comes to mandatory savings plans, COVID-19, climate protection, redistribution, abortion, or gun control). If the willingness to adhere to such rules and restrictions depends on whether they were implemented by a political opponent or someone with the same political preferences, then this implies that the power of factual arguments in support of specific rules and regulations might be limited (e.g., Kubin et al., 2021). Using factual arguments might possibly even backfire if they were perceived as an attack on the ingroup, for instance by subtly implying the moral superiority of the other side. Rather, our results highlight the importance to strengthen shared overarching identities in order to maintain acceptance of given rules within a society, as we have seen that people are significantly more often willing to accept a restriction of their choice options when an ingroup member had implemented such a restriction. Seen from this angle, policies that aim at strengthening a shared national identity (e.g., Bazzi et al., 2019; Depetris-Chauvin, Durante, and Campante, 2020; Bagues and Roth, 2023) might increase citizens' willingness to adhere to rules and regulations, even if those were created by a political opponent.

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Appendix A. First Experiment

Appendix A.1. Lifting Restrictions

Table A.1: Share of Subjects who Lifted the Restriction in the Different Contexts

	Dependent variable: Lifting the Restriction					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Overall	Time	Risk	Altruism	Prosocial	Antisocial
Outgroup Interventionist	0.0921*** (0.001)	0.112*** (0.005)	0.0146 (0.720)	0.150*** (0.000)	0.127** (0.010)	0.194*** (0.001)
Constant	0.523*** (0.000)	0.543*** (0.000)	0.474*** (0.000)	0.553*** (0.000)	0.682*** (0.000)	0.409*** (0.000)
Observations	604	604	604	604	306	298
R^2	0.019	0.013	0.000	0.024	0.021	0.037

p-values in parentheses

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A.2: Share of Subjects who Lifted the Restriction in the Different Contexts (with Controls)

	Dependent variable: Lifting the Restriction					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Overall	Time	Risk	Altruism	Prosocial	Antisocial
Outgroup Interventionist	0.0996*** (0.000)	0.117*** (0.003)	0.0301 (0.460)	0.152*** (0.000)	0.130*** (0.010)	0.190*** (0.001)
Constant	0.381*** (0.000)	0.521*** (0.000)	0.125 (0.280)	0.498*** (0.000)	0.744*** (0.000)	0.192 (0.233)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	604	604	604	604	306	298
R^2	0.071	0.076	0.041	0.049	0.060	0.079

p-values in parentheses

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Notes. Controls include age, gender, race and education

Appendix A.2. Motives

After having made their choices in the three contexts in the experiment, we elicited subjects' motives for lifting or accepting the restrictions in the three contexts. We used a 4-point scale (1=not relevant, 2=somewhat relevant, 3=relevant, and 4=very relevant) to ask for (1) instrumental motives (to make a good decision), (2) general autonomy motives (of liking or disliking external restrictions of choice in general), (3) intrinsic motives regarding the specific interventionist (of liking or disliking a restriction imposed by a Trump lover or Trump hater), and (4) intrinsic motives of liking or disliking that the interventionist had power to restrict one's choice.

The wording if the subject lifted a restriction was:

- (1) "Lifting the restriction allowed me to choose a split of money that I liked better" (version for the altruism context; description of choice varies across contexts).
- (2) "I felt a general dislike that my freedom of choice was restricted in this setting"
- (3) "I felt an even stronger dislike that a {Trump hater/Trump lover} restricted my freedom of choice"
- (4) "I felt a general dislike that the {Trump hater/Trump lover} had control in this setting"

The wording if the subject accepted a restriction was:

- (1) "I was still able to choose the split I liked best/ It wasn't that important for me to get another split" (version for the altruism context; description of choice varies across contexts)
- (2) "I liked it that somebody else made (part of) the decision for me"
- (3) "I liked it even better that a {Trump hater/Trump lover} made (part of) the decision for me"
- (4) "I liked it that a {Trump hater/Trump lover} had control in this setting"

From Tables [A.3](#) to [A.8](#), we see very clearly that both a dislike of being dependent on the interventionist and a dislike of the interventionist having power are much stronger if the interventionist is an outgroup member rather than an ingroup member:

Table A.3: Differences in the Altruism Context for Motives for Subjects who Lifted the Restriction

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	MotiveLiftingAltruism1	MotiveLiftingAltruism2	MotiveLiftingAltruism3	MotiveLiftingAltruism4
Outgroup Interventionist	-0.0761 (0.329)	0.207* (0.063)	0.806*** (0.000)	0.655*** (0.000)
Constant	3.640*** (0.000)	2.839*** (0.000)	1.758*** (0.000)	1.963*** (0.000)
Observations	381	381	381	381
R^2	0.002	0.009	0.108	0.073

p -values in parentheses

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A.4: Differences in the Risk Context for Motives for Subjects who Lifted the Restriction

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	MotiveLiftingRisk1	MotiveLiftingRisk2	MotiveLiftingRisk3	MotiveLiftingRisk4
Outgroup Interventionist	-0.0961 (0.325)	0.532*** (0.000)	1.005*** (0.000)	0.854*** (0.000)
Constant	3.580*** (0.000)	2.572*** (0.000)	1.616*** (0.000)	1.819*** (0.000)
Observations	291	291	291	291
R^2	0.003	0.055	0.167	0.128

p -values in parentheses

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A.5: Differences in the Time Context for Motives for Subjects who Lifted the Restriction

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	MotiveLiftingTime1	MotiveLiftingTime2	MotiveLiftingTime3	MotiveLiftingTime4
Outgroup Interventionist	-0.00788 (0.911)	0.124 (0.309)	0.731*** (0.000)	0.460*** (0.000)
Constant	3.709*** (0.000)	2.544*** (0.000)	1.557*** (0.000)	1.823*** (0.000)
Observations	362	363	363	363
R^2	0.000	0.003	0.098	0.041

p -values in parentheses

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A.6: Differences in the Altruism Context for Motives for Subjects who Accepted the Restriction

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	MotiveAcceptingAltruism1	MotiveAcceptingAltruism2	MotiveAcceptingAltruism3	MotiveAcceptingAltruism4
Outgroup Interventionist	0.0492 (0.735)	-0.207* (0.073)	0.615*** (0.000)	-0.310*** (0.002)
Constant	2.962*** (0.000)	1.562*** (0.000)	1.819*** (0.000)	1.492*** (0.000)
Observations	223	223	389	223
R^2	0.001	0.013	0.061	0.039

p -values in parentheses

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A.7: Differences in the Risk Context for Motives for Subjects who Accepted the Restriction

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	MotiveAcceptingRisk1	MotiveAcceptingRisk2	MotiveAcceptingRisk3	MotiveAcceptingRisk4
Outgroup Interventionist	-0.0287 (0.808)	-0.0825 (0.233)	-0.169*** (0.010)	-0.174*** (0.005)
Constant	3.085*** (0.000)	1.314*** (0.000)	1.294*** (0.000)	1.261*** (0.000)
Observations	313	313	313	313
R^2	0.000	0.005	0.022	0.026

p -values in parentheses

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A.8: Differences in the Time Context for Motives for Accepted who Lifted the Restriction

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	MotiveAcceptingTime1	MotiveAcceptingTime2	MotiveAcceptingTime3	MotiveAcceptingTime4
Outgroup Interventionist	0.0625 (0.646)	-0.212** (0.013)	-0.265*** (0.002)	-0.233*** (0.003)
Constant	3.030*** (0.000)	1.406*** (0.000)	1.414*** (0.000)	1.353*** (0.000)
Observations	241	241	241	241
R^2	0.001	0.024	0.037	0.035

p -values in parentheses

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Appendix A.3. Beliefs about Motives of Interventionist

The wording was:

- Belief 1) “The Trump lover/Trump hater made the restrictions to harm me”
- Belief 2) “The Trump lover/Trump hater made the restrictions to protect me and others against bad decisions”
- Belief 3) “The Trump lover/Trump hater made the restrictions because he/she likes to feel powerful”

Table A.9: Treatment Effects on Beliefs about Motives of Interventionist

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Harming	Protecting	Power
Outgroup Interventionist	0.827*** (0.000)	-0.591*** (0.000)	0.809*** (0.000)
Constant	2.103*** (0.000)	1.997*** (0.000)	2.622*** (0.000)
Observations	604	604	604
R^2	0.194	0.133	0.182

p-values in parentheses

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Notes: A value of 1 corresponds to “Strongly disagree”, 2 corresponds to “Somewhat disagree”, 3 corresponds to “Somewhat agree”, and 4 corresponds to “Strongly agree”.

Table A.10: Effects on Surprise and Perceived Reasonableness of Restrictions

	(1)	(2)
	Surprised	Restrictions Reasonable
Outgroup Interventionist	-0.353*** (0.000)	-0.676*** (0.001)
Constant	0.526*** (0.000)	4.254*** (0.000)
Observations	604	604
R^2	0.138	0.019

p-values in parentheses

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Notes. “Surprised” is a dummy indicating whether or not a subject was surprised that the interventionist imposed the restrictions on her; “RestrictionsReasonable” ranges from 1 to 10.

Table A.11: Predictive Power of Beliefs

	Dependent variable: Share of lifted restrictions		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Harming	0.0206 (0.237)		0.0215 (0.227)
Protecting	-0.0735*** (0.000)		-0.0744*** (0.000)
Power	0.0449** (0.013)		0.0456** (0.014)
Outgroup Interventionist		0.0921*** (0.001)	-0.00652 (0.833)
Constant	0.507*** (0.000)	0.523*** (0.000)	0.507*** (0.000)
Observations	604	604	604
R^2	0.083	0.019	0.083

p-values in parentheses

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Appendix B. Second Experiment

Appendix B.1. Lifting Restrictions

Table B.1: Share of Subjects who Lifted the Restriction in the Different Contexts

	Dependent variable: Lifting the Restriction					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Overall	Time	Risk	Altruism	Prosocial	Antisocial
Outgroup Interventionist	0.0790*** (0.000)	0.0808** (0.031)	0.0536* (0.060)	0.103*** (0.005)	0.0420 (0.378)	0.131** (0.013)
Constant	0.633*** (0.000)	0.534*** (0.000)	0.802*** (0.000)	0.562*** (0.000)	0.731*** (0.000)	0.423*** (0.000)
Observations	694	694	694	694	332	362
R^2	0.018	0.007	0.005	0.011	0.002	0.017

p-values in parentheses

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table B.2: Share of Subjects who Lifted the Restriction in the Different Contexts (with Controls)

	Dependent variable: Lifting the Restriction					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Overall	Time	Risk	Altruism	Prosocial	Antisocial
Outgroup Interventionist	0.0792*** (0.000)	0.0811** (0.031)	0.0551* (0.057)	0.101*** (0.006)	0.0467 (0.333)	0.119** (0.026)
Constant	0.640*** (0.000)	0.668*** (0.000)	0.772*** (0.000)	0.479*** (0.000)	0.714*** (0.000)	0.208 (0.137)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	694	694	694	694	332	362
R^2	0.051	0.035	0.026	0.036	0.026	0.074

p-values in parentheses

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Notes. Controls include age, gender, race and education

Appendix B.2. Motives

We measured the same motives as in the first experiment (see also section [Appendix A.2](#)).

Table B.3: Differences in the Altruism Context for Motives for Subjects who Lifted the Restriction

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	MotiveLiftingAltruism1	MotiveLiftingAltruism2	MotiveLiftingAltruism3	MotiveLiftingAltruism4
Outgroup Interventionist	-0.00131 (0.987)	0.219** (0.020)	1.175*** (0.000)	0.831*** (0.000)
Constant	3.492*** (0.000)	3.055*** (0.000)	1.683*** (0.000)	2.085*** (0.000)
Observations	425	425	425	425
R^2	0.000	0.013	0.229	0.120

p -values in parentheses

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table B.4: Differences in the Risk Context for Motives for Subjects who Lifted the Restriction

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	MotiveLiftingRisk1	MotiveLiftingRisk2	MotiveLiftingRisk3	MotiveLiftingRisk4
Outgroup Interventionist	-0.0294 (0.554)	0.281*** (0.002)	0.809*** (0.000)	0.785*** (0.000)
Constant	3.792*** (0.000)	2.595*** (0.000)	1.641*** (0.000)	1.792*** (0.000)
Observations	575	575	575	575
R^2	0.001	0.016	0.121	0.111

p -values in parentheses

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table B.5: Differences in the Time Context for Motives for Subjects who Lifted the Restriction

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	MotiveLiftingTime1	MotiveLiftingTime2	MotiveLiftingTime3	MotiveLiftingTime4
Outgroup Interventionist	-0.0192 (0.796)	0.416*** (0.000)	0.981*** (0.000)	0.849*** (0.000)
Constant	3.651*** (0.000)	2.556*** (0.000)	1.497*** (0.000)	1.730*** (0.000)
Observations	398	398	398	398
R^2	0.000	0.035	0.174	0.129

p -values in parentheses

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table B.6: Differences in the Altruism Context for Motives for Subjects who Accepted the Restriction

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	MotiveAcceptingAltruism1	MotiveAcceptingAltruism2	MotiveAcceptingAltruism3	MotiveAcceptingAltruism4
Outgroup Interventionist	-0.0516 (0.704)	-0.334*** (0.002)	0.754*** (0.000)	-0.339*** (0.000)
Constant	2.832*** (0.000)	1.729*** (0.000)	1.751*** (0.000)	1.497*** (0.000)
Observations	269	269	460	269
R^2	0.001	0.031	0.090	0.047

p -values in parentheses

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table B.7: Differences in the Risk Context for Motives for Subjects who Accepted the Restriction

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	MotiveAcceptingRisk1	MotiveAcceptingRisk2	MotiveAcceptingRisk3	MotiveAcceptingRisk4
Outgroup Interventionist	-0.120 (0.555)	-0.424*** (0.004)	-0.384** (0.012)	-0.339** (0.023)
Constant	2.529*** (0.000)	1.629*** (0.000)	1.629*** (0.000)	1.543*** (0.000)
Observations	119	119	119	119
R^2	0.003	0.058	0.045	0.037

p -values in parentheses

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table B.8: Differences in the Time Context for Motives for Subjects who Accepted the Restriction

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	MotiveAcceptingTime1	MotiveAcceptingTime2	MotiveAcceptingTime3	MotiveAcceptingTime4
Outgroup Interventionist	-0.186 (0.125)	-0.0944 (0.331)	-0.171* (0.069)	-0.103 (0.215)
Constant	3.255*** (0.000)	1.430*** (0.000)	1.430*** (0.000)	1.339*** (0.000)
Observations	296	296	296	296
R^2	0.008	0.003	0.011	0.005

p -values in parentheses

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Appendix B.3. Beliefs about Motives of Interventionist

Figure B.1: Beliefs about Motives of Interventionist in each Context




Table B.9: Predictive Power of Beliefs (Aggregated over Contexts)

	Dependent variable: Share of lifted restrictions		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Harming	0.0218 (0.181)		0.0259 (0.127)
Protecting	-0.0648*** (0.002)		-0.0697*** (0.001)
Power	0.0631*** (0.001)		0.0652*** (0.001)
Outgroup Interventionist		0.0790*** (0.000)	-0.0243 (0.369)
Constant	0.522*** (0.000)	0.633*** (0.000)	0.524*** (0.000)
Observations	694	694	694
R^2	0.095	0.018	0.097

p-values in parentheses

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$