Personal norms — and not only social norms — shape economic behavior

Zvonimir Bašić
Eugenio Verrina

MAX PLANCK SOCIETY

Personal norms — and not only social norms — shape economic behavior

Zvonimir Bašić / Eugenio Verrina

October 2020

Revised October 2023

Personal norms — and not only social norms — shape economic behavior[*]

Zvonimir Bašić and Eugenio Verrina[†]

October 6, 2023

Abstract

We propose a simple utility framework and design a novel two-part experiment to study the relevance of personal norms across various economic games and settings. We show that personal norms — together with social norms and monetary payoff — are highly predictive of individuals' behavior. Moreover, they are: *i)* distinct from social norms across a series of economic contexts, *ii)* robust to an exogenous increase in the salience of social norms, and *iii)* complementary to social norms in predicting behavior. Our findings support personal norms as a key driver of economic behavior.

Keywords: Personal norms, social norms, social image, elicitation method, normative conflict

JEL Classification: C91, D01, D63, D64, D91

1 Introduction

For decades, social norms have been used as a central assumption of economic models, and have helped to explain a large variety of phenomena, such as prosocial behavior (Bénabou and Tirole, 2006; Andreoni and Bernheim, 2009; Krupka and Weber, 2013; Bénabou et al., 2020), lying aversion (Gächter and Schulz, 2016; Abeler et al., 2019), costly punishment (Fehr and Gächter, 2000; Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004), all the way to labor market outcomes (Akerlof, 1980; Fehr et al., 1998; Lindbeck et al., 1999), and the effect of incentive schemes and contracts (Sliwka, 2007; Kessler and Leider, 2012; Huck et al., 2012; Danilov and Sliwka, 2017). Yet, alongside social norms, economic decisions might also be guided by *personal norms.* Both social and personal norms represent perceptions of appropriate behavior, i.e., behavior that is considered moral or correct.[1] However, they differ with respect to whose perceptions they capture — while social norms capture *societal* perceptions, personal norms capture *individually* held perceptions.[2]

Although the two norms might coincide, they might also be in conflict in many economically relevant contexts. For example, someone who disapproves of wealth redistribution might have a different personal norm about tax compliance compared to the social norm of the social welfare-oriented society she lives in. Likewise, the normative beliefs of a person who supports universal equal rights can be in conflict with those of a society that openly discriminates against members of other ethnic or socioeconomic groups. Further, the norms promoted through the organizational culture of a company, e.g, on shirking, whistle blowing, or taking advantage of informational asymmetries between sellers and consumers, can be at odds with the personal norms of its employees. Such discrepancies of normative beliefs can exist in principle for any economic behavior that is governed by norms.[3] If people's behavior is not only driven by

---

[1]In this paper, we are interested in the clash between personal and social perceptions of *appropriate* behavior. Hence we focus on injunctive social norms, i.e., prescriptions of which behavior is socially appropriate, and not descriptive social norms, i.e., which behavior people usually engage in. While both norms can influence behavior (see, e.g., Cialdini et al., 1990; Bicchieri and Xiao, 2009; Krupka and Weber, 2009; Bartke et al., 2017), the former provide the ideal conceptual counterpart to personal norms and allow us to analyze how the two normative perceptions of appropriate behavior shape economic decisions.

[2]We use the term "personal norms" to define individually held perceptions of appropriate behavior, following the early influential work by Shalom Schwartz (see, e.g., Schwartz, 1973, 1977) and subsequent work by Cialdini et al. (1991) in psychology, as well as more recent work in economics (see, e.g., Burks and Krupka, 2012; Alempaki et al., 2021; Capraro and Perc, 2021; te Velde, 2022). Note, however, that there are also other commonly used terms that describe the same or similar concepts in the literature, e.g., "moral norms" (see, e.g., Bicchieri, 2005) or "personal normative beliefs" (see, e.g., Bicchieri and Xiao, 2009; Bicchieri et al., 2021). See Section 2 for an exhaustive definition and discussion of related literature.

[3]Similar conflicts can arise due to pluralistic ignorance (Katz et al., 1931), which describes a situation in which people are privately against a social norm, but wrongly believe that others are in favor of it. An example is that of racial segregation in the USA (O'Gorman, 1975). Recently, Bursztyn et al. (2020) show how correcting

social but also by personal norms, they are then confronted with two (potentially competing) normative principles that can both determine behavior, and neglecting the latter would be detrimental to the understanding of economic decision making. Additionally, this could lead to dangerous pitfalls in the design of normative interventions and may provoke frictions that affect the success of organizations.

Taking this as our starting point, we propose a simple utility framework and design a novel experiment to study the relevance of personal norms across various economic games and settings. We estimate our utility framework with the collected data and demonstrate that personal norms — while taking monetary payoff and social norms into account — are *strong predictors* of economic behavior. Our findings show that personal norms are: *i) distinct* from social norms across a wide range of economic contexts, *ii) robust* to an exogenous increase in the salience of social norms, which increases the predictive value of social norms, but does not affect that of personal norms, leaving it strong and stable, and *iii) complementary* to social norms in predicting behavior, as a model with both personal and social norms outperforms a model with only one of the two norms.

As a first step in our paper, we present a simple utility framework in which people care about their monetary payoff, social norms, and personal norms. More precisely, we assume people care about the money they earn from an action, the degree to which this action complies with their beliefs about what society finds appropriate, and the degree to which this action complies with their own private perception about what is appropriate. Thus, personal norms are one of the components that determine a person's preferences over a set of alternative actions. Similarly to social norms, they can act as a driver of non-selfish behavior. The utility framework aims to capture a decision-making process in which two normative principles — one coming from within the person and the other one from society — are decisive for behavior.[4]

We then design a two-part experiment which allows us to investigate the predictive value of personal norms as well as social norms across four economic games. In the first part of the experiment, we elicit both social and personal norms in an online session for four games: dictator game, dictator game with tax, ultimatum game and third-party punishment game. To do so, we design a simple method to elicit personal and social norms with a symmetric procedure.

---

these beliefs can lead to important changes in behavior.

[4]This aspect marks the key distinction of our framework in comparison to classic approaches to modeling prosocial behavior, as it distinguishes between *who* is dictating the fairness principle — the individual or the society (see Section 2 for a discussion).

Subjects go through an adapted version of the Krupka and Weber (2013) social norms elicitation method and a symmetric procedure for eliciting personal norms, in randomized order. The main difference between the two procedures is the following: subjects evaluate all possible actions *i)* according to the opinion of *society* for social norms, or *ii)* according to their *own* opinion for personal norms. We demonstrate that the two norms elicited with this procedure are correlated, but that there are substantial differences at the individual level in all four games, indicating that the two norms are empirically distinct.

In the second part of our experiment, we invite the same subjects to the lab approximately four weeks after the norm elicitation took place. In the lab, they play the four games for which we elicited the norms. Importantly, this was not revealed to subjects prior to the lab experiment. We then connect subjects' behavior elicited in the lab to their answers from the elicitation of personal and social norms in the online experiment. We estimate our utility framework by using a conditional (fixed-effect) logit choice model, and show that personal norms — while taking social norms and monetary payoffs into account — are highly predictive of individuals' behavior. This finding holds across all four games individually, as well as when pooling them together. In addition to personal norms, our results also reveal that the other two components of our framework — social norms and monetary payoff — are predictive of behavior. Having demonstrated the strong relation between personal norms and economic behavior in a treatment where decisions remain private (Private), we then analyze the results of a treatment in which we *exogenously* increase the salience of social norms (Social). As economic decisions are rarely taken in a social vacuum, we investigate the predictive value of the two norms when subjects' actions are under the scrutiny of others. Following the reasoning of Bicchieri (2005), we hypothesize that this manipulation will increase subjects' concerns for their social image, leading them to act more in line with the views held by society. Hence, we expect the relation between social norms and behavior to become stronger. We find that, on average, the relation between social norms and behavior is strengthened by our manipulation. The weight people put on social norms significantly increases for two out of four games, as well as when pooling all four games together. This change, however, does not come at the expense of personal norms, since their relation with behavior remains significant and stable between the two treatments. Together, these results show that personal norms are strong predictors of behavior across different contexts, and support their role as a fundamental behavioral motive.

To substantiate further the importance of personal norms and to validate our two-norm

utility framework, we pit it against two alternative ones: one in which subjects only care about social norms and their monetary payoff (see, e.g., Krupka and Weber, 2013) and another one in which they only care about personal norms and their monetary payoff. If our fundamental assumption that people's decision-making is not only influenced by social norms but also by personal norms is true, the inclusion of both norms should lead to an improvement in the predictive fit of the estimated models. Comparing Log-likelihood ratios between the models, we find that adding personal norms significantly increases the predictive fit for almost all games, across both the PRIVATE and the SOCIAL treatment. We then also preform this comparison with the Akaike and Bayesian information criteria, which penalize the inclusion of additional predictors. Again, for both measures, the majority of comparisons favors the two-norm model (in almost all other cases, the model with only personal norms prevails). This model comparison exercise supports the central assumption of our framework, and shows that the inclusion of personal norms leads to an increase in our ability to predict economic behavior.

After establishing our main results, we provide several robustness checks to further support our findings and counter alternative explanations. First, we design a DOUBLE-ANONYMOUS treatment in order to address the concern that our results on the relation between personal norm and behavior might be due to subjects trying to signal certain values to the experimenter. We show that our results remain robust also when experimenter-subject anonymity is guaranteed with a double anonymous procedure. Moreover, we show that the weights subjects place on personal norms in this treatment are statistically indistinguishable from those in a replication of our PRIVATE treatment, suggesting that signaling motives in our main treatment are negligible. Second, we argue and provide evidence for why our results cannot be explained by a preference for consistency (Falk and Zimmermann, 2018). We minimize this concern through features of our design, most importantly, a long time lag between the online and the lab session (approx. 4 weeks). Moreover, we perform a robustness check and show that restricting our sample to subjects who report having an imperfect recall of the online part leaves our results intact. Third, we argue and provide multiple robustness checks to address the concern that our results might be due to subjects rating actions according to how much utility they would bring them, instead of answering according to their personal norms. We tackle this issue already in our experimental design, most importantly, by carefully constructing the elicitation of personal norms to identify this precise construct. We then show that this concern is not supported in our data: *i)* monetary payoff and social norms bear strong predictive value and increase the

goodness-of-fit of our models, which is at odds with the alternative explanation; *ii)* the actions which according to the alternative explanation should be among the least preferred ones are often chosen, and personal norms remain a robust predictor when we restrict our attention to these actions; and *iii)* a non-negligible proportion of actions which are rated as most personally appropriate are inconsistent with the alternative explanation, and for those decisions personal norms remain a significant predictor. Fourth, we test whether our results are influenced by the operationalization we use for social norms. Instead of using subjects' beliefs about the social norm, we assign them a common social norm by computing the average beliefs across all subjects — in line with Krupka and Weber (2013) — and re-run our main regressions. Also in this case, our results stay robust. Finally, we test whether the order in which the norms were elicited affects our results. Our results remain robust both when looking at each order separately and when re-estimating our utility framework by adding an interaction term between each of the two norms and the elicitation order.

As a last step, we go beyond our main analysis and complement it with three additional results. First, we replicate our key findings on the relation between the two norms and on the predictive value of personal norms with a separate set of subjects, indicating that these findings are stable across comparable populations. Second, we elicit the two norms for seven additional games and a battery of vignettes representing economic situations in everyday life or at a workplace, e.g., nepotism, tax evasion, shirking, and misreporting the amount of hours worked. We show substantial individual-level differences between the two norms in all the additional games and vignettes, showing that this result is not restricted to the four games in our main experiment. In combination with our main findings, this suggests that personal norms are a relevant behavioral predictor across a wide range of economic contexts. Finally, we analyze the differences between personal and social norms across all of the eleven games we elicited the norms for and show that there are systematic differences which depend on the game and the context, further underscoring the importance of understanding both norms before engaging in normative interventions.

Our results contribute to the literature investigating the effect of social norms on economic behavior (see, e.g., Krupka and Weber, 2009; Kessler and Leider, 2012; Krupka and Weber, 2013; Gächter et al., 2013; Banerjee, 2016; Kimbrough and Vostroknutov, 2016; Agerström et al., 2016; Krupka et al., 2017; Gächter et al., 2017; Barr et al., 2018; Boonmanunt et al., 2020; Bicchieri et al., 2022; Erkut, 2022). We show that, in addition to social norms, personal

norms have a strong and robust relation to economic behavior. Importantly, we show that they *complement* social norms in predicting behavior.

Our study is closely connected to a stream of papers exploring the idea that — alongside social norms — people also care about some type of individually held values. Michaeli and Spiro (2015) utilize this idea to explain theoretically how strictness in societies can affect publicly stated opinions and te Velde (2022) to show how using social incentives might backfire. Closer to our study, Burks and Krupka (2012) study social norms across different groups in a financial firm. They also elicit personal norms, and report that a summary measure of overall misalignment between the two norms in a vignette on whistle-blowing is correlated to job satisfaction and behavior in an "advice game". Moreover, Alempaki et al. (2021) study how using a foreign language affects lying behavior, and elicit both personal and social norms after the lying task. They report that both norms correlate with lying behavior.[5] These studies point to the potential that personal norms hold; however, they do not aim (and hence are not designed) to empirically isolate the relevance of personal norms. In our study, we employ a novel design with two experimental parts, separated by a time lag. This allows us to cleanly *estimate and establish* a relation between both social and personal norms, on the one side and behavior, on the other, across various experimental games and settings.

Our study also connects to the literature on moral behavior (see, e.g., Dana et al., 2007; Bénabou and Tirole, 2011; Van der Weele et al., 2014; Falk, 2021). One key question in this literature is how to induce moral behavior — whether to rely on intrinsic moral motivation or extrinsic social motivation. This question is crucial in many applications, from tax compliance to donations and voting (see, e.g., DellaVigna et al., 2012, 2016; Bott et al., 2020). Most related to our study, Cappelen et al. (2017) design an experiment where they manipulate the extrinsic social motivation and intrinsic moral motivation in a dictator game. They find that both of these motives matter, yet the social motivation only causes more prosocial behavior when there is already a moral argument for sharing (i.e., when intrinsic motives are present). Our study contributes to this literature by taking a different approach. Instead of assuming the moral values people care about, we identify them through the elicitation of personal and social norms. This allows us to study how these values differ at the individual level. More importantly, by coupling the norms with the behavioral data, our approach allows us to *estimate* the weights

---

[5]There is also evidence showing that nudging people to think about what they personally believe is moral before making a decision affects their behavior (Capraro et al., 2019; Bilancini et al., 2020).

people attach to these different motives when making decisions and also to study how the weights change when social motives are made salient.

Our findings also advance the literature on image concerns, in particular in the domain of prosociality. We connect to studies on self-image (see, e.g. Dana et al., 2007; Gneezy et al., 2012; Grossman and Van Der Weele, 2017; Adena and Huck, 2020; Bašić et al., 2020; Falk, 2021), as personal norms hinge on inner enforcement mechanisms which rely on the image or concept one has of herself. Moreover, we contribute to the understanding of social image concerns (see, e.g., Andreoni and Petrie, 2004; Alpizar et al., 2008; Ariely et al., 2009; Andreoni and Bernheim, 2009; Schram and Charness, 2015; Krysowski and Tremewan, 2020), as we report evidence underscoring the relevance of social norms in settings in which social image concerns are high.

Finally, our findings also relate to signaling models which capture the relations between image concerns, social norms and behavior (see, e.g., Bénabou and Tirole, 2006; Andreoni and Bernheim, 2009; Bénabou and Tirole, 2011). Bénabou et al. (2020) consider a setting with multiple audiences that have conflicting normative values. Our results speak to the relevance of such settings, as the presence of an internal audience (judging according to personal norms) and an external audience (judging according to social norms) is common to many economic decisions.

2 Social and personal norm-dependent utility framework

We start by defining the two concepts that build the cornerstones of our framework, social and personal norms. Regarding social norms, we closely follow the approach of Krupka and Weber (2013) and stay in line with other seminal work on the topic (Elster, 1989; Ostrom, 2000; Bicchieri, 2005). We conceptualize social norms as collective perceptions among members of a group or society regarding the appropriateness of different actions in a given situation, where the standard of appropriateness is judged according to what is perceived as moral or correct behavior. In this sense, they represent shared understandings about actions that are permitted or not. They hinge on expectations of others and can be enforced by external sanctions or the threat thereof (see Bicchieri, 2005). Importantly, the definition we use implies that, for each potential action in a given situation, it is possible to attach a socially accepted value which indicates how appropriate the action is perceived to be from the viewpoint of the respective group or society.

In contrast to social norms, personal norms represent one's *private* perceptions about the appropriateness of different actions in a given situation. To define them, we follow Schwartz (1973, 1977) who argue that personal norms come from internalized values and deviations from them are subject to intrinsic sanctioning tied to the self-concept, e.g., guilt or self-depreciation (see also Schwartz and Fleishman, 1978; Elster, 1989; Cialdini et al., 1991). In this sense, personal norms do not hinge on others' expectations to follow them (see Bicchieri, 2005), and can diverge from social norms. They arise from one's conviction of what is the right thing to do, reflecting the views on what one personally considers as moral or correct behavior (see Schwartz, 1973, 1977; Bicchieri, 2005). Following this line of reasoning, we define *personal norms* as a person's individual perception regarding the appropriateness of different actions in a given situation, where the standard of appropriateness is judged according to what an individual perceives as moral or correct behavior, irrespective of the opinion of others. Consequently, we assume that it is possible to attach a personal value to how appropriate each action is in a given situation.

Concerning the relation between the two norms, since personal norms are a product of internalized values, they can originate from (and hence be congruent with) social norms. However, they can also diverge from them via different processes (see Schwartz, 1973). In particular, an individual personal history and social interactions will expose her to different and unique (norm-relevant) information (see Tremewan and Vostroknutov, 2020). As an example, someone could abide by a new social norm after moving to another society, but still personally hold the old norm. Alternatively, this discrepancy could originate at an early age due to the transmission of parental personal norms that differ from the socially prescribed ones. In sum, one could view the process behind the formation of personal norms as the sedimentation of social interactions and individual events over one's life leading to the internalization of certain values. While we do not focus on the precise sources of the discrepancies between personal and social norms, we rely on their existence to be able to disentangle the relation between the two norms and economic behavior. We then focus only on what is necessary to answer our research question — we elicit the two norms at a given moment, thus abstracting from any dynamic processes or dependencies that might have (over time) led to the current values.

Before turning to our utility framework, we note that our normative definitions imply that social norms are shared values, whereas personal norms can differ across people. While an individual should have more or less perfect insight into her own personal norms, she can only

rely on her belief about the social norm. Elicitations of social norms often reveal that some individuals fail to guess the normative belief of the majority, i.e., their beliefs about the social norm are inaccurate (see, e.g., Krupka and Weber, 2013; Kimbrough and Vostroknutov, 2016; Krupka et al., 2017). Thus, if individuals act upon their beliefs and not upon the commonly recognized social norm — which is typically operationalized as an aggregation of individuals' beliefs (e.g., as the mean or median) — using the latter could potentially misidentify its relation with behavior. For this reason, we rely on what subjects *think* is appropriate from the viewpoint of society (belief about the social norm) and what they themselves perceive as appropriate (personal norm) in our utility framework and analysis. We find this to be a more natural way to compare personal and social norms. We later relax this assumption and repeat our entire analysis by assuming that people care about the commonly recognized social norm instead of their belief about the social norm. Our results are not affected by this different operationalization of the social norm (see Section 4.3 and Appendix A.4).

To construct our utility framework, we build on recent social norm models (see, e.g., Kessler and Leider, 2012; Krupka and Weber, 2013; Kimbrough and Vostroknutov, 2016; Krupka et al., 2017; Gächter et al., 2017; Barr et al., 2018), which explain social behavior by positing that — alongside monetary payoff — people care about adhering to social norms. In contrast to classic social preferences models, in which the fairness principle people care about is part of the assumptions — for example, equality (e.g., Fehr and Schmidt, 1999) or reciprocity (e.g., Falk and Fischbacher, 2006) — here it arises through a collectively recognized social norm, which can change depending on the context and can be measured empirically (see Krupka and Weber, 2013; Kimbrough and Vostroknutov, 2016, for a discussion). These models have recently gained a lot of attention, as they possess strong predictive capabilities and are successful in a wide array of contexts, also in those in which social preferences models commonly fail. For example, when subjects can exploit moral wiggle room (e.g., Dana et al., 2007), or when subtle contextual changes alter their behavior (e.g., Krupka and Weber, 2013). Here, we adapt the social norm models by positing that people also care about adhering to their personal norms. Guided by a long-standing literature in neighboring fields (see, e.g., Schwartz, 1973, 1977; Schwartz and Fleishman, 1978; Cialdini et al., 1991; Bicchieri, 2005), we introduce another (potentially conflicting) normative principle which can also determine behavior. Analogously to social norms, personal norms are distinct from classic social preferences, as they capture normative principles that — instead of being part of the assumption — arise from private normative values, which

10

can change depending on the context and can be measured empirically. Importantly, they can differ at the individual level, as their key feature is that they are *privately* held. This is what gives rise to the key novelty of our approach. Instead of focusing on *how* the fairness principle is modeled and captured (which differentiates social norm models and classic social preferences models), our framework sets to separate *who* is dictating the fairness principle — the society or the individual.

Another related and important class of models capturing social behavior are models assuming that different individuals might care about different fairness principles, e.g., the egalitarian or the libertarian fairness principle (see, e.g., Cappelen et al., 2007, 2013). Similarly to classical social preferences models, the fairness principles in these models are part of the assumptions. Yet they can vary across individuals, making them much more similar in spirit to our framework, even more so, as one can back out the fairness principle people care about from data. Also here, the key distinction between our framework and these models is that we aim to separate *who* is dictating the fairness principle. We posit that people *simultaneously* care about two (potentially competing) fairness principles — one coming from society and one from within the individual.

We now describe our utility framework. An individual i takes an action a_k from a set of possible actions $A = [a_1, ..., a_K]$. She cares about: *i)* the monetary payoff $\pi(a_k)$ she gets from the action, *ii)* her belief about the appropriateness of the action from society's view $S_i(a_k)$, *iii)* and her own private perception about the appropriateness of the action $P_i(a_k)$.[6] $S_i(a_k)$ and $P_i(a_k)$ are functions that assign an appropriateness score in an interval $[-1, 1]$ to each action. $S_i(a_k)$ represents the perception about the commonly held view in society and, hence, describes the subjects' beliefs about how socially appropriate or inappropriate it is to perform a certain action.[7] Similarly, $P_i(a_k)$ describes the subjects' perception about how appropriate or inappropriate it is to perform an action from their own viewpoint. In both cases, a negative score means that the action is perceived as inappropriate, whereas, if the score is positive, the action is considered to be appropriate. The utility function of an individual is then simply given by:

---

[6]A similar concept is also presented in Burks and Krupka (2012).

[7]Note that the assumption of a single social norm is a simplifying (and common) assumption we make to highlight the contrast between internal and external sources of normativity. Indeed, the seminal work of Akerlof and Kranton (2000) on identity shows that different social norms can be activated depending on one's identity. This insight could be included in our utility framework by adding group-specific norms and specifying the extent to which an individual cares about adhering to that group's norm.

$$U_i(a_k) = V(\pi(a_k)) + \gamma S_i(a_k) + \delta P_i(a_k). \tag{1}$$

Here, $V(\cdot)$ is the utility derived from money. The two parameters $\gamma, \delta \geq 0$ represent the tendency or concern of an individual to follow the social and personal norm. They are zero for an individual who is entirely untroubled by the two. The larger they are, the more an individual is influenced by the respective appropriateness ratings. While an individual might want to follow both norms, she could also be highly concerned by the social appropriateness of an action and not by the personal appropriateness, or the other way around.[8] We assume that the two parameters are determined by one's deeper preferences to follow the respective norms, but can also be affected by other, external factors. Specifically, we follow Bicchieri (2005) in arguing that "situational factors may increase the effect of norms on behavior by making a norm salient" (p. 46); hence, we assume that γ and δ can be affected by the environment (see also Berkowitz and Daniels, 1964; Schwartz and Fleishman, 1978; Rutkowski et al., 1983; Cialdini et al., 1991). We use this assumption for our manipulation of social norms salience (see Section 3.5).[9] Importantly, our utility function implies that personal norms are just one of the components which determine subjects preferences over different actions. Hence, the most preferred action, i.e., the one that yields the highest utility, does not have to be the one that is perceived as personally most appropriate. Whether the two will coincide depends also on all other components of the utility functions.[10] In Section 4.3, we report a series of robustness checks showing that our results cannot be explained by subjects rating the actions according to the utility they would bring them instead of according to their personal norms.

---

[8]The assumption of additive separability between the two normative components of the utility function follows the relevant literature, as personal norms are generally conceptualized as separate drivers of behavior from social norms (see, e.g., Schwartz, 1973, 1977). Importantly, we also test this assumption using our dataset, and find no evidence of an interaction effect between the two norms (see footnote 18 in Section 4.2).

[9]One could formalize this more explicitly by assuming that γ (δ) is a function of subjects' context independent preferences to follow social (personal) norms, and the context dependent salience of social (personal) norms. This approach is similar to the one used when modeling prosocial behavior through reputational concerns in signaling models. For example, Bénabou and Tirole (2006) assume that a single parameter captures one's concern for prosocial reputation, and that this parameter can be separated into one's context-independent concern to be perceived positively, and the context-dependent visibility or salience of one's actions.

[10]Note that one could also understand preferences as capturing what an individual wants to do, i.e., as the outcome of the utility-maximization process, and personal norms as capturing what an individual should do (based on one's own standards of behavior). This also relates to the want/should conflict in the realm of time preferences (see Milkman et al., 2008, for a review), where an individual wants to perform an action in the moment (stay on the sofa or eat a pizza) which goes against her long-term interest of what she should do (go to the gym or eat a salad).

3 Experimental design and predictions

Our experimental design consists of two parts: an online experiment and a laboratory experiment. Each subject participated in both the online and the lab part, which were separated by a considerable time lag. In both parts, subjects went through four different games. In this section, we first give an overview of our four games (see Section 3.1). We then describe the online experiment in which we elicited subjects' social and personal norms for the four games along with other variables (see Section 3.2). Following that, we illustrate the design of the lab experiment, where subjects played the four games, either in a PRIVATE or a SOCIAL treatment in a between-subjects design (see Section 3.3). We conclude by detailing the experimental procedure (see Section 3.4) and state our predictions derived from the theoretical framework (see Section 3.5).

3.1 Games

We chose the following four games: dictator game, dictator game with tax, ultimatum game, and third-party punishment game. The dictator game (Kahneman et al., 1986; Forsythe et al., 1994) is one of the most widely studied experimental setups, which captures individuals' prosocial behavior in the absence of strategic interaction. The dictator game with tax (Andreoni and Miller, 2002) extends this setup to a broader range of motives, as it introduces a conflict between competing fairness principles. The ultimatum game (Güth et al., 1982) is a widely-used paradigm that (in contrast to the first two games) investigates fairness concerns in a strategic setting. Finally, the third-party punishment game (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004) is a more recent, but highly influential setup that studies norm enforcement and altruistic punishment. We chose these four games to demonstrate that our results apply to a variety of economically relevant settings. We aimed to capture: *i)* a broad range of motives that are present as drivers in various economic decisions, and *ii)* important economic contexts, which have gained a lot of attention in previous research. The complete structure of the games was kept constant both when we elicited norms in the online experiment and when subjects played the games in the lab experiment.

Dictator game In the dictator game (DG), two participants are randomly matched together. We implement role uncertainty: participants do not know their role at the beginning and both have to decide how they would split an endowment of €10 (in intervals of €1), if they were

assigned to the role of dictator. This decision is private and both decide without knowing what the other participant would choose. The decision of the actual dictator is then implemented. Note that we use role uncertainty in all games where there is a passive recipient: dictator game, dictator game with tax, and third-party punishment game.

Dictator game with tax   The dictator game with tax (DGT) is identical to the DG above, except that the endowment to be split is of €12, and any amount sent to the recipient is reduced by 40% (the tax). Subjects can send amounts in €1.50 increments (€1.50, €3, ..., €12). Note that sending €0 maximizes the sum of payoffs, while sending €7.5 ensures equal earnings for both players (€4.5) and sending €6 equalizes the two shares before the 40% reduction.

Ultimatum game   In the ultimatum game (UG), two participants are randomly matched together and assigned the roles of proposer and responder. The proposer gets €10 and can offer any integer amount from €0 to €10 to the responder. If the responder accepts the offer, the €10 are divided as suggested by the proposer. If she rejects the offer, both participants earn nothing. We elicit the responder's choice using the strategy method (Selten, 1965): the responder has to state the minimum offer she would accept. Any offer greater or equal to the declared amount is accepted, while those below are rejected. The payoffs are determined by matching the proposer's actual offer with the choice of the responder. In this game, we are interested in responders' rejection behavior.

Third-party punishment game   In the third-party punishment game (TPP), three subjects are randomly matched together. One of them is assigned the role of dictator. The other two subjects both have to indicate how they would decide if assigned the role of third party. The dictator gets €10 and can give either €0, €2 or €5 to the recipient. The third party can punish the dictator. She gets €5 and can reduce the dictator's payoff by €3 for each punishment point she assigns, with the dictator's payoff being bounded below by €0. Each punishment point costs her €1 and she can assign at most 2 punishment points. We elicit the third-party's choice using the strategy method: the third party has to assign punishment points for each possible choice of the dictator (€0, €2, or €5). The decisions are private and all three subjects decide without knowing what the other subjects have decided. Punishment points are then assigned according to the actual choice of the dictator and the punishment choice of the actual third party. In this game, we are interested in third-parties' behavior.

3.2 Online experiment

Subjects received a link to access the online experiment immediately after subscribing to the laboratory experiment. This occurred four weeks before the first session of the lab experiment, which took place on three consecutive days. Subjects had six days to complete the online experiment, which means they completed it between 23 and 30 days before their lab session. This long time lag was specifically chosen to reduce subjects' recollection of the online tasks and of their exact answers, once they came to the lab. At the beginning of the online session, participants generated a code which we used to match their data between the online and the lab session. Then, they proceeded to the main task: the elicitation of their beliefs about social and personal norms in the four games, as described below. The elicitation of norms was organized in two blocks: a block with personal norms, and a block with social norms. The order of the two blocks as well as the order of the games within the blocks was randomized at the individual level. Each block started with an explanation of the task and an example. While completing the first block of norm elicitations, subjects were unaware of the upcoming second block. For example, if they faced the personal norm elicitation first, they were not aware that afterwards they would be facing the social norm elicitation. After both blocks, we elicited subjects' gender, age, field of study, number of siblings, favorite food, and favorite movie (the last two variables were safeguards to be able to distinguish subjects if they had the same code).

Social norms We elicited social norms using an adapted version of the widely used Krupka and Weber (2013) elicitation method. We carefully phrased the text in a manner allowing us to directly contrast personal and social norms. Subjects had to rate how socially appropriate they believed each action to be on a 6-point Likert scale, ranging from very inappropriate to very appropriate. In particular, we used the following text: *"For each action, evaluate according to the opinion of the society and independently of your own opinion, whether it is appropriate or not to choose it. "Appropriate" behavior means the behavior that you consider most people would agree upon as being "correct" or "moral"."* (See Appendix B.1 for the full instructions). We rescaled the answers to an interval from -1 to 1 for the subsequent analysis. Subjects received €0.30 for each answer that matched what most other subjects had chosen and could thus earn up to €12 from this task. This provides an incentive to coordinate on the social norm (for further discussion, see Krupka and Weber, 2013).

15

Personal norms We elicited personal norms with a symmetric procedure to the one just described for social norms. However, instead of asking for the social appropriateness, we asked subjects to rate how personally appropriate they believed each action to be, irrespective of the others' views. In particular, we used the following text: *"For each action, evaluate according to your own opinion and independently of the opinion of others, whether it is appropriate or not to choose it. "Appropriate" behavior means the behavior that you personally consider to be "correct" or "moral"."* Subjects answered on a 6-point Likert scale, ranging from very inappropriate to very appropriate, and were asked to answer as precisely as possible with their honest opinion. Answers are re-scaled between -1 to 1 for the subsequent analysis. Symmetrically to the social norm elicitation, we ask subjects to rate actions independently of the opinion of others to ensure that they understand the distinction between the two norms and to minimize their conflation.[11] This elicitation was not incentivized, as personal norms are by definition an individual value and cannot be matched to others' personal norms (see Burks and Krupka (2012) for a similar method).

3.3 Laboratory experiment

The main purpose of the lab experiment was to elicit subjects' behavior in the four games. Each subject played all games and their order was randomized at the individual level. We imposed perfect stranger matching, i.e., each subject could only be matched once with another given subject across the four games. One game was randomly selected to determine the payoff. The outcomes of the games as well as the payoff and the role assignment were revealed only after all subjects went through all four games.

Subjects were randomly assigned to one of two treatments. The treatment assignment was done at the session level, i.e., all subjects in one session were in the same treatment. In the PRIVATE treatment, subjects made the decisions for the four games in an anonymous setting. In the SOCIAL treatment, we *exogenously* manipulated the visibility of subjects' actions in order to

---

[11]While this approach is crucial to minimize the concern of subjects conflating the two norms in our elicitation, one could argue that it might induce subjects to report personal appropriateness ratings that are different from the social ones. This concern is limited for the following reasons. First, this would lead to a misidentification of personal norms, which, if anything, would make it more difficult for us to establish our key finding on the relation between personal norms and behavior (which we robustly observe across all games and treatments). Second, this issue can be viewed as an experimenter demand effect: subjects could feel encouraged to report personal norms that diverge from social norms. Arguably, a stronger experimenter demand effect would occur once subjects complete the social norms elicitation block and learn that they next need to state their personal norms, as they might deduce that the research question is related to contrasting the two norms. However, we robustly show that this concern is not supported in our data (see Section 4.3).

increase their social image concerns. To this end, subjects were informed at the very beginning of the experiment that, after everyone had completed all tasks, they all had to stand up so that everyone could see and hear everyone else. A laboratory assistant would subsequently call up each participant one after the other. Participants would then have to say their first name and what they had chosen in each of the four games. Specifically, they would have to read verbatim a text displayed on their screen containing all information regarding all the decisions they had taken. Importantly, this approach ensured that the environment during the decision-making stage was kept constant across the two treatments, and the only difference was the information about whether their behavior would become publicly known or not (see Ariely et al. (2009), Ewers and Zimmermann (2015), and Kessler et al. (2021) for similar manipulations, and Appendix B.2 for experimental instructions).

Before the start of each game, subjects had to answer control questions to make sure they had understood the experimental instructions correctly. Once subjects had completed the main part of the experiment, they went through a short series of questionnaires. This included a measurement of participants' reputational concerns (adapted from Romano and Balliet, 2017) and questions about their recollection of the online experiment and some sociodemographics.

3.4 Procedure

The experiment was conducted at the Cologne Laboratory for Economic Research (CLER) of the University of Cologne between October and November 2019. The online experiment was conducted using Qualtrics, while the laboratory experiment was programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Subjects were recruited via Orsee (Greiner, 2015). The invitations contained the information that subjects' decisions in the study might be disclosed to other participants. Our sample consists of 250 subjects that took part in both the online and the lab experiment (62% female, average age 25.8 years). In Appendix A.1, we show that there was no systematic attrition between the online and lab experiment. Out of 250 subjects, 127 participated in the PRIVATE treatment and 123 in the SOCIAL treatment.[12] All subjects received a show-up fee of €8, plus their earnings from the online experiment and their earnings from the laboratory experiment. Overall, subjects received a payment of €17.3, on average. The online experiment lasted between 20 and 35 minutes, while the laboratory experiment took on average 50 minutes.

---

[12]13 subjects participated in the lab experiment without having completed the online experiment. We exclude those lab observations, as all our analyses rely on subjects' ratings of personal and social norms, which was done in the online part.

3.5 Predictions

We have three main predictions for the results of our experiment. First, as highlighted in Section 2, we expect personal and social norms to be related, since personal norms represent internalized values which may originate from the society; however, they do not need to be identical. In fact, many economic settings contain a multitude of normative principles (e.g., equality, altruism, payoff maximization, efficiency) that could give rise to discrepancies between the two norms. These differences represent a *conditio sine qua non* for identifying the differential relation between the two norms and behavior.

Hypothesis 1 *Perceptions of social and personal normative appropriateness are correlated; however, there are non-negligible differences between the two at the individual level.*

Second, while it is well-established that social norms and monetary payoff influence economic behavior, we conjecture that personal norms are also a driver of behavior; thus, we expect them to play an important role in explaining subjects' actions across the four games.

Hypothesis 2 *Personal norms play a significant role in explaining behavior: $\delta > 0$ (Equation* (1)*).*

Third, as described in Section 2, we also posit that the weight people put on social and personal norms might differ across situations. Our treatment manipulation in the SOCIAL treatment is aimed at making social norms more salient. Since social norms, in contrast to personal norms, are subject to others' expectations of following them (Bicchieri, 2005), we conjecture that increasing the visibility of actions, i.e., social image concerns, will make subjects more concerned about the opinion of others. If there is an expectation to follow the social norm, the manipulation should raise the influence of social norms on behavior; thus, we expect the social norms' parameter to increase.

Hypothesis 3 *Social norms play a more important role in the SOCIAL treatment compared to the PRIVATE treatment in explaining behavior: $\gamma_{SOCIAL} > \gamma_{PRIVATE}$ (Equation* (1)*).*

Given that personal norms are not subject to others' expectations of following them (Bicchieri, 2005), observability should not affect the weight people assign to personal norms directly. Nevertheless, there could be an indirect ("crowding-out") effect. If social norms become more salient, the presence of a strong competing normative principle could "override" the effect of

18

personal norms (see Bicchieri, 2010), diminishing the weight assigned to them. In contrast to this line of reasoning, one might also argue that some individuals may want to follow their personal norms exactly when observed, as this could signal one's integrity (te Velde, 2022) or they may want to show others what they believe is the right thing to do. Such a mechanism could increase the weight placed on personal norms. Thus, when analyzing how the SOCIAL treatment affects social norms, we will also test for potential effects on personal norms.

4 Results

Our results are structured as follows. We first give an overview of personal and social norms across the four games and provide evidence for their distinctness at the individual level (see Section 4.1). Then, we move to our main results and analyze how personal and social norms are related to behavior (see Section 4.2). Here, we establish the predictive value of personal norms in the PRIVATE treatment and investigate how the weights of personal and social norms change in the SOCIAL treatment. Moreover, we pit our model against two competing models where subjects only care about one of the two norms to compare their predictive power. Following that, we perform five sets of robustness checks to validate our main results (see Section 4.3). We conclude with three additional results from further experiments (see Section 4.4). We replicate our key findings on the relation between the two norms and on the predictive value of personal norms. We then investigate individual-level differences between the two norms in seven additional games and ten vignettes. Finally, we investigate the patterns of personal and social norms in the eleven games we elicited the norms for.

4.1 Overview and differences between personal and social norms

We start by providing evidence for the difference between personal and social norms. As argued in Hypothesis 1, we expect social and personal norms to be related, but also sufficiently distinct from each other. In line with our conjecture, we find that appropriateness ratings of personal and social norms have a strong relationship. Specifically, we observe strong and significant correlations across all four games: 0.72 for the DG, 0.65 for the DGT, 0.74 for the UG, and 0.76 for the TPP ($p < 0.001$ for all correlations; Pearson product-moment correlation). However, this strong relation masks important differences at the individual level. To investigate this, we look at the personal and social appropriateness ratings of the available actions in each of the

four games and check whether and to what extent the two ratings differ. We visualize this information in Figure 1. For each individual, we subtract her personal-norm appropriateness rating from her social-norm appropriateness rating for all possible actions across the four games. The difference can range from -2 to 2. A difference of 0 means that the two ratings are the same.

Figure 1: Individual differences between appropriateness ratings of social and personal norms

Note: The difference is calculated by subtracting an individual's personal appropriateness rating from her social appropriateness rating. The proportion of each difference is displayed for each action in a given game. In the DG, a subject can send from €0 to €10. In the DGT, a subject can send from €0 to €12. In the UG, a subject chooses the minimum offer she is ready to accept (from €0 to €10). In the TPP, a subject decides how many punishment points she wants to assign $(0, 1, 2)$ depending on how many euros the dictator gives $(0, 2, 5)$.

One can easily notice that, while a difference of 0 is frequent, for a substantial amount of cases there is indeed a difference in the ratings of social and personal norms. In fact, a difference is present for 49.89% of the cases in DG, 55.64% in DGT, 49.67% in UG, and 47.56% in TPP. All proportions are significantly different from 0 (the 99% asymptotic binomial confidence

interval does not contain 0 in any comparison).[13] This confirms our conjecture and constitutes an excellent precondition to study the importance of personal and social norms for people's behavior.

Result 1 *While social norms and personal norms are correlated, there are substantial differences at the individual level across all four games.*

4.2 Personal norms, social norms, and behavior

We now join the data regarding personal and social norms from the online experiment with the behavioral data from the lab. This allows us to find out whether personal norms are predictors of behavior in the four games, as conjectured by Hypothesis 2.

To estimate our utility framework $(U_i(a_k) = V(\pi(a_k)) + \gamma S_i(a_k) + \delta P_i(a_k))$, we follow the approach of the current literature on social norms (see, e.g., Krupka and Weber, 2013; Gächter et al., 2013; Krupka et al., 2017), and employ a conditional (fixed-effect) logit choice model, in particular, the McFadden (1973) choice model. The model captures the utility-maximization process, taking the chosen action as the one that maximizes individual's utility. In the model, the dependent variable is a dummy variable indicating whether a subject chose a given action, and the independent variables are the three characteristics of that potential action. The first independent variable $(\pi(a_k))$ is the individual's monetary payoff when performing the action a_k. In line with previous work, we assume a linear restriction on the utility derived from money $V(\cdot)$, such that, for any payoff, $\pi(a_k)$, $V(\pi(a_k)) = \beta\pi(a_k)$. Thus, β represents the weight placed on monetary payoff. The second independent variable $(S_i(a_k))$ is the individual's social appropriateness rating of the action and the third one $(P_i(a_k))$ is her personal appropriateness rating of the action. The model relies on within-subject variation (controlling for fixed-effects at the subject-game level). The three estimated coefficients then provide us with the weights people assign to each of the three variables within our utility framework: monetary payoff (β), social appropriateness rating (γ), and personal appropriateness rating (δ) (for more details, see Appendix A.2).[14]

---

[13]These results are not driven by a small subset of individuals. To show this, we calculate the proportion of non-zero differences between the two ratings for each individual, across all the actions in the four games. We find very few subjects whose proportion of non-zero differences is negligible, as well as very few who (almost) always exhibit a difference. Around 90% of subjects show non-zero differences between the two ratings in 25% to 75% of cases (the average across all individuals is 51%, $sd = 15.83\%$).

[14]As two of our main predictors — personal norm rating and social norm rating — are strongly correlated, we calculate the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) to test for potential multicollinearity issues. We calculate the VIF for each independent variable in each of the regression models reported in the subsequent Tables 1 and 2.

Table 1 provides the estimates of our model in the PRIVATE treatment. First, we look at the personal norm ratings. We find that personal norms have sizable and significant positive coefficients across all four of our games. Pooling the four games together, we observe that the personal norm coefficient remains large and significant. Turning to social appropriateness ratings, we find a significant coefficient in all games except in the UG. Looking at the pooled dataset, we observe that social norms have a significant positive relation with behavior. Finally, in line with previous findings and standard economic theory, we also find that monetary payoffs are a strong and significant predictor of behavior.[15]

	DG	DGT	UG	TPP	All games
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Monetary payoff	0.727***	0.338***	0.514***	0.989***	0.443***
	(0.103)	(0.051)	(0.128)	(0.158)	(0.034)
Social norm rating	0.734**	0.628**	0.561	0.628***	0.514***
	(0.365)	(0.255)	(0.358)	(0.227)	(0.130)
Personal norm rating	1.399***	0.765***	0.819**	0.712***	0.933***
	(0.323)	(0.213)	(0.338)	(0.222)	(0.124)
Observations	1,397	1,143	704	504	3,748

Note: Estimation of conditional logit choice models with dummy variable indicating whether the subjects chose the action as dependent variable, and monetary payoff, social appropriateness rating, and personal appropriateness rating of the action as independent variables. Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table 1: Conditional logit estimation of choice determinants in PRIVATE treatment

Result 2 *Personal norms are a strong predictor of behavior across our four games.*

In the SOCIAL treatment, we made subjects' choices observable to others in order to increase their social image concerns.[16] According to our predictions, this manipulation should increase

---

We find that all values are below 5; hence, we do not find any indication that multicollinearity is a concern for our results (see Marquaridt, 1970; Hair Jr et al., 1995).

[15]We also check whether a higher dispersion in the actions that are perceived as socially most appropriate leads to a higher weight assigned to personal norms (for a similar intuition see d'Adda et al., 2020; Dimant et al., 2023). We take each subject's socially most appropriate action in each game (with TPP considered three times, once for each dictator's giving). We rescale the action space in each game from 0 to 1 to allow for comparability across games and calculate the standard deviation of the socially most appropriate action for each game. We observe no evidence of a positive relation between the standard deviations of the socially most appropriate action and the weights attached to personal norms across games (standard deviations in ascending order: DG, DGT, TPP (give 5), UG, TPP (give 0) and TPP (give 2); estimated personal norms weights in ascending order: TPP (give 0), DGT, TPP (give 2), UG, DG; TPP (give 5) cannot be estimated in isolation due to insufficient variation).

[16]To further confirm the validity of our SOCIAL manipulation, we also elicited responses to an adapted version of the reputation concerns questionnaire by Balliet et al. (2009), which measures subjects' concerns about the

the importance of social norms for behavior (Hypothesis 3), and could also affect the relation between personal norms and behavior.

	DG	DGT	UG	TPP	All games
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Monetary payoff	0.763***	0.234***	0.561***	0.823***	0.358***
	(0.078)	(0.030)	(0.103)	(0.104)	(0.023)
Social norm rating	0.804**	0.313	0.585	0.527**	0.371***
	(0.343)	(0.218)	(0.358)	(0.206)	(0.120)
Personal norm rating	1.424***	0.709***	0.820**	0.750***	0.895***
	(0.323)	(0.203)	(0.339)	(0.215)	(0.119)
Social norm rating	1.259***	0.893***	0.316	-0.251	0.748***
$\times$ Social	(0.426)	(0.286)	(0.503)	(0.316)	(0.173)
Personal norm rating	0.182	-0.000	-0.176	0.372	0.091
$\times$ Social	(0.455)	(0.293)	(0.478)	(0.338)	(0.179)
Observations	2,750	2,250	1,397	990	7,387

Note: Estimation of conditional logit choice model with dummy variable for whether the subjects chose the action as dependent variable, and monetary payoff, social appropriateness rating, and personal appropriateness rating of the action as well as an interaction term between personal and social norms ratings and a dummy for the Social treatment as independent variables. Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 2: Conditional logit estimation of choice determinants interacted with Social treatment

Table 2 provides the estimates of our model where we test Hypothesis 3. We find that the coefficient of the interaction between social norm ratings and Social is positive and highly significant in the DG and the DGT. For the UG and the TPP, we do not find a significant interaction effect. Considering the pooled dataset, we observe that the interaction coefficient is positive and highly significant. Overall, while we observe differences across individual games, on average we find that social norms become more important when subjects' social image concerns are increased. Turning to the interaction between personal norm ratings and Social, we do not observe a significant effect in any of the four games nor when pooling the dataset together.[17] The fact that the interaction between Social and the social norm rating is significant, while the interaction between Social and the personal norm rating is not, also underscores the notion that the two norms are distinct, complementing our Result 1. Looking at the predictive value of

---

opinion of others and thus represents a proxy for social image concerns. We find that subjects in Social are indeed more concerned about others' opinions than subjects in Private (two-sided *t*-test, $p < 0.001$, $N = 250$).

[17]Given the caveats in interpreting interaction terms in non-linear models (see Ai and Norton, 2003), as a robustness check, we re-estimate regressions from Table 2 with a linear probability model. The reported results remain robust.

personal norms in a regression that estimates their effect in the SOCIAL treatment (see Table A2 in Appendix A.3), the coefficients remain significant and comparable to coefficients in PRIVATE across all games. This shows that the relation between personal norms and behavior remains strong and stable. In order to have a complete picture of the underlying processes, we also run an additional set of regressions where we add an interaction term between monetary payoff and SOCIAL to the regression models reported in Table 2. We find a significant decrease of the weight attached to monetary payoff in one out of four games and when pooling the games together, thus observing some evidence that the weight people attach to monetary payoff decreases (see Table A3 in Appendix A.3).[18]

Result 3 *The relation between social norms and behavior is on average stronger in the SOCIAL in comparison to the PRIVATE treatment. The relation between personal norms and behavior remains stable.*

Next, we put our utility framework to a further test. The central assumption of our social- and personal-norm dependent utility framework, is that people are not only influenced by social norms, but that two (potentially competing) normative principles guide their behavior. Hence, we pit our two-norm framework against two other frameworks. One in which subjects care only about their monetary payoff and social norms, which reflects the usual modeling approach taken by the social norms literature (see, e.g., Krupka and Weber, 2013), and another in which subjects care only about their monetary payoff and personal norms. We carry out a model comparison exercise to evaluate the predictive fit of these three models in each of the four games and for the pooled dataset, for both the PRIVATE and the SOCIAL treatment, using three complementary approaches. First, we perform a pairwise comparison of the Log-likelihood measures of each of the two single-norm models (with either the personal or the social norm) with the two-norm model and report the corresponding Likelihood ratio tests. Second, we perform a direct comparison of the three models by using the Akaike information criterion (AIC) and also the Bayesian information criterion (BIC). Both the AIC and BIC penalize for an increase in the amount of predictors.[19] Table 3 contains the comparisons. Overall, we find strong support

---

[18]As our utility function assumes additive separability between the two normative utility components, we additionally test for potential interaction effects between the two norms. To do so, we add an interaction term between personal and social norms to our framework and re-estimate it for each of the four games as well as for the pooled dataset, both in PRIVATE and SOCIAL. Across the ten resulting regressions, we find no evidence of interaction effects between personal and social norms ($p > 0.258$ in all regression).

[19]For the AIC and BIC there is no clear testing procedure to determine whether one model is better than the other, but the differences are to be interpreted in an ordinal way. In general, the greater the difference the stronger the support for one model over the other (Burnham et al., 2011).

for our utility framework. All comparisons of Log-likelihoods, both for the PRIVATE and the SOCIAL treatment across all four games and for the pooled dataset (20 pairwise comparisons), favor our two-norm model over the other two one-norm models. These differences are significant in 90% of cases (Log-likelihood ratio test). Turning to the AIC, results are strongly in favor of the two-norm model (9 out of 10 three-way comparisons). The social norm model never prevails, while the personal norm model arises as the winner in just one case. When using the BIC, the two-norm model is again the most successful one (5 out of 10 three-way comparisons). For the cases in which this model does not prevail, the comparisons primarily support the model with only personal norms (4 out of 10 three-way comparisons), and only once the model with only social norms.[20] To sum up, we find coherent evidence supporting our claim that personal and social norms are complements in predicting behavior. In the few cases in which this is not true, the model comparisons predominantly favor the model with only personal norms.

Result 4 *Personal norms and social norms complement each other in predicting behavior.*

4.3 Robustness checks

After having established our main findings, we next provide a series of robustness checks of our main results to show that they are not due to one of the following reasons: i) a desire to signal certain values to the experimenter, ii) a desire to behave consistently with what one has stated in the online experiment, iii) subjects rating the actions according to how much utility they would bring them instead of how personally appropriate they perceive them to be, iv) the way social norms are operationalized, and v) the order of the norm elicitations.

Double-anonymous experiment.   One important concern is that the relationship between personal norms and behavior may (partly) come from social signaling motives towards the experimenter. If subjects want to signal they care about certain values to the experimenter, they can do so without any monetary costs in the elicitation of personal norms. Similarly, in the lab, although the behavior is incentivized (and signaling is not cheap), subjects may again be driven by the same motive. If such a motive exists in both sessions, it could lead to a spurious relation between our measure of personal norms and behavior.

---

[20]If we also look at which of the two one-norm models prevails in a direct comparison (without the two-norm model), both the AIC and the BIC results again suggest that both norms matter, as the personal norm model prevails 6 times, and the social norm model 4 times, for both measures. Complementary to our Result 3, the personal norm model always prevails in PRIVATE (5/5 comparisons), and the social norm model almost always does so in SOCIAL (4/5 comparisons; for both BIC and AIC), suggesting that personal norms might be more informative in an private setting, while social norms might be more informative in a public setting.

Table 3: Model comparison

	DG			DGT			UG			TPP			All games		
	(1a)	(1b)	(1c)	(2a)	(2b)	(2c)	(3a)	(3b)	(3c)	(4a)	(4b)	(4c)	(5a)	(5b)	(5c)
	Sn	Pn	Sn + Pn	Sn	Pn	Sn + Pn	Sn	Pn	Sn + Pn	Sn	Pn	Sn + Pn	Sn	Pn	Sn + Pn
PRIVATE															
Log-likelihood	-240.988	-231.757	-229.699	-238.166	-234.569	-231.457	-119.641	-117.866	-116.645	-116.294	-114.734	-110.744	-738.654	-715.751	-707.913
Likelihood test Sn vs. Sn+Pn	22.58 (<0.001)			13.42 (<0.001)			5.99 (0.014)			11.10 (<0.001)			61.48 (<0.001)		
Likelihood test Pn vs. Sn+Pn	4.12 (0.042)			6.22 (0.013)			2.44 (0.118)			7.981 (0.005)			15.68 (<0.001)		
Akaike IC	485.976	467.514	465.398	480.331	473.137	468.914	243.281	239.732	239.290	236.587	233.468	227.487	1481.309	1435.503	1421.827
Bayesian IC	496.460	477.998	481.124	490.414	483.219	484.038	252.395	248.846	252.960	245.032	241.913	240.155	1493.767	1447.961	1440.514
SOCIAL															
Log-likelihood	-178.437	-186.443	-165.716	-230.950	-235.503	-225.354	-109.375	-110.965	-107.570	-126.056	-116.940	-116.378	-686.112	-687.040	-659.378
Likelihood test Sn vs. Sn+Pn	25.44 (<0.001)			11.19 (<0.001)			3.61 (0.057)			19.36 (<0.001)			53.47 (<0.001)		
Likelihood test Pn vs. Sn+Pn	41.54 (<0.001)			20.3 (<0.001)			6.79 (0.009)			1.13 (0.288)			55.32 (<0.001)		
Akaike IC	360.875	376.886	337.432	465.899	475.006	456.709	222.750	225.929	221.139	256.111	237.880	238.756	1376.225	1378.080	1324.756
Bayesian IC	371.295	387.306	353.062	475.918	485.025	471.737	231.832	235.011	234.762	264.484	246.253	251.314	1388.624	1390.479	1343.354

Note: Comparisons of log-likelihoods, Bayesian information criteria, and Akaike information criteria between models which include monetary payoff and social norm as predictors (Sn columns), models which include monetary payoff and personal norm as predictors (Pn columns), and models which include monetary payoff, and both social norm and personal norm as predictors (Sn + Pn columns). Comparisons are accompanied by likelihood ratio tests (p value in brackets) which are reported for the estimation of all individual games (Columns 1a - 4c) and all games together (5a - 5c), separately for PRIVATE and SOCIAL treatment.

To address this concern, we design a new experiment ($n = 208$) inspired by Barmettler et al. (2012), in which we minimize signaling motives towards the experimenter. In the PRIVATE-REPLICATION treatment, we replicate our PRIVATE treatment, which we use as a control.[21] In the DOUBLE-ANONYMOUS treatment, the only difference from the PRIVATE-REPLICATION treatment is that we implement a payment procedure which ensures complete anonymity between the experimenter and the subjects. The crucial aspect is that the experimenter cannot link in any way an individual's behavior to a name or a face. A post-experimental questionnaire confirms that subjects understood that the procedure insured anonymity, and that they trusted the experimenter not to violate the protocol (see Appendix A.4).

We report the estimations of our utility framework for the DOUBLE-ANONYMOUS treatment in Table A4. We observe that monetary payoff, social norms, and most importantly, personal norms remain significant and sizeable predictors. This holds true for each of the four games and when pooling all games together, showing that our results hold also when minimizing potential signaling motives towards the experimenter. Next, we look at whether the weights attached to the two norms change in comparison to the PRIVATE-REPLICATION treatment. We estimate our utility framework by adding two interaction terms between a dummy variable capturing the DOUBLE-ANONYMOUS treatment (with PRIVATE-REPLICATION as the omitted category) and each of the two norms (see Table A5). The interaction effect between personal norms and DOUBLE-ANONYMOUS is not significant in 3 out of 4 games, and when pooling all games together (in one game the interaction is significant at the 10% level and goes in the opposite direction to what one would expect if signaling motives played a role). The same holds for the interaction between social norms and PRIVATE-REPLICATION. Thus, our results suggest that also in our main experiment, where there is no strict subject-experimenter anonymity, signaling motives towards the experimenter do not play an important role. These results are in line with those of Barmettler et al. (2012). For further details on the experimental design, procedure, and results of the robustness check see Appendix A.4.

Consistency. One could argue that our results may (partly) be due to a preference for consistency (see Falk and Zimmermann, 2018), which could lead subjects to behave in line with what they stated to be the personally most appropriate behavior in the online experiment. Our experiment was designed to minimize such concerns. During the online session, subjects answered

---

[21]This also allows us to compare the replicability of our results from the PRIVATE treatment (see Section 4.4).

to more than 80 items, including both personal and social norms, as well as a post-experimental questionnaire. After answering these questions, there was a long time lag of approximately 4 weeks until the lab experiment. Hence, it is unlikely that subjects had a precise recollection of the answers given in the online session when making their decisions in the lab. Nevertheless, to remove any further concerns, we test whether the predictive value of personal norms stays robust when removing subjects who reported having a good recollection of the online experiment during the lab experiment. To this end, we re-estimate our utility framework by progressively excluding subjects according to their recollection of the online experiment (see Table A6). Our results remain robust in all regressions. For further details of the robustness check see Appendix A.4.

Most preferred action. A further concern is that, rather than having evaluated the actions according to their personal norms, subjects evaluated them according to how much utility each action would provide them if they had performed it, giving the highest value to the action with highest utility (most preferred action), second highest value to the action with second highest utility (second most preferred action), etc. This would lead to a spurious relation between our measure of personal norms and behavior. First, we reduce this concern through several design features. Our elicitation method is designed to clearly follow the definition of personal norms and to formalize this construct with very precise wording. Moreover, subjects rated the actions of hypothetical other individuals and were not informed that they would face these decisions in the lab. We then turn to our dataset to fully address this concern. First, we look at our results from the main analysis. If the alternative explanation was true, this would leave little scope for social norms and monetary payoff to bear weight in our analysis. However, both are robust and sizeable predictors across our regressions and even increase the predictive fit of our models, which shows that they contribute together with personal norms to explaining behavior.[22] Second, we find that subjects choose options that are low in their personal norms rating in a considerable amount of cases, which should not occur if the rating mirrored the utility subjects would gain from the actions. Moreover, we re-estimate our utility framework by progressively excluding the actions with the highest, second highest, and third highest personal appropriateness rating from our dataset. Personal norms remain a significant predictor across

---

[22]For each game, both in PRIVATE and SOCIAL, adding monetary payoff to a model with personal and social norms increases the predictive fit according to BIC and AIC, and significantly so according to the Log-likelihood ratio test. Likewise, adding social (personal) norms to a model with personal (social) norms and payoff also increases the predictive fit (see Result 4).

all degrees of exclusion (see Table A7). Third, we check whether the action with the highest personal appropriatness rating always fall within the interval of the most profitable action and the action with the highest social appropriateness. This should be the case if subjects only cared about these factors (and not personal norms) and have ranked actions according to the utility they would bring them. We find that this is not always the case. We re-estimate our utility framework using only the cases outside the interval and find that personal norms remain a significant predictor, comparable in size with the values of our main regressions (see Table A8). In conclusion, our results are not consistent with this alternative explanation. For further details regarding this robustness check see Appendix A.4.

Average social norm. In Section 2, we argued in favor of using a person's belief about the social norm, which led us to design the experiment such that we could obtain individual values for both the personal and social norms. However, one might still argue in favor of using an aggregate measure of the social norm. For example, since the social norm depends on the beliefs of others, it is possible that the inherent uncertainty might cause subjects to fail in their guess, although they actually possess a good understanding of what is socially appropriate. To address this concern, we operationalize the social norms as the mean of all individual social appropriateness ratings, in line with influential work in the literature (see Krupka and Weber, 2013; Gächter et al., 2013; Kimbrough and Vostroknutov, 2016), and repeat our regression analyses. All our results remain unaffected (see Tables A9-A12). For further details on this robustness check see Appendix A.4.

Order of norm elicitation. Finally, we address the concern that our estimates may be affected by the order of the norm elicitation. Since we randomized the norm elicitation order at the individual level, we use this randomization to test whether the predictive value of a particular norm remains robust conditioning on the order. Both personal and social norms remain strongly predictive when personal norms were elicited first (and subjects were still unaware of the second norm elicitation), and when they were elicited second (see Tables A13 and A14). We also re-estimate our utility framework while interacting the variables for the two norms with a dummy variable for the elicitation order. We find no significant interaction between the two norms and the order in any of the regressions (see Tables A15 and A16). For further details of the robustness check see Appendix A.4.

29

4.4 Further evidence on personal and social norms

In this section, we put the empirical value of personal norms to a further test by tackling three questions. First, we test the replicability of our core findings, i.e., the relation between the two norms for our four main games (Result 1) and the weight subjects place on personal norms while making decisions (Result 2) by comparing our main experiment with two additional ones. Second, we test whether the differences between personal and social norms extend beyond our four main game to a broader set of economic settings, which would support a broad applicability of our findings. Lastly, we provide a systematic analysis of the differences between personal and social norms to detect potential patterns across games.

Replication. First, we examine the replicability of Result 1. To this end, we compare the elicited norms across three samples: the main sample that took part in PRIVATE and SOCIAL treatments, the sample that took part in PRIVATE-REPLICATION and DOUBLE-ANONYMOUS treatments, and a further sample with whom we elicit the two norms in an additional lab experiment ($n = 160$; for more information about the procedure of this experiment, see Appendix A.5). The correlation between social and personal norms in our main sample, and the two replication samples are all very close to each other across the four games (the largest pairwise difference is between a correlation of 0.68 and 0.76 in the TPP). Similarly, the proportions of non-zero differences are also highly comparable (the maximum difference is of 7 percentage points). Thus, we observe a high level of consistency across the three samples when looking at Result 1 (see Appendix A.5 for a detailed statistical analysis). Next, we examine the replicability of Result 2. Similarly to PRIVATE, all three of our variables — monetary payoff, social norms, and importantly, personal norms — are significant predictors of behavior in PRIVATE-REPLICATION (see Table A18). We then compare PRIVATE and PRIVATE-REPLICATION by re-estimating our utility framework and interacting each variable with a dummy variable capturing the PRIVATE-REPLICATION treatment (with PRIVATE as the omitted category, see Table A19). For each individual game and the pooled dataset, the interaction effects are not significant (except for the interaction effect between monetary payoff and PRIVATE-REPLICATION in the pooled dataset, which is significant at the 10% level). Hence, we again observe a high level of consistency.

Result 5 *Results 1 and 2 successfully replicate with new sets of subjects.*

Additional games. In the additional lab experiment mentioned in the previous paragraph, we also elicited personal and social norms in seven additional games: lying (die-roll) game, trust game, public-goods game, charitable giving game, charitable giving game with entitlement, dictator game with entitlement, and ultimatum game with computer first move. Some of these games study important economic behaviors, not captured by our four games, such as lying (see Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi, 2013), trustworthiness (see Berg et al., 1995), or cooperation (see Ledyard, 1995), while other games are variants of our four games in which we introduce new motives with variations which are widely used in the literature, such as entitlement over the endowment (see Cherry et al., 2002), playing with a charity (see Eckel and Grossman, 1996), or eliminating intentions by randomly determining a player's choice (see Falk et al., 2008). In addition to these seven games, we also elicited personal and social norms in ten vignettes capturing real-life situations. These vignettes represent common economic interactions that people encounter in everyday life or at a workplace. For example, "a colleague working from home claims to have worked for more hours than she actually did", "your neighbor pays a painter under the table and thus pays no taxes", or "an employee of a firm calls in sick to prolong his holiday". A list of all vignettes, along with a full description of the games, and further information on the additional lab experiment ($n = 160$) can be found in Appendix A.5.

Figure 2 depicts the differences in social and personal appropriateness ratings for the additional games and vignettes. The correlation between the two ratings is highest in the public-goods game (0.75) and lowest in the trust game (0.13), while it ranges from 0.1 to 0.59 in the individual vignettes. Otherwise, it takes on values above 0.5. The proportion of non-zero differences between the two norms is again substantial in each game. It is the lowest in the public-goods game (47.87%) and the highest in the trust game (76.74%), while it ranges from 44.68% to 70.21% in the individual vignettes. In the other games, the proportion of non-zero differences is always higher then 50%. Overall, these data show that the presence of differences between personal and social norms is common to a wide array of economics interactions. Together with our main findings, this supports personal norms as a relevant predictor of behavior across a wide range of economic contexts.

Result 6 *There are substantial individual-level differences between personal and social norms across seven additional games and ten vignettes describing real-life economic situations.*

Figure 2: Individual difference between appropriateness ratings of social and personal norms in additional games.

Note: The difference is calculated by subtracting an individual's personal appropriateness rating from her social appropriateness rating. The proportion of each difference is displayed for each action in a given game. The following games are displayed: (a) charitable giving game, (b) lying game, (c) ultimatum game with computer first move, (d) dictator game with entitlement, (e) trust game, (f) charitable giving game with entitlement, (g) public-goods game, and (h) 10 different vignettes.

Differences between personal and social norms. So far, our results on the relation between personal and social norms were limited to their correlations and individual-level differ-

ences. Another relevant question is whether there are systematic patterns in the way personal and social norms differ. It could be that the two norms always follow a similar pattern across games, in which case, one could in principle roughly infer the distribution of personal norms from that of social norms. Alternatively, the patterns of the two norms might differ across different contexts, which would further underscore their empirical distinction and, more importantly, the importance of considering both norms when designing interventions.

To analyze the patterns of the two norms across different situations, we compare their mean ratings for each action across our four main games and the seven additional games (a detailed analysis can be found in Appendix A.5, where we provide a visual representation of the average ratings of the actions in each game in Figures A1 and A2 and a statistical analysis of the differences in Tables A20-A23). We find systematic differences between the two norms and classify the games in three categories. The first category comprises games where actions that increase one's own expected payoff tend to be *more personally than socially* appropriate (the dictator game, the dictator game with tax, the third-party punishment game, the trust game, and the ultimatum game with computer first move). In contrast, the second category contains games where the actions that increase one's own expected payoff tend to be *more socially than personally* appropriate (the dictator game with entitlement, the dictator game with charity, the dictator game with charity and entitlement, and the lying game). Finally, the third category consists of games where we observe no difference (on average) between the two norms (the ultimatum game and the public goods game).[23] These findings reveal that the patterns of the differences between the two norms change across different games and that single contextual features can completely reverse these patterns. For example, playing a dictator game with another subject yields a different pattern between the two norms than playing a dictator game with a charity or in case there is entitlement over the money to be split.[24] While our study is not designed to identify the underlying causes of these differences, the fact that they exist has important implications. Specifically, it further underscores the importance of eliciting both norms when designing normative interventions as one cannot easily infer the distribution of personal norms from that of social norms.

---

[23]Note that our main finding, namely, that we observe three distinct categories, is robust to different ways of categorizing the games. We obtain the same result when using the other's expected payoff instead of own expected payoff to categorize the games.

[24]While it is well known that small changes in the design of such games can alter behavior and social norms (see, e.g., Krupka and Weber, 2013), we find that this also alters the relationship between personal and social norms.

Result 7 *The relation between personal and social norms differs across games. We observe three categories of games in which the actions that increase own expected payoff tend to be i) more personally than socially appropriate, ii) more socially than personally appropriate, or iii) in which there is no clear difference.*

5 Discussion and conclusion

In this study, we pursue the idea that people, in addition to caring about social norms and their monetary payoff, also care about personal norms. We propose a simple utility framework that captures these relations and design a novel two-part experiment to estimate it.

We establish that personal and social norms are related, but that there are substantial differences between the two at the individual level. We then estimate our framework and show robust evidence that personal norms — while taking social norms and monetary payoff into account — are strong predictors of economic behavior across four different economic games, both in a PRIVATE treatment where decisions are anonymous and in a SOCIAL treatment where social image concerns are made salient. In line with our predictions, the increase in social image concerns on average strengthens the relation between social norms and behavior; however, this does not affect the relation between personal norms and behavior which remains strong and stable. We show that our two-norms framework has higher predictive power in contrast to a framework where people only care about the social norm (see, e.g., Krupka and Weber, 2013) or the personal norm. Finally, we successfully replicate two of our key findings, we also show that individual-level differences between the two norms exist across seven additional games and a battery of vignettes capturing economic situations in everyday life and at a workplace, and we show that the exact relation between the two norms depends on the particular game and context.

The findings we present in this study offer strong evidence on the relevance of personal norms for economic behavior. They show that personal norms are powerful predictors of behavior in economic settings, and they support them as a key motive in economic decisions. Given that we observe that personal norms are distinct from social norms across a large variety of games and vignettes and that the two norms follow different patterns, the implications of these findings are likely to extend to a wide array of real-world economic decisions, especially so as these are often embedded in complex environments that provide a great scope for different normative

34

judgements to arise.

While our findings highlight the relevance of personal norms, it is important to stress that we do not belittle the role played by social norms. On the contrary, our results take both norms into account and provide insights on how the two norms interact and how they relate to behavior. In line with the existing literature, we find that social norms play an important role; however, the estimations of our framework with both norms have higher predictive power in contrast to frameworks that take only one of the two norms into account, showing that personal norms complement social norms in predicting behavior. In the few cases in which the two-norm model does not outperform the others, interestingly, it is mostly the framework with only personal norms that prevails.

Apart from offering support to our utility framework, the findings from the model comparison imply that by ignoring personal norms and focusing only on social norms we are worse off in forecasting how people will behave in economic settings. This can have important implications for policy-makers. If people's behavior is co-determined by personal and social norms, an intervention targeting only social norms might lack effectiveness or even fail completely. This connects directly to the reasoning of Bicchieri and Dimant (2019), who argue that when trying to change norms — especially those with a long history of failed interventions (e.g., child marriage) — knowing the behavioral driver is crucial. For example, if the behavior is driven by personal normative beliefs, then targeting social normative beliefs will not yield the desired result. Similar challenges are also shared by companies when trying to promote certain behaviors. Relying on employees to follow social norms in line with the company's organizational values might not be as effective if people are driven by their personal norms in a specific context. Moreover, there are other sources of complexities. As the misalignment of social and personal norms was found to be related to employee dissatisfaction (Burks and Krupka, 2012), promoting norms which diverge from employees' personal norms might cause important frictions. In addition, multiple social norms — coming from different social groups — may coexist in a given environment, depending on someone's identity (Akerlof and Kranton, 2000). For example, people may care especially about the social norm of their own department at work when it comes to working together or competing with each other, or of their own political group on questions concerning redistribution or immigration. In this case, it is first necessary to identify the relevant social group and then to elicit the corresponding norms for that group. Overall, our findings provide evidence for the existence of dangerous pitfalls when designing normative interventions or shaping desired

behavior within organizations, and they underscore the importance of understanding personal norms in these situations.

Besides from offering evidence that both types of norms shape behavior, we also shed light on how they interact and how the focus can be shifted to a particular norm. Our findings from the SOCIAL treatment indicate that increasing social image concerns enhances the importance of social norms for behavior. This supports our conjecture that situational factors can make a particular norm salient (see Bicchieri, 2005; Berkowitz and Daniels, 1964; Schwartz and Fleishman, 1978; Rutkowski et al., 1983; Cialdini et al., 1991). Interestingly, we observe this finding in the pooled dataset, but it does not hold for each individual game. One speculation for why this might be the case lies in the nature of the games. Dictator games capture costly prosocial behavior, while the ultimatum game and the third-party punishment game capture (second and third-party) punishment. Both social image and punishment were critical mechanisms in the evolutionary rise of prosocial and cooperative behavior (see, e.g., Milinski et al., 2001; Boyd et al., 2003; Boyd and Richerson, 2009); thus, it could be that the two mechanisms have the potential to affect prosocial behavior, but not each other. We believe a broader investigation encompassing more games would be beneficial in better understanding this finding, and we leave this open for future research. In contrast to this finding, we observe no effect on the weight assigned to personal norms in our SOCIAL treatment. Although we cannot dismiss the possibility that stronger manipulations might affect the weight assigned to personal norms, the findings from our SOCIAL treatment suggest that personal norms are a rather robust motive that is not easy to "override" (see Bicchieri, 2010). Conversely, the findings also do not reveal any evidence that people might want to place higher weight on their personal norms when observed, e.g., to signal integrity (see te Velde, 2022) or to show others what they think is the correct thing to do.[25]

Taken as a whole, our results imply that future research should consider personal norms when investigating normative prescriptions and their effect on economic behavior. This opens up important new questions from both a theoretical and practical perspective, such as how personal norms develop over time, what leads to incongruences with social norms, and most importantly, how one can shape personal norms. One limitation of our study is that it does not directly manipulate personal norms (or the weight attached to them). A deeper understanding of

---

[25]It is possible that only a small subset of people is driven by such a motive, or also that the two motives ("crowding out" of personal norms through social norms and willingness to signal integrity or show others what one thinks is the correct thing to do) cancel each other out on average.

how to accomplish this in a clean manner would be highly informative, especially for normative interventions. We leave this important question open for future studies. Other open questions pertain cross-cultural differences in the relationship between personal norms, social norms, and behavior, since one could expect the distinction as well as the importance of the two norms to differ in more collectivist compared to more individualistic societies.

References

Abeler, J., D. Nosenzo, and C. Raymond (2019). Preferences for truth-telling. *Econometrica 87*(4), 1115–1153.

Adena, M. and S. Huck (2020). Online fundraising, self-image, and the long-term impact of ask avoidance. *Management Science 66*(2), 722–743.

Agerström, J., R. Carlsson, L. Nicklasson, and L. Guntell (2016). Using descriptive social norms to increase charitable giving: The power of local norms. *Journal of Economic Psychology 52*, 147–153.

Ai, C. and E. C. Norton (2003). Interaction terms in logit and probit models. *Economics Letters 80*(1), 123–129.

Akerlof, G. A. (1980). A theory of social custom, of which unemployment may be one consequence. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics 94*(4), 749–775.

Akerlof, G. A. and R. E. Kranton (2000). Economics and identity. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics 115*(3), 715–753.

Alempaki, D., G. Doğan, and Y. Yang (2021). Lying in a foreign language? *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 185*, 946–961.

Alpizar, F., F. Carlsson, and O. Johansson-Stenman (2008). Anonymity, reciprocity, and conformity: Evidence from voluntary contributions to a national park in costa rica. *Journal of Public Economics 92*(5-6), 1047–1060.

Andreoni, J. and B. D. Bernheim (2009). Social image and the 50–50 norm: A theoretical and experimental analysis of audience effects. *Econometrica 77*(5), 1607–1636.

Andreoni, J. and J. Miller (2002). Giving according to garp: An experimental test of the consistency of preferences for altruism. *Econometrica 70*(2), 737–753.

Andreoni, J. and R. Petrie (2004). Public goods experiments without confidentiality: A glimpse into fund-raising. *Journal of Public Economics 88*(7-8), 1605–1623.

Ariely, D., A. Bracha, and S. Meier (2009). Doing good or doing well? Image motivation and monetary incentives in behaving prosocially. *American Economic Review 99*(1), 544–55.

Balliet, D., C. Parks, and J. Joireman (2009). Social value orientation and cooperation in social dilemmas: A meta-analysis. *Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 12*(4), 533–547.

Banerjee, R. (2016). On the interpretation of bribery in a laboratory corruption game: Moral frames and social norms. *Experimental Economics 19*(1), 240–267.

Barmettler, F., E. Fehr, and C. Zehnder (2012). Big experimenter is watching you! anonymity and prosocial behavior in the laboratory. *Games and Economic Behavior 75*(1), 17–34.

Barr, A., T. Lane, and D. Nosenzo (2018). On the social inappropriateness of discrimination. *Journal of Public Economics 164*, 153–164.

Bartke, S., A. Friedl, F. Gelhaar, and L. Reh (2017). Social comparison nudges — Guessing the norm increases charitable giving. *Economics Letters 152*, 73–75.

Bašić, Z., A. Falk, and S. Quercia (2020). Self-image, social image, and prosocial behavior. *Mimeo.*

Bénabou, R., A. Falk, and J. Tirole (2020). Narratives, imperatives, and moral persuasion. https://www.tse-fr.eu/sites/default/files/TSE/documents/doc/by/tirole/narratives_april_2_2020.pdf. Accessed 2023-07-31.

Bénabou, R. and J. Tirole (2006). Incentives and prosocial behavior. *American Economic Review 96*(5), 1652–1678.

Bénabou, R. and J. Tirole (2011). Identity, morals, and taboos: Beliefs as assets. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics 126*(2), 805–855.

Berg, J., J. Dickhaut, and K. McCabe (1995). Trust, reciprocity, and social history. *Games and Economic Behavior 10*(1), 122–142.

Berkowitz, L. and L. R. Daniels (1964). Affecting the salience of the social responsibility norm: Effects of past help on the response to dependency relationships. *The Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 68*(3), 275.

Bicchieri, C. (2005). *The grammar of society: The nature and dynamics of social norms.* Cambridge University Press.

Bicchieri, C. (2010). Norms, preferences, and conditional behavior. *Politics, Philosophy & Economics 9*(3), 297–313.

Bicchieri, C. and E. Dimant (2019). Nudging with care: The risks and benefits of social information. *Public Choice*, 1–22.

Bicchieri, C., E. Dimant, S. Gächter, and D. Nosenzo (2022). Social proximity and the erosion of norm compliance. *Games and Economic Behavior 132*, 59–72.

Bicchieri, C., E. Dimant, and E. Xiao (2021). Deviant or wrong? the effects of norm information on the efficacy of punishment. *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 188*, 209–235.

Bicchieri, C. and E. Xiao (2009). Do the right thing: But only if others do so. *Journal of Behavioral Decision Making 22*(2), 191–208.

Bilancini, E., L. Boncinelli, V. Capraro, T. Celadin, and R. Di Paolo (2020). "Do the right thing" for whom? An experiment on ingroup favouritism, group assorting and moral suasion. *Judgment and Decision Making 15*(2), 182–193.

Bock, O., I. Baetge, and A. Nicklisch (2014). hroot: Hamburg registration and organization online tool. *European Economic Review 71*, 117–120.

Boonmanunt, S., A. Kajackaite, and S. Meier (2020). Does poverty negate the impact of social norms on cheating? *Games and Economic Behavior 124*, 569–578.

Bott, K. M., A. W. Cappelen, E. Ø. Sørensen, and B. Tungodden (2020). Youve got mail: A randomized field experiment on tax evasion. *Management Science 66*(7), 2801–2819.

Boyd, R., H. Gintis, S. Bowles, and P. J. Richerson (2003). The evolution of altruistic punishment. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 100*(6), 3531–3535.

Boyd, R. and P. J. Richerson (2009). Culture and the evolution of human cooperation. *Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 364*(1533), 3281–3288.

Burks, S. V. and E. L. Krupka (2012). A multimethod approach to identifying norms and normative expectations within a corporate hierarchy: Evidence from the financial services industry. *Management Science 58*(1), 203–217.

Burnham, K. P., D. R. Anderson, and K. P. Huyvaert (2011). Aic model selection and multimodel inference in behavioral ecology: some background, observations, and comparisons. *Behavioral ecology and sociobiology 65*(1), 23–35.

Bursztyn, L., A. L. González, and D. Yanagizawa-Drott (2020). Misperceived social norms: Women working outside the home in Saudi Arabia. *American Economic Review 110*(10), 2997–3029.

Cappelen, A. W., T. Halvorsen, E. Ø. Sørensen, and B. Tungodden (2017). Face-saving or fair-minded: What motivates moral behavior? *Journal of the European Economic Association 15*(3), 540–557.

Cappelen, A. W., A. D. Hole, E. Ø. Sørensen, and B. Tungodden (2007). The pluralism of fairness ideals: An experimental approach. *American Economic Review 97*(3), 818–827.

Cappelen, A. W., J. Konow, E. Ø. Sørensen, and B. Tungodden (2013). Just luck: An experimental study of risk-taking and fairness. *American Economic Review 103*(4), 1398–1413.

Capraro, V., G. Jagfeld, R. Klein, M. Mul, and I. Van De Pol (2019). Increasing altruistic and cooperative behaviour with simple moral nudges. *Scientific Reports 9*(1), 1–11.

Capraro, V. and M. Perc (2021). Mathematical foundations of moral preferences. *Journal of the Royal Society interface 18*(175), 20200880.

Cherry, T. L., P. Frykblom, and J. F. Shogren (2002). Hardnose the dictator. *American Economic Review 92*(4), 1218–1221.

Cialdini, R. B., C. A. Kallgren, and R. R. Reno (1991). A focus theory of normative conduct: A theoretical refinement and reevaluation of the role of norms in human behavior. In *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology*, Volume 24, pp. 201–234. Elsevier.

Cialdini, R. B., R. R. Reno, and C. A. Kallgren (1990). A focus theory of normative conduct: Recycling the concept of norms to reduce littering in public places. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 58*(6), 1015.

d'Adda, G., M. Dufwenberg, F. Passarelli, and G. Tabellini (2020). Social norms with private values: Theory and experiments. *Games and Economic Behavior 124*, 288–304.

Dana, J., R. A. Weber, and J. X. Kuang (2007). Exploiting moral wiggle room: Experiments demonstrating an illusory preference for fairness. *Economic Theory 33*(1), 67–80.

Danilov, A. and D. Sliwka (2017). Can contracts signal social norms? Experimental evidence. *Management Science 63*(2), 459–476.

DellaVigna, S., J. A. List, and U. Malmendier (2012). Testing for altruism and social pressure in charitable giving. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics 127*(1), 1–56.

DellaVigna, S., J. A. List, U. Malmendier, and G. Rao (2016). Voting to tell others. *The Review of Economic Studies 84*(1), 143–181.

Dimant, E., M. J. Gelfand, A. Hochleitner, and S. Sonderegger (2023). Strategic behavior with tight, loose, and polarized norms. http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4004123. Accessed: 2023-08-02.

Eckel, C. C. and P. J. Grossman (1996). Altruism in anonymous dictator games. *Games and Economic Behavior 16*(2), 181–191.

Elster, J. (1989). Social norms and economic theory. *Journal of Economic Perspectives 3*(4), 99–117.

Erkut, H. (2022). Social norms and preferences for generosity are domain dependent. *Games and Economic Behavior 131*, 121–140.

Ewers, M. and F. Zimmermann (2015). Image and misreporting. *Journal of the European Economic Association 13*(2), 363–380.

Falk, A. (2021). Facing yourself–a note on self-image. *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 186*, 724–734.

Falk, A., E. Fehr, and U. Fischbacher (2008). Testing theories of fairness – Intentions matter. *Games and Economic Behavior 62*(1), 287–303.

Falk, A. and U. Fischbacher (2006). A theory of reciprocity. *Games and Economic Behavior 54*(2), 293–315.

Falk, A. and F. Zimmermann (2018). Information processing and commitment. *The Economic Journal 128*(613), 1983–2002.

Fehr, E. and U. Fischbacher (2004). Third-party punishment and social norms. *Evolution and Human Behavior 25*(2), 63–87.

Fehr, E. and S. Gächter (2000). Fairness and retaliation: The economics of reciprocity. *Journal of Economic Perspectives 14*(3), 159–181.

Fehr, E., E. Kirchler, A. Weichbold, and S. Gächter (1998). When social norms overpower competition: Gift exchange in experimental labor markets. *Journal of Labor Economics 16*(2), 324–351.

Fehr, E. and K. M. Schmidt (1999). A theory of fairness, competition, and cooperation. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics 114*(3), 817–868.

Fischbacher, U. (2007). z-tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments. *Experimental Economics 10*(2), 171–178.

Fischbacher, U. and F. Föllmi-Heusi (2013). Lies in disguise – An experimental study on cheating. *Journal of the European Economic Association 11*(3), 525–547.

Forsythe, R., J. L. Horowitz, N. E. Savin, and M. Sefton (1994). Fairness in simple bargaining experiments. *Games and Economic Behavior 6*(3), 347–369.

Gächter, S., L. Gerhards, and D. Nosenzo (2017). The importance of peers for compliance with norms of fair sharing. *European Economic Review 97*, 72–86.

Gächter, S., D. Nosenzo, and M. Sefton (2013). Peer effects in pro-social behavior: Social norms or social preferences? *Journal of the European Economic Association 11*(3), 548–573.

Gächter, S. and J. F. Schulz (2016). Intrinsic honesty and the prevalence of rule violations across societies. *Nature 531*(7595), 496–499.

Gneezy, A., U. Gneezy, G. Riener, and L. D. Nelson (2012). Pay-what-you-want, identity, and self-signaling in markets. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 109*(19), 7236–7240.

Greiner, B. (2015). Subject pool recruitment procedures: Organizing experiments with orsee. *Journal of the Economic Science Association 1*(1), 114–125.

Grossman, Z. and J. J. Van Der Weele (2017). Self-image and willful ignorance in social decisions. *Journal of the European Economic Association 15*(1), 173–217.

Güth, W., R. Schmittberger, and B. Schwarze (1982). An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining. *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 3*(4), 367–388.

Hair Jr, J., R. Anderson, R. Tatham, and W. Black (1995). *Multivariate Data Analysis* (3 ed.). New York: Macmillan.

Huck, S., D. Kübler, and J. Weibull (2012). Social norms and economic incentives in firms. *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 83*(2), 173–185.

Kahneman, D., J. L. Knetsch, and R. H. Thaler (1986). Fairness and the assumptions of economics. *Journal of Business*, S285–S300.

Katz, D., F. H. Allport, and M. B. Jenness (1931). Students' attitudes: A report of the syracuse university reaction study.

Kessler, J. B. and S. Leider (2012). Norms and contracting. *Management Science 58*(1), 62–77.

Kessler, J. B., C. Low, and M. Singhal (2021). Social policy instruments and the compliance environment. *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 192*, 248–267.

Kimbrough, E. O. and A. Vostroknutov (2016). Norms make preferences social. *Journal of the European Economic Association 14*(3), 608–638.

Krupka, E. and R. A. Weber (2009). The focusing and informational effects of norms on pro-social behavior. *Journal of Economic Psychology 30*(3), 307–320.

Krupka, E. L., S. Leider, and M. Jiang (2017). A meeting of the minds: Informal agreements and social norms. *Management Science 63*(6), 1708–1729.

Krupka, E. L. and R. A. Weber (2013). Identifying social norms using coordination games: Why does dictator game sharing vary? *Journal of the European Economic Association 11*(3), 495–524.

Krysowski, E. and J. Tremewan (2020). Why does anonymity make us misbehave: Different norms or less compliance? *Economic Inquiry*.

Ledyard, J. O. (1995). Public goods: A survey of experimental research. In J. Kagel and A. Roth (Eds.), *Handbook of Experimental Economics*, pp. 111–194. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Lindbeck, A., S. Nyberg, and J. W. Weibull (1999). Social norms and economic incentives in the welfare state. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics 114*(1), 1–35.

Loewenstein, G. (1999). Experimental economics from the vantage-point of behavioural economics. *The Economic Journal 109*(453), 25–34.

Marquaridt, D. W. (1970). Generalized inverses, ridge regression, biased linear estimation, and nonlinear estimation. *Technometrics 12*(3), 591–612.

McFadden, D. (1973). Conditional logit analysis of qualitative choice behavior. In P. Zarembka (Ed.), *Frontiers in Econometrics*, pp. 105–142. New York: Academic Press.

Michaeli, M. and D. Spiro (2015). Norm conformity across societies. *Journal of Public Economics 132*, 51–65.

Milinski, M., D. Semmann, T. C. Bakker, and H.-J. Krambeck (2001). Cooperation through indirect reciprocity: image scoring or standing strategy? *Proceedings of the Royal Society of London. Series B: Biological Sciences 268*(1484), 2495–2501.

Milkman, K. L., T. Rogers, and M. H. Bazerman (2008). Harnessing our inner angels and demons: What we have learned about want/should conflicts and how that knowledge can help us reduce short-sighted decision making. *Perspectives on Psychological Science 3*(4), 324–338.

O'Gorman, H. J. (1975). Pluralistic ignorance and white estimates of white support for racial segregation. *Public Opinion Quarterly 39*(3), 313–330.

Ostrom, E. (2000). Collective action and the evolution of social norms. *Journal of Economic Perspectives 14*(3), 137–158.

Romano, A. and D. Balliet (2017). Reciprocity outperforms conformity to promote cooperation. *Psychological Science 28*(10), 1490–1502.

Rutkowski, G. K., C. L. Gruder, and D. Romer (1983). Group cohesiveness, social norms, and bystander intervention. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 44*(3), 545.

Schram, A. and G. Charness (2015). Inducing social norms in laboratory allocation choices. *Management Science 61*(7), 1531–1546.

Schwartz, S. H. (1973). Normative explanations of helping behavior: A critique, proposal, and empirical test. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 9*(4), 349–364.

Schwartz, S. H. (1977). Normative influences on altruism. *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology 10*(1), 221–279.

Schwartz, S. H. and J. A. Fleishman (1978). Personal norms and the mediation of legitimacy effects on helping. *Social Psychology*, 306–315.

Selten, R. (1965). Die Strategiemethode zur Erforschung des eingeschränkt rationalen Verhaltens im Rahmen eines Oligopolexperimentes. Seminar für Mathemat. Wirtschaftsforschung u. Ökonometrie.

Sliwka, D. (2007). Trust as a signal of a social norm and the hidden costs of incentive schemes. *American Economic Review 97*(3), 999–1012.

te Velde, V. L. (2022). Heterogeneous norms: Social image and social pressure when people disagree. *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 194*, 319–340.

Tremewan, J. and A. Vostroknutov (2020). An informational framework for studying social norms: An extended version. http://www.vostroknutov.com/pdfs/tv-normsframework.pdf. Accessed: 2021-01-27.

Van der Weele, J. J., J. Kulisa, M. Kosfeld, and G. Friebel (2014). Resisting moral wiggle room: How robust is reciprocal behavior? *American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 6*(3), 256–264.

A Appendix A

This Appendix contains further details, tables and graphs which complement our analyses.

A.1 Attrition

As subjects participated in an online and a lab session that were about 4 weeks apart, we observe a certain attrition (24%). Here, we check whether attrition was systematic, as this might threaten the validity of our results. First, we check whether attrition is correlated with any of the observable characteristics elicited in the online study. Table A1 shows the results of a probit regression in which the dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if the subjects came to the lab and zero if the subject attrited. None of the observable characteristics predicts attrition.

	(1)
Female (=1)	0.028
	(0.048)
Siblings	-0.023
	(0.022)
Age	0.002
	(0.004)
Study (=1)	0.036
	(0.104)
Observations	330

Note: Estimation of probit model with dummy variable for whether a subject also participated in the lab session or only in the online session as the dependent variable, and sociodemographic variables collected in the online session as independent variables. Coefficients represent average marginal effects. Standard errors in parentheses, *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$.

Table A1: Probit model for attrition on observable characteristics

Second, we go one step further and check whether the personal and social norm ratings differ between those who participated in the lab and the online session, and those who participated only in the online session. We compare the distribution of the two appropriateness ratings across the two samples for each action in the four games, for both personal and social norms. We run altogether 80 Chi-squared tests with Monte Carlo simulated p-values over 10.000 replications and use the Bonferroni-Holm correction to account for multiple hypotheses testing at the game level for personal and social norms separately. Only one out of the 80 tests turns out significant.

Thus, the norm ratings across the two samples are highly consistent. Altogether, the observed attrition does not seem to present an issue for the interpretation our results.

A.2 Estimation of the utility framework

To estimate our utility framework (Equation 1), we use a conditional (fixed-effect) logit choice model (see, e.g., Krupka and Weber, 2013; Gächter et al., 2013; Krupka et al., 2017). To estimate the model, we first reshape our dataset for each game. For the DG, we expand each individual decision to the number of actions the subject in the role of dictator could choose from (give €0, €1, ..., €10; 11 observations in total). We then generate a new dependant variable which equals one if the subject chose the given action and zero if she did not. We regress this outcome on characteristics of that potential action, which are the three independent variables from our utility framework. The first variable is the monetary payoff. In the DG, the monetary payoff is equal to the amount of euros a subject would receive by choosing the particular action. Here (as well as in the other games), we assume a linear restriction on the function $V(\cdot)$ from our utility framework, such that $V(\pi(a_k)) = \beta\pi(a_k)$. Hence, we estimate β which is the weight subjects place on monetary payoff. The second dependent variable is the social norm appropriateness rating assigned by the subject to that action. The third is the personal norm appropriateness rating assigned by the subject to that action. The regression takes into account that each of the 11 observations stems from one individual decision. The same approach was taken for the other three games with necessary adjustments. In the DGT, there were eight potential actions, which translates into eight observations per decision. In the UG, receivers had eleven potential actions; hence, this translates into eleven observations per decision. To get the receivers' monetary payoff in the UG, we calculated their expected payoff for each rejection threshold (i.e., each potential action) using the distribution of all proposers' offers. Finally, in the TPP, each subject playing as a third-party made three decisions, as she had to indicate her punishment choice for each potential action of the dictator (strategy method). Each of these decisions consisted of three potential actions; hence, we expanded the dataset to 3 observations per decision, where each subject made 3 decisions.[26]

---

[26]During the first day of data collection, subjects in the TPP game were exposed to a non-obstructive software issue. To avoid any potential bias in our estimation, we do not include the data from the TPP game collected during the first day in the analysis. We also perform a robustness check in which we include this data and find that all reported results in the study remain robust to inclusion of this data.

A.3 Personal norms, social norms, and behavior

Here we report complementary information to our main results. Table A2 reports the estimation of our utility framework in the SOCIAL treatment. All coefficients on the personal norm ratings are significant across all games as well as in the pooled regression, confirming that Result 2 also holds in SOCIAL. The fact that personal norm coefficients are comparable with Table 1, and that social norm coefficients on average increase, reflects what we report in Result 3. Table A3 reports the estimation of our utility function by including the interaction terms between our three main variables — monetary payoff, social norms, and personal norms — and a dummy variable for the SOCIAL treatment. Similarly to Table 2, we observe that personal norms do not interact with the SOCIAL treatment, while for social norms, we observe that the weight attached to them increases for DG and when pooling all games together. Moreover, we observe that monetary payoff interacts significantly and negatively with the SOCIAL treatment in DGT and when pulling all games together. Given the caveats in interpreting interaction terms in non-linear models (see Ai and Norton, 2003), we also re-estimate the regressions from Table A3 with a linear probability model. The reported interaction effects remain robust, but we also observe a significant interaction effect between social norm rating and SOCIAL treatment in DGT, thus observing the identical significance pattern as we report in Table 2 (significant interaction terms between social norm rating and SOCIAL treatment for DG, DGT, and when pooling all games together).

	DG	DGT	UG	TPP	All games
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Monetary payoff	0.805***	0.146***	0.635***	0.676***	0.265***
	(0.118)	(0.039)	(0.176)	(0.138)	(0.031)
Social norm rating	2.149***	0.973***	0.922**	0.256	0.966***
	(0.381)	(0.223)	(0.363)	(0.240)	(0.134)
Personal norm rating	1.631***	0.691***	0.655*	1.076***	0.944***
	(0.335)	(0.206)	(0.340)	(0.253)	(0.130)
Observations	1,353	1,107	693	486	3,639

Note: Estimation of conditional logit choice model with dummy variable for whether the subjects chose the action as dependent variable, and monetary payoff, social appropriateness rating, and personal appropriateness rating of the action as independent variables. Standard errors in parentheses, *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$

Table A2: Conditional logit estimation of choice determinants in SOCIAL treatment

	DG	DGT	UG	TPP	All games
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Monetary payoff	0.727***	0.338***	0.514***	0.989***	0.443***
	(0.103)	(0.051)	(0.128)	(0.158)	(0.034)
Social norm rating	0.734**	0.628**	0.561	0.628***	0.514***
	(0.365)	(0.255)	(0.358)	(0.227)	(0.130)
Personal norm rating	1.399***	0.765***	0.819**	0.712***	0.933***
	(0.323)	(0.213)	(0.338)	(0.222)	(0.124)
Monetary payoff ×	0.078	-0.192***	0.121	-0.313	-0.178***
SOCIAL	(0.156)	(0.064)	(0.217)	(0.210)	(0.046)
Social norm rating ×	1.414***	0.345	0.360	-0.372	0.452**
SOCIAL	(0.528)	(0.338)	(0.509)	(0.330)	(0.187)
Personal norm rating ×	0.233	-0.074	-0.164	0.364	0.012
SOCIAL	(0.466)	(0.296)	(0.480)	(0.337)	(0.179)
Observations	2,750	2,250	1,397	990	7,387

Note: Estimation of conditional logit choice model with dummy variable for whether the subjects chose the action as dependent variable, and monetary payoff, social appropriateness rating, and personal appropriateness rating of the action as well as interaction terms between monetary payoff, personal appropriateness rating, social appropriateness rating and a dummy variable for the SOCIAL treatment as independent variables. Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A3: Conditional logit estimation of choice determinants (including monetary payoff) interacted with SOCIAL treatment

A.4   Robustness checks

As described in Section 4.3, we provide several robustness checks of our main results. Here, we report complementary information to those checks. In our first set of robustness checks, we design an experiment which aims to remove potential signaling motives towards the experimenter. Inspired by Barmettler et al. (2012), we implement two treatments — PRIVATE-REPLICATION and DOUBLE-ANONYMOUS — where we : i) design an exogenous variation of *experimenter-subject anonymity* while keeping the decision making part identical, and ii) implement a *self-explanatory procedure*, where the explanation of our experimental procedure itself reveals the existence of the experimenter-subject anonymity, in contrast to making this explicit and potentially nudging subjects to act in certain way (see, e.g., Loewenstein, 1999, for a discussion).

The experiment was conducted in the Cologne Laboratory for Economic Research (CLER) and the Decision Lab at the Max Planck Institute in Bonn (two laboratories in neighbouring

cities). The sessions were conducted from November, 2022 until April, 2023. Altogether, 208 subjects took part in both the online and the lab session.

In the DOUBLE-ANONYMOUS treatment, at the beginning of a session, subjects received all information relevant to the double anonymous procedure (See Appendix B.1 for the full instructions). One subject was randomly selected to be the helper. The helper's task was to assist in the payment procedure at the end of the session. During the session, the helper sat in her own cubicle and filled out an unrelated questionnaire. The helper received a fixed amount of money for her role in the session, which was added to the show-up fee and the earnings from the online session. To guarantee double anonymity, we separated the people conducting the study into two groups: lab assistants (whose role was always filled by research assistants) and the experimenter (whose role was always filled by the authors of the study). Subjects were informed that the helper as well as the lab assistants would stay in the experimental room during the session. The lab assistants were there to answer potential questions. From their seat in the lab, they did not see the subjects in their cubicles directly, but were able to see if someone raised their hand (as in the other treatment). The experimenter stayed in the control room throughout the entire session and had no way to see into the experimental room.

Subjects were informed that they would receive their payment at their seats and about all the details of the payment procedure. The experimenter, who was the only person who could see the connection between the seat number and the payment, prepared individual envelopes for each participant. Each envelope contained a participant's payment and a receipt and was sealed. In this way, nobody was able to infer the payments from the outside. The experimenter wrote on each envelope the seat number of the corresponding participant. Once subjects finished all the tasks in the study, the helper went to the experimenter to collect the envelopes. The helper then came back, distributed the envelopes to the participants, and went back to her seat. The participants then took out the money and signed the receipts, all in private, in their cubicles. Following this, the helper collected the receipts in a large envelope, and sealed it. Then, the helper returned to the experimenter, handed over the envelope, and left the lab. Once the procedure was over, all participants could leave the lab. The envelope was not opened by anyone involved in the study and was handed over to the accounting department.

To ensure that subjects understood that the procedure ensures anonymity, we asked the following question (taken from Barmettler et al. (2012) and adjusted for our study): "Is it clear from the instructions that due to the payment procedure the experimenter and the lab

assistants are not able to match your identity with your decisions and payment?". The subjects answered on a 5-point likert scale, ranging from 1 (not clear at all) to 5 (completely clear). We observe that subjects understood that the procedure insured anonymity (mean answer = 4.76, $sd = 0.51$). Moreover, since the implementation of the double-anonymity depended on us not violating the experimental procedure, we also asked subjects: "How much do you trust that the experimenter and the lab assistants will stick to the procedure described?". The subjects answered on a 5-point likert scale, ranging from 1 (not trust at all) to 5 (completely trust). We find that subjects trust we will follow the procedure (mean answer = 4.56, $sd = 0.74$).

Table A4 reports the estimation of our utility framework in the DOUBLE-ANONYMOUS treatment. As reported in the main text, we observe that personal norm are a significant predictor of behavior — this holds for each individual game, and when pooling all games together. Moreover, social norms and monetary payoff are also significant predictors. Table A5 reports the estimation of our utility framework when using both DOUBLE-ANONYMOUS and PRIVATE-REPLICATION treatments and interacting each of the two normative ratings variables with a dummy variable capturing the DOUBLE-ANONYMOUS treatment. Overall, we observe that the weights attached to the two norms do not change when introducing double anonymity. This holds true for personal norms in 3 out of 4 games as well as when pooling the games together (in one case the interaction is significant at the 10% level, yet the sign is opposite of what one would expect if signaling motives towards the experimenter were relevant). Similarly, the same result holds for social norms.

	DG	DGT	UG	TPP	All games
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Monetary payoff	0.734***	0.293***	0.865***	1.225***	0.417***
	(0.110)	(0.050)	(0.257)	(0.172)	(0.036)
Social norm rating	1.433***	0.732***	0.866**	0.814***	0.739***
	(0.349)	(0.238)	(0.393)	(0.241)	(0.126)
Personal norm rating	1.369***	1.159***	0.793**	0.958***	1.131***
	(0.307)	(0.213)	(0.384)	(0.230)	(0.125)
Observations	1,177	963	594	639	3,373

Note: Estimation of conditional logit choice model with dummy variable for whether the subjects chose the action as dependent variable, and monetary payoff, social appropriateness rating, and personal appropriateness rating of the action as independent variables. Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A4: Conditional logit estimation of choice determinants in DOUBLE-ANONYMOUS

	DG	DGT	UG	TPP	All games
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Monetary payoff	0.725***	0.281***	0.763***	0.995***	0.387***
	(0.081)	(0.036)	(0.152)	(0.103)	(0.025)
Social norm rating	1.618***	0.391	-0.311	0.746***	0.595***
	(0.329)	(0.257)	(0.452)	(0.184)	(0.123)
Personal norm rating	1.090***	1.094***	1.419***	0.461***	0.971***
	(0.280)	(0.243)	(0.466)	(0.172)	(0.119)
Social norm rating	-0.202	0.314	1.139*	-0.073	0.105
Double-Anonymous ×	(0.390)	(0.312)	(0.592)	(0.263)	(0.164)
Personal norm rating	0.273	0.053	-0.645	0.471*	0.139
Double-Anonymous ×	(0.410)	(0.319)	(0.595)	(0.277)	(0.170)
Observations	2,288	1,872	1,144	1,242	6,546

Note: Estimation of conditional logit choice model with dummy variable for whether the subjects chose the action as dependent variable, and monetary payoff, social appropriateness rating, and personal appropriateness rating of the action as well as an interaction term between personal and social norms ratings and a dummy for the Double-Anonymous treatment (with Private-Replication as omitted category) as independent variables. Standard errors in parentheses, *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$

Table A5: Conditional logit estimation of choice determinants interacted with Double-Anonymous treatment

In the second set of robustness checks, we want to rule out consistency as a potential explanation of our results. We asked subjects at the end of the lab experiment how well they remembered the online experiment on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (extremely well). We observe strong heterogeneity in the reported recollection (mean answer = 4.04, $sd = 1.69$). We test whether the predictive value of personal norms stays robust when removing those who have a good recollection of the online experiment. The regressions reported in Table A6 confirm Result 2. Regression (1) to (5) are performed with subjects who report a score below 6. Data are pooled across the Private and Social treatment to guarantee enough power (note that the coefficients estimating the relation between personal norms and behavior do not differ between Private and Social treatment (see Table 2)). In regression (6), we only include subjects that score below the midpoint of our scale. We only perform this regression pooling all our games together and not for each game separately, as the number of observations decreases significantly.

The third set of robustness checks is constructed to rule out that our results were due to subjects evaluating the actions according to how much utility they would bring them, instead of answering according to their personal norms. While subjects should have always chosen the

| | | Memory < 6 | | | Memory < 4 |
| | DG | DGT | UG | TPP | All games | All games |
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Monetary payoff	0.688***	0.226***	0.588***	0.799***	0.344***	0.343***
	(0.078)	(0.033)	(0.120)	(0.114)	(0.025)	(0.034)
Social norm rating	1.155***	0.746***	0.643**	0.390**	0.638***	0.333**
	(0.265)	(0.188)	(0.275)	(0.174)	(0.102)	(0.139)
Personal norm rating	1.462***	0.651***	0.961***	0.948***	0.987***	1.005***
	(0.241)	(0.160)	(0.264)	(0.185)	(0.098)	(0.135)
Observations	2,178	1,782	1,078	774	5,812	2,731

Note: Estimation of conditional logit choice model with dummy variable for whether the subjects chose the action as dependent variable, and monetary payoff, social appropriateness rating, and personal appropriateness rating of the action as independent variables. The sample is restricted to subjects with a given score on the question of how well they remember the online session. Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A6: Conditional logit estimation of choice determinants for robustness check of consistency

personally most appropriate action if they had rated actions this way, this actually happened in 52% of cases (similarly, in 47% of cases the action with the highest social appropriateness rating was chosen).[27] Assuming some error, subjects could have chosen the action with the second or even the third highest personal appropriateness rating; however, we observe that they often opted for actions that ranked even lower, i.e., those that were supposedly among the least preferred. In particular, the actions ranked as fourth, fifth, and sixth were *each* chosen in 10% of cases.[28] Table A7 shows the results of the regressions obtained by progressively excluding actions rated as personally most appropriate. We first exclude the most appropriate action (Top 1). For purposes of statistical power, we pool the data across PRIVATE and SOCIAL together. We then exclude the second and the third personally most appropriate actions (Top 2 and Top

---

[27]If there is more than one action which is personally (socially) most appropriate, then we count that the subject chose the personally (socially) most appropriate action if she chose any of those actions. Similarly for the following robustness check, if there is more than one action rated as the personally most appropriate one, and any of those fall outside the interval of the most profitable action and the action with the highest social appropriateness rating, then we count that the subject rated an action outside of that interval as her personally most appropriate one.

[28]To calculate the proportion of x ranked choice, we take into account decisions where subjects can choose rank x, i.e., cases in which there are at least x available ranks. We also employ an alternative check and look at the proportion of cases where subjects choose between differently ranked actions and decide for one which is strictly in the lower half (e.g., if there are 5 ranks then only 4th and 5th ranks correspond to the lower half). Again, we find strong evidence that subjects often go for lower ranked actions, as they choose an action from the lower half of ranks in 23% of cases.

3). As this strongly reduces the sample size, we only look at the pooled dataset.

Actions excluded	Top 1					Top 2	Top 3
	DG	DGT	UG	TPP	All games	All games	All games
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Monetary payoff	0.651***	0.177***	0.565***	0.893***	0.309***	0.348***	0.440***
	(0.102)	(0.032)	(0.133)	(0.239)	(0.029)	(0.043)	(0.078)
Social norm rating	1.550***	0.648***	0.554	0.090	0.665***	0.626***	-0.161
	(0.385)	(0.211)	(0.442)	(0.386)	(0.147)	(0.242)	(0.420)
Personal norm rating	0.561*	0.362	1.897***	1.285***	0.698***	0.823***	0.990*
	(0.320)	(0.229)	(0.497)	(0.455)	(0.155)	(0.275)	(0.577)
Observations	1,104	1,093	695	176	3,068	1,240	488

Note: Estimation of conditional logit choice model with dummy variable for whether the subjects chose the action as dependent variable, and monetary payoff, social appropriateness rating, and personal appropriateness rating of the action as independent variables. The sample is restricted by progressively excluding actions with the highest, second highest, and third highest personal appropriateness rating. Standard errors in parentheses, *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$.

Table A7: Conditional logit estimation of choice determinants when excluding actions with highest personal appropriateness ratings

We also take another approach starting from the assumption that, if subjects care only about the monetary payoff and social norms, the action that yields the highest utility (i.e., the most preferred action) should never fall outside of the interval of the highest monetary payoff and the socially most appropriate action. In particular, in DG, DGT (and TPP), higher giving (punishment) strictly implies lower monetary payoff; hence, the action with the highest personal appropriateness rating, if it really represented the one that would bring the highest utility, should never be outside of the interval between zero giving (punishment) and the action with the highest social appropriateness, or, if there are more such actions, the one with smaller payoff. In UG, we utilize the expected monetary payoff, and as the payoff is weakly decreasing in the minimum accepted offer, again the same argument holds. As the decrease is not strict, we also eliminate six decisions for which, due to payoff equivalence, one might choose the action which is above the one where social appropriateness is highest. We observe that across our four games, the action with the highest personal appropriateness is strictly outside of that interval in 13% of cases. The percentage ranges from 10.9% in the TPP to 20.5% in the UG. We take this sample and re-estimate our utility framework for our main games (see Table A8).

As this strongly limits the sample, we pool all these decisions together. Note that, also in the additional games (see Section 4.4), the action with the highest personal appropriateness is frequently strictly outside of the interval reaching from the most profitable action to the action with the highest social appropriateness. Across the seven additional games this happens between 10.4% to 50.75% of the times.

	All games
	(1)
Monetary payoff	0.229***
	(0.051)
Social norm rating	0.637***
	(0.172)
Personal norm rating	0.773***
	(0.238)
Observations	1,013

Note: Estimation of conditional logit choice model with dummy variable for whether the subjects chose the action as dependent variable, and monetary payoff, social appropriateness rating, and personal appropriateness rating of the action as independent variables. The sample is restricted to cases which are incosistent with subjects caring only about social norms and monetary payoff: it consists of decisions where the personally most appropriate action is outside of the range defined by the socially most appropriate action and the payoff maximizing one, and it additionally excludes 6 decisions in UG where the personally most appropriate action falls outside of the interval but might still be accounted for by the alternative explanation. Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A8: Conditional logit estimation of choice determinants when restricting to decisions where personally most appropriate action is outside of the interval defined by socially most appropriate action and payoff maximizing action

In our fourth set of robustness checks, we use the average social norm rating for a given action instead of a subject's belief and re-run our complete analysis. In line with the literature using this approach (see, e.g., Krupka and Weber, 2013; Gächter et al., 2013; Krupka et al., 2017), we estimate a conditional (fixed-effect) logit choice model and calculate bootstrapped standard errors. More in detail, as the average social norm ratings may suffer from a sampling error, we bootstrap 500 replications to calculate the errors. For each replication, we resample (with replacement) from the norm rating data to calculate the average of the social norm for that particular replication, and then resample (with replacement) from our behavioral data to conduct the replication. Table A9 displays the results of these regressions for the PRIVATE treatment. This confirms Result 2, namely that personal norms are a strong and stable predictor

of behavior.

In Table A10, we provide a robustness check of Result 3. The interaction between average social norm ratings (as constructed for this robustness check) and the SOCIAL treatment is significant for the DG and DGT (and at a 10% level for TPP), as well as for all games pooled together. Also, the interaction between average social norm ratings and the PRIVATE treatment is insignificant in all regression models. Finally, we also report the estimations performed only for the SOCIAL treatment in Table A11.

In Table A12, we provide a robustness check of Result 4. Again, all Log-Likelihood comparisons favor the model that includes both personal and social norms over the two models that include only one of the two norms (all of the 20 Likelihood tests are highly significant). The same holds when looking at the AIC and the BIC, where the result becomes even stronger as the comparisons all support the model with two norms (19 out of 20 three-way comparisons), except from one case in which the personal norm model is favored.

	DG	DGT	UG	TPP	All games
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Monetary payoff	1.179***	0.542	0.382	1.022***	0.520***
	(0.355)	(0.626)	(0.495)	(0.186)	(0.040)
Social norm rating (avg.)	2.649***	2.096	1.945	0.999***	1.101***
	(1.019)	(3.396)	(1.184)	(0.308)	(0.190)
Personal norm rating	0.986***	0.755***	0.721**	0.795***	0.880***
	(0.281)	(0.255)	(0.288)	(0.263)	(0.140)
Observations	1,397	1,143	704	504	3,748

Note: Estimation of conditional logit choice model with dummy variable for whether the subjects chose the action as dependent variable, and monetary payoff, average social appropriateness rating, and personal appropriateness rating of the action as independent variables. Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A9: Conditional logit estimation of choice determinants in PRIVATE treatment using average social norm

	DG	DGT	UG	TPP	All games
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Monetary payoff	1.357***	0.595	0.545	1.022***	0.512***
	(0.270)	(0.528)	(0.353)	(0.148)	(0.029)
Social norm rating (avg.)	3.161***	2.382	1.997*	0.999***	1.079***
	(0.799)	(2.863)	(1.029)	(0.323)	(0.190)
Personal norm rating	0.984***	0.757***	0.762***	0.795***	0.878***
	(0.286)	(0.257)	(0.289)	(0.260)	(0.138)
Social norm rating (avg.)	1.388***	2.141***	0.733	0.973*	1.832***
× Social	(0.414)	(0.501)	(0.836)	(0.540)	(0.313)
Personal norm rating	0.036	-0.102	-0.048	0.013	-0.067
× Social	(0.407)	(0.342)	(0.388)	(0.362)	(0.201)
Observations	2,750	2,250	1,397	990	7,387

Note: Estimations of conditional logit choice model with dummy variable for whether the subjects chose the action as dependent variable, and monetary payoff, social appropriateness rating, and personal appropriateness rating of the action, as well as an interaction term between personal and average social norm ratings and the Social treatment as independent variables. Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A10: Conditional logit estimation of choice determinants interacted with Social treatment using average social norm

	DG	DGT	UG	TPP	All games
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Monetary payoff	1.660***	0.682	1.432**	1.022***	0.500***
	(0.315)	(0.744)	(0.568)	(0.248)	(0.038)
Social norm rating (avg.)	5.352***	4.999	4.156***	1.972***	2.874***
	(0.926)	(3.915)	(1.294)	(0.444)	(0.259)
Personal norm rating	1.001***	0.661***	0.827***	0.808***	0.808***
	(0.303)	(0.238)	(0.319)	(0.245)	(0.148)
Observations	1,353	1,107	693	486	3,639

Note: Estimations of conditional logit choice model with dummy variable indicating whether the subjects chose the particular action as dependent variable, and monetary payoff, average social appropriateness rating, and personal appropriateness rating of the action as independent variables. Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A11: Conditional logit estimation of choice determinants in Social treatment using average social norm

	DG			DGT			UG			TPP			All games		
	(1a)	(1b)	(1c)	(2a)	(2b)	(2c)	(3a)	(3b)	(3c)	(4a)	(4b)	(4c)	(5a)	(5b)	(5c)
	Sn	Pn	Sn + Pn	Sn	Pn	Sn + Pn	Sn	Pn	Sn + Pn	Sn	Pn	Sn + Pn	Sn	Pn	Sn + Pn
PRIVATE															
Log-likelihood	-226.502	-231.757	-219.634	-234.683	-234.568	-227.035	-113.919	-117.866	-110.537	-118.050	-114.734	-108.396	-728.383	-715.751	-693.979
Likelihood test Sn vs. Sn+Pn		13.74 (<0.001)			15.3 (<0.001)			6.76 (0.009)			19.31 (<0.001)			68.82 (<0.001)	
Likelihood test Pn vs. Sn+Pn		-24.25 (<0.001)			15.07 (<0.001)			14.66 (<0.001)			12.68 (<0.001)			43.55 (<0.001)	
Akaike IC	457.0047	467.5138	445.268	473.366	473.137	460.070	231.837	239.732	227.075	240.010	233.468	222.792	1460.767	1435.503	1393.950
Bayesian IC	467.489	477.998	460.995	483.448	483.219	475.194	240.951	248.846	240.745	248.545	241.913	235.459	1473.225	1447.961	1412.636
SOCIAL															
Log-likelihood	-136.146	-186.443	-130.452	-194.441	-235.503	-188.423	-100.558	-110.965	-96.465	-107.921	-116.940	-99.611	-583.317	-687.040	-558.763
Likelihood test Sn vs. Sn+Pn		11.39 (<0.001)			12.04 (<0.001)			8.19 (0.004)			16.62 (<0.001)			49.11 (<0.001)	
Likelihood test Pn vs. Sn+Pn		111.98 (<0.001)			94.16 (<0.001)			29 (<0.001)			34.66 (<0.001)			256.55 (<0.001)	
Akaike IC	276.292	376.886	266.905	392.882	475.006	382.847	205.115	225.929	198.930	219.842	237.880	205.222	1170.634	1378.080	1123.526
Bayesian IC	286.713	387.306	282.535	402.901	485.025	397.875	214.198	235.011	212.553	228.214	246.253	217.781	1183.033	1390.479	1142.125

Note: Comparisons of log-likelihoods, Bayesian information criteria, and Akaike information criteria between models which include monetary payoff and average social norm as predictors (Sn columns), models which include monetary payoff and personal norm as predictors (Pn columns), and models which include monetary payoff and both average social norm and personal norm as predictors (Sn + Pn columns). Comparisons are accompanied by likelihood ratio tests (p value in brackets) which are reported for the estimation of all individual games (Columns 1a - 4c) and all games together (5a - 5c), separately for PRIVATE and SOCIAL treatment.

Table A12: Model comparison robustness check (avg. social norm rating)

Finally, we provide a fifth set of robustness checks to rule out a potential influence of the order in which social and personal norms were elicited on our results. First, we test whether the predictive value of the two norms remains robust across games and in the pooled dataset when looking at each elicitation order individually. Since this exercise halves our sample size, we join the PRIVATE and SOCIAL treatment together (see Table A13 and Table A14).[29] Second, we directly test whether the elicitation order affects any of the estimated norms coefficients in the estimations of our utility framework. We re-estimate our regressions for all games and the pooled dataset in PRIVATE and SOCIAL treatment separately, and add an interaction variable between each of the two norm variables and an order dummy variable (see Table A15 and Table A16).[30]

	DG	DGT	UG	TPP	All games
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Monetary payoff	0.654***	0.236***	0.532***	0.859***	0.337***
	(0.094)	(0.042)	(0.150)	(0.151)	(0.030)
Social norm rating	1.172***	0.882***	0.711**	0.703***	0.750***
	(0.330)	(0.224)	(0.355)	(0.231)	(0.127)
Personal norm rating	1.337***	0.574***	0.602*	0.618**	0.822***
	(0.301)	(0.204)	(0.365)	(0.244)	(0.126)
Observations	1,342	1,098	627	513	3,580

Note: Estimations of conditional logit choice model with dummy variable indicating whether the subjects chose the particular action as dependent variable, and monetary payoff, average social appropriateness rating, and personal appropriateness rating of the action as independent variables. Standard errors in parentheses, *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$.

Table A13: Conditional logit estimation of choice determinants when personal norms were elicited first in the online experiment

---

[29]As the estimates of the social norms coefficient depend on the treatment (see Result 3), we also inspect them by repeating the robustness check for PRIVATE and SOCIAL separately. Since this strongly reduces our sample size, we repeat the regressions only for the pooled dataset. We find that regardless of the treatment or order, the social norm coefficient is always significant ($p < 0.027$ for the social norm coefficient in each of the four regressions).

[30]Given the caveats in interpreting interaction terms in non-linear models (see Ai and Norton, 2003), as a robustness check, we also re-estimate the regressions from Tables A15 and A16, with a linear probability model. Our conclusions stay the same when using a linear probability model. Out of ten models with two interaction terms each, only one interaction term in one model (interaction between personal norms and the order dummy variable in DG, SOCIAL treatment) yields a significant result (at the 10% level).

	DG	DGT	UG	TPP	All games
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Monetary payoff	0.953***	0.244***	0.604***	0.842***	0.378***
	(0.125)	(0.044)	(0.144)	(0.150)	(0.033)
Social norm rating	1.788***	0.565**	0.795**	0.128	0.641***
	(0.385)	(0.244)	(0.359)	(0.239)	(0.135)
Personal norm rating	1.566***	0.920***	0.811**	1.189***	1.080***
	(0.323)	(0.213)	(0.317)	(0.243)	(0.125)
Observations	1,397	1,143	770	477	3,787

Note: Estimations of conditional logit choice model with dummy variable indicating whether the subjects chose the particular action as dependent variable, and monetary payoff, average social appropriateness rating, and personal appropriateness rating of the action as independent variables. Standard errors in parentheses, *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$.

Table A14: Conditional logit estimation of choice determinants when social norms were elicited first in the online experiment

	DG	DGT	UG	TPP	All games
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Monetary payoff	0.734***	0.335***	0.517***	1.010***	0.444***
	(0.104)	(0.052)	(0.129)	(0.161)	(0.034)
Social norm rating	0.335	0.422	0.492	0.348	0.374**
	(0.498)	(0.349)	(0.470)	(0.360)	(0.188)
Personal norm rating	1.830***	1.033***	0.915**	0.878**	1.116***
	(0.485)	(0.312)	(0.425)	(0.353)	(0.180)
Social norm rating	0.751	0.341	0.185	0.441	0.252
× order	(0.622)	(0.412)	(0.707)	(0.442)	(0.237)
Personal norm rating	-0.855	-0.525	-0.259	-0.249	-0.363
× order	(0.641)	(0.430)	(0.691)	(0.460)	(0.247)
Observations	1,386	1,134	704	504	3,728

Note: Estimations of conditional logit choice model with dummy variable indicating whether the subjects chose the particular action as dependent variable, and monetary payoff, average social appropriateness rating, and personal appropriateness rating of the action, as well as an interaction term between personal and social norm rating and a dummy for the order of norms elicitation as independent variables. Standard errors in parentheses, *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$.

Table A15: Conditional logit estimation of choice determinants interacted with the order of norm elicitation in PRIVATE

	DG	DGT	UG	TPP	All games
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Monetary payoff	0.801***	0.145***	0.637***	0.733***	0.266***
	(0.117)	(0.039)	(0.176)	(0.145)	(0.031)
Social norm rating	2.429***	0.819***	1.132**	-0.013	0.900***
	(0.485)	(0.315)	(0.554)	(0.333)	(0.183)
Personal norm rating	1.256***	0.729**	0.647	1.369***	0.968***
	(0.441)	(0.295)	(0.482)	(0.330)	(0.174)
Social norm rating	-0.601	0.286	-0.369	0.747	0.129
× order	(0.593)	(0.409)	(0.730)	(0.531)	(0.252)
Personal norm rating	0.844	-0.015	-0.095	-0.880	-0.033
× order	(0.663)	(0.420)	(0.699)	(0.584)	(0.264)
Observations	1,353	1,107	693	486	3,639

Note: Estimations of conditional logit choice model with dummy variable indicating whether the subjects chose the particular action as dependent variable, and monetary payoff, average social appropriateness rating, and personal appropriateness rating of the action, as well as an interaction term between personal and social norm rating and a dummy for the order of norms elicitation as independent variables. Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A16: Conditional logit estimation of choice determinants interacted with the order of norm elicitation in SOCIAL

A.5   Further evidence on personal and social norms

A.5.1   Additional games

	No. of subjects	Games rated
Group 1	67	charitable giving game, dictator game with entitlement, lying game, ultimatum game with computer first move
Group 2	46	dictator game (DG), charitable giving game with entitlement, ultimatum game (UG), trust game
Group 3	47	dictator game with tax (DGT), third-party punishment game (TPP), public-goods game, vignettes

Table A17: Information about additional games.

The data for these additional experiments were collected during July and September 2017 at the BonnEconLab (University of Bonn). The experiment was programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Subjects were recruited via hroot (Bock et al., 2014). Subjects were divided in three groups and each group faced the norm elicitation task for a subset of the games (see Table A17), after an unrelated experiment. Subjects had to rate the personal and social appropriateness of each action available to the individual in the game or the behavior described in the vignettes presented to them. As in our main experiment, subjects were incentivized to guess the most common social appropriateness ranking of the given action in the session, while no incentives were provided for stating one's personal appropriateness ranking. All games and vignettes are described below.

Charitable giving game.   An individual is given €10 and has to decide how much to give to a charity. She can give any integer amount between €0 and €10. The charity was UNICEF, an internationally renowned organization dedicated to providing humanitarian and developmental aid to children worldwide.

Charitable giving game with entitlement.   Also, here, an individual has to decide how much out of €10 she wants to give to UNICEF. However, in this case, she has earned the €10 by answering a questionnaire that lasted about 30 minutes.

Dictator game with entitlement.   Similarly to the DG in the main analysis, an individual has €10 and can decide how much to give to another individual in the lab. Before this, however, both individuals had to work on a tiresome task for 20 minutes. They were given a series of

matrices containing ones and zeros and had to count the number of zeros in each matrix. The one who managed to complete more of such matrices is given the €10 and the decision of how much thereof to give to the other individual.

Lying game. An individual is given a six-sided die and can privately roll it once. She gets the amount she reports in euros. In the case evaluated by participants, the individual rolls a one and can decide which number to report (from one to six).

Ultimatum game with computer first move. The structure of this game is analogous to that of the UG in our main experiment. An individual is given €10 and can offer any integer amount to another individual. If the individual accepts the offer, both get the proposed amounts. If she rejects it, they both earn nothing. However, the proposed amount is determined by a random device. The responder has to state the minimum offer she is willing to accept.

Trust game. An individual receives €4 and a second one €0. The first individual can send any integer amount to the second one. This amount is tripled. The second individual can then decide how much she wants to send back to the first one. In the case evaluated by participants, the first individual sends €3 and the second participant has to decide how much of the €9 she received she wants to send back.

Public-goods game. An individual is grouped together with three other people. They each receive €5. They then simultaneously decide how to allocate the €5 between a private and a common account. The individual can keep any money put in the private account, while the money in the common account is summed together, multiplied by two and shared equally amongst all members.

Vignettes.

1. "Your neighbor pays a painter under the table and thus pays no taxes."

2. "The chair of a commission at the university rejects a weak candidate to hire the daughter of a good friend."

3. "A woman who is moving out of her flat sells the couch she had paid €1500 for €2000."

4. "A freelancer eats at a restaurant with his friends for his birthday and deducts the check from his taxes."

5. "An employee of a firm calls in sick to prolong his holiday."

6. "A young man who finished university two years ago uses his old student card to use public transport."

7. "A customer at the supermarket notices that he has been given €5 too much, but keeps them."

8. "An acquaintance buys a highly polluting vintage car and drives it around just for fun in his free time."

9. "A colleague working from home claims to have worked for more hours than she actually did."

10. "An acquaintance who has purchased an insurance for his smartphone places his phone in water to get a new one just before the insurance expires."

A.5.2 Replication

The correlation between social and personal norms between our main sample, and the two replication samples are 0.72 (main sample), 0.68, and, 0.72 for DG; 0.65, 0.62, and 0.58 in DGT; 0.74, 0.73, and 0.68 in UG; and 0.76, 0.73, and 0.68 in TPP. Turning to the distinction between the two norms, we observe that the proportions of non-zero differences are 49.89% (main sample), 51.01%, and 53.75% of cases in DG; 55.64%, 58.12%, and 60.28% in DGT; 49.67% , 48.34%, and 50.99% in UG; and 47.56% , 51.28%, and 54.61% in TPP.[31] Thus, we observe a high level of consistency across the three samples when looking at Result 1. Next, we examine the replicability of Result 2. We observe that all three variables of our utility framework remain significant predictors in the PRIVATE-REPLICATION treatment (see Table A18). We then compare the weights attached to the three variables of our framework in the PRIVATE-REPLICATION treatment with those in the PRIVATE treatment (see Table A19). We

---

[31]Similarly to the main sample, for each reported correlation from the two replication samples, we observe that $p < 0.001$(Pearson product-moment correlation). Also, for each reported proportion of non-zero differences in the two replication samples, we observe that they are significantly different than 0 (the 99% asymptotic binomial confidence interval does not contain 0 in any comparison). Finally, we also check whether the distribution of personal and social norm ratings for each action in the four games differs across the two samples. For a total of 80 tests, we find that the two distributions differ only in a single case, revealing a very consistent pattern for both normative perceptions (we run Chi-squared tests with Monte Carlo-simulated p-values over 10.000 replications, and use the Bonferroni-Holm correction to account for multiple hypotheses testing at the game level for personal and social norms separately).

observe that there is no significant interaction effect between a dummy variable capturing the PRIVATE-REPLICATION treatment and the three variables of our utility framework. This holds true for each individual game and for the pooled dataset, except from one case (the interaction term between Monetary payoff and PRIVATE-REPLICATION in the pooled dataset is significant at the 10% level). Overall, this shows a remarkable level of consistency in the weights attached to the three variables of our framework between the PRIVATE treatment and the PRIVATE-REPLICATION treatment.

	DG	DGT	UG	TPP	All games
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Monetary payoff	0.714***	0.267***	0.694***	0.825***	0.358***
	(0.119)	(0.052)	(0.188)	(0.132)	(0.034)
Social norm rating	1.592***	0.349	-0.302	0.637***	0.546***
	(0.390)	(0.280)	(0.446)	(0.185)	(0.128)
Personal norm rating	1.088***	1.088***	1.384***	0.519***	0.965***
	(0.280)	(0.242)	(0.464)	(0.172)	(0.118)
Observations	1,111	909	550	603	3,173

Note: Estimation of conditional logit choice model with dummy variable for whether the subjects chose the action as dependent variable, and monetary payoff, social appropriateness rating, and personal appropriateness rating of the action as independent variables. Standard errors in parentheses, *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$

Table A18: Conditional logit estimation of choice determinants in PRIVATE-REPLICATION

	DG	DGT	UG	TPP	All games
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Monetary payoff	0.727***	0.338***	0.514***	0.989***	0.443***
	(0.103)	(0.051)	(0.128)	(0.158)	(0.034)
Social norm rating	0.734**	0.628**	0.561	0.628***	0.514***
	(0.365)	(0.255)	(0.358)	(0.227)	(0.130)
Personal norm rating	1.399***	0.765***	0.819**	0.712***	0.933***
	(0.323)	(0.213)	(0.338)	(0.222)	(0.124)
Monetary payoff	-0.013	-0.070	0.179	-0.164	-0.085*
× Private-Replication	(0.157)	(0.073)	(0.227)	(0.206)	(0.048)
Social norm rating	0.858	-0.279	-0.864	0.009	0.032
× Private-Replication	(0.534)	(0.379)	(0.572)	(0.292)	(0.183)
Personal norm rating	-0.310	0.323	0.565	-0.194	0.032
× Private-Replication	(0.428)	(0.322)	(0.574)	(0.281)	(0.171)
Observations	2,508	2,052	1,254	1,107	6,921

Note: Estimations of conditional logit choice model with dummy variable indicating whether the subjects chose the particular action as dependent variable, and monetary payoff, social appropriateness rating, and personal appropriateness rating of the action as well as an interaction term between these three variables and a dummy variable for the Private-Replication treatment (with Private as the omitted category) as independent variables. Standard errors in parentheses, *** $p<0.01$, ** $p<0.05$, * $p<0.1$.

Table A19: Conditional logit estimation of choice determinants interacted with Private-Replication treatment (with Private as the omitted category)

A.5.3   Differences between personal and social norms

To analyze the differences between personal and social norms we compare the averages appropriateness of the different actions in each game. A visual representation is provided by Figures A1 and A2, where we plot the average appropriateness ratings of the different actions for each game in a separate graph. In Tables A20-A23, we report the average personal and social appropriateness ratings and their difference alongside its statistical significance. We also separately report whether the significant differences survive the Bonferroni-Holm correction to account for multiple hypotheses testing. Our key findings from Section 4.4 remain unchanged.

Figure A1: Differences between average personal and social appropriateness ratings for all variants of the dictator game and the ultimatum game

Figure A2: Differences between average personal and social appropriateness ratings for the ultimatum game with computer first move, the third-party punishment game, the lying game, the trust game, and the public goods game

	Dictator game			
Action: give	Mean pn rating	Mean sn rating	Difference	Survives Bonferrini-Holm correction?
0	-0.74	-0.9	0.16***	yes
1	-0.6	-0.7	0.1***	yes
2	-0.38	-0.45	0.08**	no
3	-0.08	0.1	-0.18***	yes
4	0.25	0.25	0	
5	0.78	0.78	0	
6	0.29	0.36	-0.07*	no
7	0.05	0.14	-0.08**	no
8	-0.12	-0.02	-0.09*	no
9	-0.23	-0.17	-0.07	
10	-0.31	-0.26	-0.05	
	Dictator game with tax			
Action: give	Mean pn rating	Mean sn rating	Difference	Survives Bonferrini-Holm correction?
0	-0.58	-0.76	0.18***	yes
1	-0.41	-0.52	0.11***	yes
2	-0.17	-0.23	0.06*	no
3	0.08	0.09	-0.01	
4	0.27	0.37	-0.1**	yes
5	0.39	0.55	-0.16***	yes
6	-0.09	0.06	-0.15***	yes
7	-0.28	-0.18	-0.1*	no
8	-0.39	-0.31	-0.08	
	Dictator game with entitlement			
Action: give	Mean pn rating	Mean sn rating	Difference	Survives Bonferrini-Holm correction?
0	-0.64	-0.02	-0.62***	yes
1	-0.28	0.08	-0.36***	yes
2	-0.02	0.2	-0.22**	yes
3	0.19	0.24	-0.05	
4	0.37	0.29	0.08	
5	0.56	0.33	0.23**	yes
6	0.15	-0.02	0.16*	no
7	0.03	-0.18	0.2**	yes
8	-0.11	-0.25	0.14*	no
9	-0.22	-0.36	0.14	
10	-0.31	-0.39	0.08	

*** $p<0.001$, ** $p<0.01$, * $p<0.05$

Table A20: Differences between average personal and social appropriateness ratings for the dictator game, the dictator game with tax, and the dictator game with entitlement

Dictator game with charity

Action: give	Mean pn rating	Mean sn rating	Difference	Survives Bonferrini-Holm correction?
0	-0.84	-0.44	-0.4***	yes
1	-0.46	-0.21	-0.24**	yes
2	-0.22	-0.04	-0.18*	no
3	-0.02	0.12	-0.14	
4	0.22	0.25	-0.03	
5	0.49	0.48	0.02	
6	0.53	0.44	0.08	
7	0.55	0.37	0.18**	yes
8	0.59	0.37	0.22**	yes
9	0.59	0.32	0.26***	yes
10	0.65	0.31	0.34***	yes

Dictator game with charity and entitlement

Action: give	Mean pn rating	Mean sn rating	Difference	Survives Bonferrini-Holm correction?
0	-0.78	-0.27	-0.5***	yes
1	-0.38	0.02	-0.4***	yes
2	-0.06	0.25	-0.31**	yes
3	0.24	0.31	-0.06	
4	0.36	0.4	-0.04	
5	0.56	0.46	0.1	
6	0.52	0.38	0.14	
7	0.42	0.33	0.09	
8	0.39	0.27	0.12	
9	0.32	0.26	0.06	
10	0.25	0.23	0.02	

Ultimatum game

Action: accept above	Mean pn rating	Mean sn rating	Difference	Survives Bonferrini-Holm correction?
0	-0.21	-0.2	-0.01	
1	-0.09	-0.04	-0.06	
2	0.03	0.09	-0.06	
3	0.21	0.25	-0.04	
4	0.37	0.43	-0.06*	no
5	0.56	0.6	-0.04	
6	-0.13	-0.07	-0.07	
7	-0.4	-0.36	-0.04	
8	-0.57	-0.56	-0.01	
9	-0.66	-0.71	0.05	
10	-0.73	-0.79	0.06	

*** $p<0.001$, ** $p<0.01$, * $p<0.05$

Table A21: Differences between average personal and social appropriateness ratings for the dictator game with charity, the dictator game with charity and entitlement, and the ultimatum game

Ultimatum game with computer first move				
Action: accept above	Mean pn rating	Mean sn rating	Difference	Survives Bonferrini-Holm correction?
0	0.42	0.2	0.22*	no
1	0.53	0.31	0.22**	yes
2	0.44	0.26	0.18*	no
3	0.4	0.24	0.16*	no
4	0.32	0.26	0.06	
5	0.19	0.3	-0.11	
6	-0.08	0.1	-0.18*	no
7	-0.27	-0.08	-0.19*	no
8	-0.43	-0.18	-0.25**	yes
9	-0.6	-0.28	-0.32***	yes
10	-0.68	-0.34	-0.33***	yes
Third party punishment game				
Action: punish (giving)	Mean pn rating	Mean sn rating	Difference	Survives Bonferrini-Holm correction?
0 (0)	-0.34	-0.52	0.18***	yes
1 (0)	0.22	0.33	-0.11**	yes
2 (0)	0.32	0.48	-0.16***	yes
0 (2)	-0.07	-0.18	0.11**	yes
1 (2)	0.22	0.31	-0.09**	yes
2 (2)	-0.12	0	-0.12**	yes
0 (5)	0.85	0.87	-0.02	
1 (5)	-0.74	-0.73	-0.01	
2 (5)	-0.87	-0.91	0.04*	no
Lying game				
Action: report	Mean pn rating	Mean sn rating	Difference	Survives Bonferrini-Holm correction?
1	0.8	0.84	-0.05	
2	-0.2	-0.19	-0.01	
3	-0.42	-0.33	-0.09	
4	-0.64	-0.48	-0.16*	yes
5	-0.76	-0.5	-0.26***	yes
6	-0.86	-0.48	-0.39***	yes

*** $p<0.001$, ** $p<0.01$, * $p<0.05$

Table A22: Differences between average personal and social appropriateness ratings for the ultimatum game with computer first move, the third-party punishment game, and the lying game

72

Trust game				
Action: send back	Mean pn rating	Mean sn rating	Difference	Survives Bonferrini-Holm correction?
0	0.06	-0.81	0.87***	yes
1	0.22	-0.62	0.83***	yes
2	0.28	-0.36	0.64***	yes
3	0.38	0.04	0.35**	yes
4	0.47	0.63	-0.16	
5	0.43	0.36	0.06	
6	-0.16	0.08	-0.24*	no
7	-0.44	-0.12	-0.32**	yes
8	-0.71	-0.26	-0.45***	yes
9	-0.85	-0.38	-0.47***	yes
Public goods game				
Action: contribute	Mean pn rating	Mean sn rating	Difference	Survives Bonferrini-Holm correction?
0	-0.83	-0.71	-0.12	
1	-0.46	-0.42	-0.04	
2	-0.04	-0.03	-0.01	
3	0.34	0.21	0.14*	no
4	0.49	0.36	0.13	
5	0.59	0.53	0.06	

*** $p<0.001$, ** $p<0.01$, * $p<0.05$

Table A23: Differences between average personal and social appropriateness ratings for the trust game and the public goods game

B Appendix B

B.1 Instructions for the online experiment

These are the instructions used in the online experiment. The original text was in German and is available upon request.

Welcome

Welcome and thank you for your participation in this study.

This study is composed of two parts, today's online part (first part) and a part in the premises of the Cologne Laboratory for Economic Research (second part). This online part will take about 30-45 minutes. Please be aware that you need to complete this online part to take part in the second part. You will receive an email to remind you of this.

Please complete this part in one sitting, undisturbed and concentrated. If possible, please use a computer or a tablet. Please avoid other disturbances and complete this study alone. We reserve the right to exclude participants from the experiment who do not complete the study carefully.

All your decisions will be used only for scientific purposes and for determining your payment.

You will get a fixed payment of €8 for participation after you have completed both parts of the study. You have the opportunity to earn a further amount of money during this first part as well as during the second part. For this reason, please read the following instructions carefully.

The further earnings from the online part as well as the earnings from the part in the Cologne Laboratory for Economic Research and the fixed payment of 8€ will be paid out after the part in the Cologne Laboratory.

Please click on the arrow below to start with the study.

Code

In order to guarantee your payment, you have to generate a code below. You will generate the exact same code in the second part of the experiment. We will use your code to complete your payment anonymously.

Please insert your personal code in lower-case letters and without accents or other special symbols.

The code is composed by the following components:

SECOND letter of your own name

FIRST letter of your mother's name (if unknown insert "***")

FIRST letter of your father's name (if unknown insert "***")

SECOND letter of the name of your birthplace (if unknown insert "***")

Day of your birthday (e.g., 15 for 15/07 or 08 for 08/03)

Please type in the code in small letters and without accents or other special symbols.

Please do not use any umlaut. Write a instead of ä, o instead of ö and u instead of ü.

Example: Max Mustermann, son of Lisa and Paul, born in Bonn on the 27/04 the resulting code would be alpo27.

This online part is composed of three parts. You will obtain the corresponding instructions before each part and then complete that part.

Part 1

(*Elicitation of personal norms*)

In this part of the study, you will read the description of different situations. In each situation there is one person who has to make a choice between different actions.

After you read the description of each situation, you have to evaluate the different actions amongst which the person in that situation can choose from. For each action, evaluate according to your own opinion and independently of the opinion of others, whether it is appropriate or not to choose it. "Appropriate" behavior means the behavior that you personally consider to be "correct" or "moral". The standard is, hence, your personal opinion, independently of the opinion of others.

We kindly ask you to answer as precisely as possible with your own honest opinion. There is no right or wrong answer; you will not get any additional payment for your answers in this part.

Overall there are four different situations for which you have to evaluate the possible actions. To show you how the different actions can be evaluated we now give you an example.

Example

Person A is sitting in a cafe near the university. Person A notices that another person has left his wallet on the table. Person A has to decide what to do. Person A has to choose from four possible actions:

- Take the wallet and keep it;

- Ask other guests if the wallet belongs to one of them;

- Leave the wallet there;

- Give the wallet to the manager of the cafe.

For each action evaluate according to your own personal opinion and independently of the opinion of others, whether it is appropriate or not to choose it. "Appropriate" behavior means the behavior that you personally consider to be "correct" or "moral".

You can choose from a scale with six points

- Very inappropriate

- Inappropriate

- Rather inappropriate

- Rather appropriate

- Appropriate

- Very appropriate

You will evaluate the actions using a table. To evaluate the behavior you have to mark the corresponding option. Please give an evaluation for each of the actions.

Assume, for example, that you evaluate

- Taking and keeping the wallet as very inappropriate,

- Asking other guests if the wallet belongs to them as appropriate,

- Leaving the wallet there as rather inappropriate,

- Giving the wallet to the manager of the cafe as very appropriate

You would insert the following evaluations.

	very inappropriate	inappropriate	rather inappropriate	rather appropriate	appropriate	very appropriate
take the wallet and keep it	●	○	○	○	○	○
ask other guests if the wallet belongs to one of them	○	○	○	○	●	○
leave the wallet there	○	○	●	○	○	○
give the wallet to the manager of the cafe	○	○	○	○	○	●

After clicking on "next", the description of the actual situations that you have to evaluate will follow.

Description of the situations

Dictator game

In a study conducted at the economic laboratory, Person A is randomly matched with another participant, Person B. The matching is anonymous, hence no participant will ever learn about the identity of the other participants.

In this study, Person A takes a decision. Person B knows which decision Person A has to take. Person B also knows which consequences this decision has for the monetary payment and will know which decision Person A has taken.

Person A gets €10 at the beginning of the task. Person A can then give any amount of this €10 to Person B.

Person A can, for example, give €0 to Person B. Person A would get €10 and Person B €0. Person A could also give €10. Person A would then get €0 and Person B €10. Similarly, Person A could give €1, €2, €3, ... or €9.

At first, both participants will take a decision in the role of Person A. This means that both will indicate how many euros they would give to Person B, in case they would be assigned the role of Person A. After both participants have taken their decision, they will learn who was assigned the role of Person A and of Person B. Both participants are paid according to the role assignment and the taken decision.

Please evaluate the possible actions of Person A.

Dictator game with tax

In a study conducted at the economic laboratory, Person A is randomly matched to another participant, Person B. The matching is anonymous, hence no participant will ever learn about the identity of the other participants.

In this study, Person A takes a decision. Person B knows which decision Person A has to take. Person B also knows which consequences this decision has for the monetary payment and will know which decision Person A has taken.

Person A's decision

Person A gets €12 at the beginning of the task. Person B gets €0. Person A can then send an amount of this €12 to Person B. Person B gets €0.90 for each €1.50 Person A sends to him. Hence, 40% of the amount sent gets lost.

Person A can, for example, send €0 to Person B. Person A would get €12 and Person B €0. Person A could also send €12. Person A would then get €0 and Person B €7.20. Similarly, Person A could send €1.50, €3, €4.50, ... or €10.50. You can find an overview of the possible actions and the corresponding earnings here:

A sends hence Person A and Person B earn:	€0	€1.50	€3	€4.50	€6	€7.50	€9	€10.50	€12
A earns	€12	€10.50	€9	€7.50	€6	€4.50	€3	€1.50	€0
B earns	€0	€0.90	€1.80	€2.70	€3.60	€4.50	€5.40	€6.30	€7.20

At first, both participants take a decision in the role of Person A. This means that both have to indicate how many euros they would send to Person B, in case they would be assigned the role of Person A. After both participants have taken their decision, they will learn who was assigned the role of Person A and of Person B. Both participants are paid according to the role assignment and the taken decision.

Please evaluate the possible actions of Person A.

Ultimatum game

In a study conducted at the economic laboratory, Person A is randomly matched to another participant, Person B. The assignment is anonymous, hence no participant will ever learn about the identity of the other participants.

In this study, Person A and Person B take decisions simultaneously. Both know which decision the other has to take. They also know which consequences this decision has for the monetary payment and will know in the end which decision the other has taken. Here is a description of Person A's and Person B's decisions.

Person A gets €10 at the beginning of the task. Person B gets €0. Person A and Person B then take a simultaneous decision.

Person A's decision

Person A can propose any amount of the €10 to Person B. Person A hence decides how much of the €10 he wants to propose to Person B.

Person B's decision

Person B decides which proposals he is ready to accept. The two participants get the stipulated amounts only if Person B accepts the offer. If he rejects the offer, both get €0.

For this purpose, Person B chooses an amount between €0 and €10. This amount is the lowest proposal that Person B is still ready to accept. All proposals that are equal to or higher than this amount are accepted by Person B. All proposals that are lower than this amount are rejected by Person B.

Since the decisions are taken simultaneously, Person A does not know what the minimal amount of money Person B is willing to take at the point of his decision. Similarly, Person B does not know how much money Person A will actually propose at the point of his decision.

For example, Person B could accept proposals starting from 2 €. Proposals of €0 and €1 would be rejected. All other proposals would be accepted. Person B could also accept proposals starting from €8. Then, only proposals of €8, €9 or €10 would be accepted and all other offers would be rejected.

Please evaluate the possible actions of Person B.

Third-party punishment game

In a study conducted at the economic laboratory, Person C is randomly matched to two another participants, Person A and Person B. The matching is anonymous, hence no participant will ever learn about the identity of the other participants.

In this study, Person C and Person A take a decision. All three participants know which decision Person A and Person C have to take. They also know which consequences these decisions have for the monetary payment and will know which decisions have been taken.

Person A gets €10 at the beginning of the task. Person B gets €0. Person C gets €5.

Person A's decision

Person A can give Person B €0, €2, or €5 of his €10. Person A could give Person B €0. Then, Person A would get €10 and Person B €0. Person A could also give Person B €5. If Person A gave €5, then he would get €5 and Person B would get €5 as well. If Person A gave €2, then he would get €8 and Person B €2.

Person C's decision

Person C can assign deduction points to Person A depending on his decision. Person C can assign 0, 1 or 2 deduction points to Person A. The earnings of Person C are reduced by €1 and Person A by €3 for each deduction point assigned. The earning of Person A cannot, however, go below €0. This means that his earnings can be reduced only until €0. The assignment of deduction points has no consequence for Person B.

If Person C, for example, assigned 0 deduction points, then neither the earnings of Person C nor those of Person A would be reduced. If Person C assigned 1 deduction point, then his earnings would be reduced by €1 and those of Person A by €3. If Person C assigned 2 deduction points, then his earnings would be reduced by €2 and those of Person A by €6.

Person C has to indicate how many deduction points he would assign Person A for each of his possible decisions (€0, €2, or €5). Only the decision of Person C that corresponds to the actual decision of Person A is implemented.

Example: Person A gives €2 to Person B. Person C indicated that in this case he would assign him 1 deduction point. Then, Person A would get a deduction of €3 and Person C of €1. In this case Person A would hence get (€8 - €3 =) €5, Person B €2, and Person C (€5 - €1 =) €4.

One of the participants is assigned the role of Person A. The other two both at first take a decision in the role of Person C. Both indicate how many deduction points they would assign to Person A in case they were Person C. The two participants will learn who was assigned the role of Person B and who to that of Person C only after they made their decision. Participants are paid according to role assignment and the decisions taken.

(1) Assume Person A decides to give Person B €0. He, hence, keeps €10 while Person B gets €0. Please evaluate the possible actions of Person C.

(2) Assume Person A decides to give Person B €2. He, hence, keeps €8 while Person B gets €2. Please evaluate the possible actions of Person C.

(3) Assume Person A decides to give Person B €5. He, hence, keeps €5 while Person B gets €5. Please evaluate the possible actions of Person C.

Elicitation

(*After each game description, subjects where first reminded of their task and then had to fill out the elicitation table for normative ratings. Here we show an example of the elicitation table from DG.*)

For each action, evaluate according to your own personal opinion and independently of the opinion of others, whether it is appropriate or not to choose it. "Appropriate" behavior means the behavior that you personally consider to be "correct" or "moral".

	very inappropriate	inappropriate	rather inappropriate	rather appropriate	appropriate	very appropriate
give €0	O	O	O	O	O	O
give €1	O	O	O	O	O	O
give €2	O	O	O	O	O	O
give €3	O	O	O	O	O	O
give €4	O	O	O	O	O	O
give €5	O	O	O	O	O	O
give €6	O	O	O	O	O	O
give €7	O	O	O	O	O	O
give €8	O	O	O	O	O	O
give €9	O	O	O	O	O	O
give €10	O	O	O	O	O	O

Part 2

(*Elicitation of social norms*)

In the following you will read the description of different situations. In each situation there is one person who has to make a choice between different actions.

After you have read the description of each situation, you have to evaluate the different actions amongst which the person in the situation can choose from. For each action, evaluate according to the opinion of the society and independently of your own opinion, whether it is appropriate or not to choose it. "Appropriate" behavior means the behavior that you consider most people would agree upon as being "correct" or "moral". The standard is, hence, not your personal opinion, but your assessment of the opinion of the society. We kindly ask you to answer as precisely as possible.

In this part, you can earn up to €12 on top of your participation fee of €8, depending on your answers. The answers of the other participants will influence your payment in this part.

At the end of the study, we will determine for each action in each situation which answer most of the other participants gave. You will obtain €0.30 for each action for which you gave the same answer as most of the other participants.

Your payment is determined in the following way: you will evaluate the possible actions of a person according to the opinion of the society in 4 different situations. For each action in each situation the following holds: if your evaluation is exactly the same as the answer of most of the other participants, you will earn money. For each match you get €0.30. This means that you can earn up to €12 in addition to the fixed participation fee of €8. If, on the contrary, you never give the same answer as most of the other participants, then you will earn no money in this task. If, for example, you give the most frequent answer for 10 actions, you get €3 for this task.

Note: only the answers of other participants in this part count. All other participants have received the same instructions. Also, they get €0.30 for each action for which they give the same answer as most other participants.

Overall there are four different situations for which you have to evaluate the possible actions. To show you how the different actions can be evaluated, we now give you an example.

Example

Person A is sitting in a cafe near the university. Person A notices that another person has left his wallet on the table. Person A has to decide what to do. Person A has to choose from four possible actions:

- Take the wallet and keep it;

- Ask other guests if the wallet belongs to one of them;

- Leave the wallet there;

- Give the wallet to the manager of the cafe.

For each action, evaluate according to the opinion of the society and independently of your own opinion, whether it is appropriate or not choose it. "Appropriate" behavior means the behavior that you consider most people would agree upon as being "correct" or "moral". Note: you earn €0.30 for each action for which your answer matches the most frequent answer of the other participants in this second part.

You can choose from a scale with six points

- Very inappropriate

- Inappropriate

- Rather inappropriate

- Rather appropriate

- Appropriate

- Very appropriate

You will evaluate the actions using a table. To evaluate the behavior you have to mark the corresponding option. Please give an evaluation for each of the actions.

Assume, for example, that you evaluate

- Taking and keeping the wallet as very inappropriate,

- Asking other guests if the wallet belongs to them as appropriate,

- Leaving the wallet there as rather inappropriate,

- Giving the wallet to the manager of the cafe as very appropriate.

You would insert following evaluations.

	very inappropriate	inappropriate	rather inappropriate	rather appropriate	appropriate	very appropriate
take the wallet and keep it	●	○	○	○	○	○
ask other guests if the wallet belongs to one of them	○	○	○	○	●	○
leave the wallet there	○	○	●	○	○	○
give the wallet to the manager of the cafe	○	○	○	○	○	●

Assume the other participants gave the following evaluations. The table below shows for each action the percentage of other participants who gave a given evaluation. Obviously, you will not get this information in the actual situations. This example should help you understand how you can earn additional money.

Action	Very inappropriate	Inappropriate	Rather inappropriate	Rather appropriate	Appropriate	Very appropriate
Take the wallet and keep it	50%	30%	15%	5%	0%	0%
Ask other guests, if the wallet belongs to one of them	0%	5%	10%	40%	25%	20%
Leave the wallet there	15%	20%	40%	20%	0%	5%
Give the wallet to the manager of the cafe	0%	0%	0%	10%	30%	60%

How much additional money (in cent) would you get for this situation? (If, for example, the correct answer is €1.5, then write 150.)

After you have answered this question, the description of the actual situation that you have to evaluate will follow.

Description of the situations

Repetition of the situation descriptions (*see above*).

Elicitation

(*After each game description, subjects were first reminded of their task and then had to fill out the elicitation table for normative ratings.*)

For each action, evaluate according to the opinion of the society and independently of your own opinion, whether it is appropriate or not choose it. "Appropriate" behavior means the behavior that you consider most people would agree upon as being "correct" or "moral". Note: you earn €0.30 for each action for which your answer matches the most frequent answer of the other participants in this second part.

(*The elicitation tables were the same as when eliciting personal norms (see above).*)

B.2 Instructions for the laboratory experiment

These are the instructions used in the laboratory experiment. The original text was in German and is available upon request.

Only for PRIVATE **and** SOCIAL **treatments**

Welcome

Welcome to the second part of the study!

Today, you will take part in the second part of this study. You have already completed the first part online. You will be able to earn money in addition to the fixed amount of €8 and the amount you earned during the online study.

The size of this additional amount depends on your decisions, the decisions of other participants, and chance. Thus, please read the instructions carefully.

Please avoid any conversation with your neighbors. Switch off your mobile phone and remove any item you do not need for the study from your table. In case you have questions, raise your hand and we will answer your question at your seat.

Only for DOUBLE ANONYMOUS **treatment**

Welcome

Welcome to the second part of the study!

Today, you will take part in the second part of this study. You have already completed the first part online. You will be able to earn money in addition to the fixed amount of €8 and the amount you earned during the online study.

The size of this additional amount depends on your decisions, the decisions of other participants, and chance. Thus, please read the instructions carefully.

To make it easier for you to read, we restricted to masculine terms in the course of the text. All references to persons nevertheless apply to all genders.[32]

At the beginning of todays session a participant has been randomly selected to assist the lab assistants during the study. This participant is henceforth called the "helper". The helper will assist in the payment procedure at the end of the todays session, and will fill out an unrelated questionnaire while you take part in the session. For his role today, the helper will earn a fixed amount of money.

The lab assistants as well as the helper will stay in the experimental room throughout todays session. The lab assistants are here to answer your questions. The experimenter, who is responsible for the study, will stay in the control room throughout the entire session. He has no way to see into the experimental room.

---

[32]This paragraph was added to the text in DOUBLE ANONYMOUS due to requirements of the lab. Note that this paragraph was added also in the PRIVATE-REPLICATION treatment.

Please avoid any conversation with your neighbors. Switch off your mobile phone and remove any item you do not need for the study from your table. In case you have questions, raise your hand and we will answer your question at your seat.

For all treatments

Code

Please insert your code from the online study below so that we can carry out your payment correctly at the end of the study.

Reminder: The code is composed by the following components:

SECOND letter of you own name

FIRST letter of your mothers name (if unknown insert "***")

FIRST letter of your fathers name (if unknown insert "***")

SECOND name of your birthplace (if unknown insert "***")

Day of your birthday (e.g., 15 for 15/07 or 08 for 08/03)

Please type in the code in small letters and without accents or other special symbols.

Please do not use any umlaut. Write a instead of ä, o instead of ö and u instead of ü.

B.2.1   Instructions for experimental games

Only for PRIVATE and DOUBLE ANONYMOUS **treatments**

Today's study is composed of four tasks. The tasks will be presented in a random order. You will receive the respective instructions before each task, and can then work on the task.

In these tasks you will be matched with other participants. You and other participants will take decisions during these tasks. You can be matched with each participant only once – it cannot happen that you are assigned to the same participant in two different tasks.

One of the tasks will be randomly selected for the payment of today's study. Since you will not know which task will be chosen until the end of the study, please go through the tasks carefully. At the end of this session you will receive the sum you earned during the whole study (€8 participation fee as well as the money from the online study and your payment from today's study) in cash.

Only for SOCIAL **treatment**

Today's study is composed of four tasks. The tasks will be presented in a random order. You will receive the respective instructions before each task, and can then work on the task.

In these tasks you will be matched with other participants. You and other participants will take decisions during these tasks. You can be matched with each participant only once — it cannot happen that you are assigned to the same participant in two different tasks.

One of the tasks will be randomly selected for the payment of today's study. Since you will not know which task will be chosen until the end of the study, please go through the tasks carefully. At the end of this session, you will receive the sum you earned during the whole study (€8 participation fee as well as the money from the online study and your payment from today's study) in cash.

When all participants in the session have completed the tasks, everyone will have to stand up (so that all participants can hear and see each other). An assistant will call the participants one after the other. Each participant will have to say his name and tell the other participants which choices he made in the tasks. For this purpose, a text will be displayed on your screen and you will have to read it verbatim. This means that all other participants will know your name and all the choices you have made in the tasks.

(*At the top of the decision screen in each of the four games, the following text was displayed:*)

Reminder: When you are done with all the tasks, you will have to stand up and tell all other participants which decision you made in this and the other tasks.

(*After the four games:*)

All participants have completed all tasks. Please stand up and wait until an assistant calls your cabin number. When you hear your cabin number, please read the following text verbatim.

Games

For all treatments

(*The four games were titled: task A, task B, task C, and task D.*)

Dictator game

In this task, you will be randomly matched to another participant. You will not find out neither before nor after the study who the other participant is.

You and the other participant will be assigned one of two roles: Person A or Person B.

Person A's decision

Person A gets €10 at the beginning of the task. Person A can then give any amount of this €10 to Person B. Person A can, for example, give €0 to Person B. Person A would get €10 and Person B €0. Person A could also give €10. Person A would then get €0 and Person B €10. Similarly, Person A could give €1, €2, €3, ... or €9.

At first, you and the other participant will both take a decision in the role of Person A. This means that you will indicate how many euros you would give to Person B, in case you would be assigned to the role of Person A. Both of you will learn which role you have been assigned (Person A or Person B) only at the end of the study. The earnings of both participants are calculated according to the assignment of roles and the decision taken by Person A.

Before you take your decision on the next page, please answer the following two questions.

1. How much does Person A earn, if Person A gives €3 to Person B?

2. How much does Person A earn, if Person A gives €1 to Person B?

Dictator game with tax

In this task, you will be randomly matched to another participant. You will not find out neither before nor after the study who the other participant is.

You and the other participant will be assigned one of two roles: Person A or Person B.

<u>Person A's decision</u>

Person A gets €12 at the beginning of the task. Person B gets €0. Person A can then send an amount of these €12 to Person B. Person B gets €0.90 for each €1.50 Person A sends to him. Hence, 40% of the amount sent gets lost.

Person A can, for example, send €0 to Person B. Person A would get €12 and Person B €0. Person A could also send €12. Person A would then get €0 and Person B €7.20. Similarly, Person A could send €1.50, €3, €4.50, ... or €10.50. You can find an overview of the possible actions and the corresponding earnings here:

A sends	€0	€1.50	€3	€4.50	€6	€7.50	€9	€10.50	€12
hence Person A and Person B earn:									
A earns	€12	€10.50	€9	€7.50	€6	€4.50	€3	€1.50	€0
B earns	€0	€0.90	€1.80	€2.70	€3.60	€4.50	€5.40	€6.30	€7.20

At first, you and the other participant will both take a decision in the role of Person A. This means that you will indicate how many euros you would send to Person B, in case you would be assigned to the role of Person A. Both of you will learn which role you have been assigned (Person A or Person B) only at the end of the study. The earnings of both participants will be calculated based on the assignment of roles and the decision taken by Person A.

Before you take your decision on the next page, please answer the following two questions.

1. How much do Person A and Person B earn, if Person A sends €1.50 to Person B?

2. How much do Person A and Person B earn, if Person A sends €9 to Person B?

Ultimatum game

In this task, you will be randomly matched to another participant. You will not find out neither before nor after the study who the other participant is.

One participant is randomly assigned to the role of Person A and the other to the role of Person B.

Person A gets €10 at the beginning of the task. Person B gets €0. Person A and Person B then take a simultaneous decision.

<u>Person A's decision</u>

Person A can propose any amount of €10 to Person B. Person A hence decides how much of the €10 he wants to propose to Person B.

<u>Person B's decision</u>

Person B decides which proposals he is ready to accept. The two participants get the stipulated amounts only if Person B accepts the offer. If he rejects the offer, both get €0.

For this purpose, Person B chooses an amount between €0 and €10. This amount is the lowest proposal that Person B is still ready to accept. All proposals that are equal to or higher than this amount are accepted by Person B. All proposals that are lower than this amount are rejected by Person B.

Person A does not know what the minimal amount of money Person B is willing to accept at the point of his decision. Similarly, Person B does not know how much money Person A will actually propose at the point of his decision.

For example, Person B could only accept proposals starting from €2. Proposals of €0 and €1 would be rejected. All other proposals would be accepted. Person B could also only accept proposals starting from €8. Then, only proposals of €8, €9, or €10 would be accepted and all other offers would be rejected.

(*Person A's text*)

You were assigned to the role of Person A. The other participant was assigned to the role of Person B.

(*Person B's text*)

You were assigned to the role of Person A. The other participant was assigned to the role of Person B.

(*Text for both participants*)

1. How much would Person A and Person B earn, if Person A offers Person B €4 and Person B accepts the offer?

2. How much would Person A and Person B earn, if Person A offers Person B €2 and Person B ...

    a ... accepts the offer?

    b ... rejects the offer?

Third-party punishment game

In this task, you will be randomly matched to two other participant. You will not find out neither before nor after the study who these other participants are.

One participant will be assigned to the role of Person A, another one to the role of Person B and a third one to the role of Person C. Person A gets €10 at the beginning of the task. Person B gets €0. Person C gets €5.

 <u>Persons A's decision</u>

Person A can give Person B €0, €2, or €5. Person A could give Person B €0. Then, Person A would get €10 and Person B €0. Person A could also give Person B €5. If Person A gave €5, then he would get €5 and Person B would get €5 as well. If Person A gave €2, then he would get €8 and Person B €2.

 <u>Person C's decision</u>

Person C can assign deduction points to Person A depending on his decision. Person C can assign 0, 1 or 2 deduction points to Person A. The earnings of Person C are reduced by €1 and Person A by €3 for each assigned deduction point. The earnings of Person A cannot, however, go below €0. This means that his earnings can be reduced only until €0. The assignment of deduction points has no consequence for Person B.

If Person C assigned 0 deduction points, for example, then neither the earnings of Person C nor those of Person A would be reduced. If Person C assigned 1 deduction points, then his earnings would be reduced by €1 and those of Person A by €3. If Person C assigned 2 deduction points, then his earnings would be reduced by €2 and those of Person A by €6.

Example: Person A gives €2 to Person B. Person C indicated that in this case he would assign him 1 deduction point. Then, Person A would be deducted €3 and Person C €1. In this case, Person A would hence get (€8 - €3 =) €5, Person B €2 and Person C (€5 - €1 =) €4.

Person B does not make any decision in this task.

(*Person A's text*)

You have been assigned to the role of Person A.

The other two participants have been assigned the role of Person B and Person C. At first, both of the other participants will take a decision in the role of Person C. Both will indicate how many deduction points they would assign to you (Person A) in case they were Person C. The other participants will learn only at the end of the experiment which role they were assigned to: one of them Person B and the other one Person C. The earnings for all participants will be calculated based on this assignment of roles and the decisions taken.

The two other participants have to indicate how many deduction points they would assign to you for each of your possible decisions (€0, €2 , or €5), in case they were assigned to the role of Person C. Only the decision of Person C that corresponds to your actual decision will be implemented.

(*Person B's and Person C's text*)

One of the participants was assigned to the role of Person A. You and the remaining participant, who was not assigned to the role of Person A, will at first both take a decision in the role of Person C. You will both indicate how many deduction points you would assign to Person A in case you were Person C. You will both learn only at the end of the experiment which role you were assigned to: one of you Person B and the other one Person C. The earnings for all participants will be calculated based on this assignment of roles and the decisions taken.

You have to indicate how many deduction points you would assign for each of the possible decisions of Person A (€0, €2, or €5), in case you were assigned to the role of Person C. Only the decision of Person C that corresponds to the actual decision of Person A will be implemented.

(*Text for all participants*)

Before you take your decision on the next page, please answer the following two questions.

1. How much would Person A, B, and C earn, if Person A gives €0 to Person B and Person C has assigned 1 deduction point to Person A for that case?

2. How much would Person A, B, and C earn, if Person A gives €5 to Person B and Person C has assigned 0 deduction point to Person A for that case?

Decision

(*An example of a decision screen in DG,* PRIVATE *treatment.*)

Please choose the amount you would like to give to Person B.

| €0 | €1 | €2 | €3 | €4 | €5 | €6 | €7 | €8 | €9 | €10 |

Confirm

B.2.2 Reputation questionnaire

The following questions relate to the four tasks that you have just completed.

Please think about how you felt during the tasks and indicate to which extent the following statements apply. Please answer on a scale from "I completely disagree" to "I completely agree".

1. During the task I did not think about what other participants would say about me.

2. It's important that the other participants will accept me.

3. During the task, I thought about how the other participants would think about me.

4. It's important to me that the other participants have a positive evaluation about me.