Dr. Christian Traxler
Position
Senior Research Fellow
Contact Information
| Email | |
| Phone | ++49 (0) 228 91416-69 |
| Fax | ++49 (0) 228 91416-62 |
| Room | 3.5b |
Research Focus
- Public Economics: Tax Evasion, Fiscal Federalism, Interregional Redistribution
- Law and Economics: Economics of Crime, Law Enforcement
- Behavioral Economics: Social Norms, Fairness, Reference Groups
Academic Career
- 12|2007 – present Senior Researcher, MPI
- 03|2009 – 06|2009 Visiting Fellow, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor
- 06|2007 – 12|2007 Post Doc, CREED, University of Amsterdam
- 04|2006 – 06|2007 Research Fellow, Seminar for Economic Policy, University of Munich
- 03|2006 PhD in Economics (summa cum laude), University of Munich
- 11|2004 – 05|2005 Visiting Fellow, CREED, University of Amsterdam
- 10|2002 – 03|2006 PhD Student, Munich Graduate School of Economics, University of Munich
- 10|1995 – 10|2001 Undergraduate Student in Economics , University of Vienna and Carlos III de Madrid
Research Papers
Law and Economics
- Deterrence through Word of Mouth (with Johannes Rincke, University of Munich), Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Working Paper 2009-04, invited for resubmission to Review of Economics and Statistics
- Testing Enforcement Strategies in the Field: Legal Threat, Moral Appeal and Social Information (with Gerlinde Fellner and Rupert Sausgruber), Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Working Paper 2009-31.
Abstract:
We run a large-scale natural field experiment to evaluate alternative strategies to enforce compliance with the law. The experiment varies the text of mailings sent to potential evaders of TV license fees. We find a strong alert effect of mailings, leading to a substantial increase in compliance. Among different mailing conditions a legal threat that stresses a high detection risk has a significant and highly robust deterrent effect. Neither appealing to morals nor imparting information about others' behavior enhances compliance. However, the information condition has a positive effect in municipalities where evasion is believed to be common. Overall, the economic model of crime performs remarkably well in explaining our data.
- Survey Evidence on Conditional Norm Enforcement (with Joachim Winter, University of Munich),Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Working Paper 2009-03, under review.
- The Interaction of Legal and Social Norm Enforcement (with Sebastian Kube), work in progress.
Public Economics
- Voting over Taxes: The Case of Tax Evasion, Public Choice, Vol. 140(1), 43-58.
An extended working paper version is available here. A follow-up paper is:
- Majority Voting and the Welfare Implications of Tax Avoidance, Working Paper 2009-22, under review.
- Tax Evasion and Auditing in a Federal Economy (with Sven Stöwhase), International Tax and Public Finance, 2005, Vol. 12 (4), 515-531.
- Social Norms and Conditional Cooperative Taxpayers, European Journal of Political Economy, forthcoming.
- Apportionment, Fiscal Equalization and Decentralized Tax Enforcement (with Andreas Reutter), Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Working Paper 2008-21, under review.
- Interest Group Formation and Political Convergence – An Experimental Approach (with Ernesto Reuben, Columbia University, and Frans van Winden, University of Amsterdam), work in progress.
- A Political Economy Analysis of Tax Evasion and Occupational Choice (with Rainald Borck), work in progress.
Behavioral Economics
- Reserve prices as reference points – Evidence from auctions for football players at hattrick.org (with Stefan Trautmann, University of Tillburg), March 2009, Journal of Economic Psychology, forthcoming
- Social Norms and the Indirect Evolution of Conditional Cooperation (with Mathias Spichtig, University of Amsterdam), revised version of Munich Discussion Papers in Economics 2007-12, under review.
- Name Your Own Price! Micro Evidence from a NYOP Restaurant (with Gerhard Rienner, University of Essex), work in progress.
Links
- Two events that I am co-organizing: the Law&Econ Seminar at the University of Bonn and the Bonn&Paris Workshops on Law and Economics (joint with Roberto Galbiati, Univeristy of Paris Nanterre).