Leading with(out) Sacrifice? A Public-Goods Experiment with a Super Privileged Player

Publication Type  Articles in Peer Reviewed Journals
Author  Andreas Glöckner, Bernd Irlenbusch, Sebastian Kube, Andreas Nicklisch, Hans-Theo Normann
Year of Publication  2011
Journal  Economic Inquiry
Volume  49
Pagination  591-597
Abstract  We analyse two team settings in which one member in a team has stronger incentives to contribute than the others. If contributions constitute a sacrifice for the strong player, the other team members are more inclined to cooperate than if contributions are strictly dominant for the strong player.
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Keywords  Experiments, reciprocity, Leadership, Voluntary Contribution Mechanism
JEL-Codes  H41, C92, C91, H40