| Publication Type | | Preprints |
| Author | | Sophie Bade |
| Year of Publication | | 2010 |
| Issue | | 2010/22 |
| Abstract | | The nonexistence of equilibria in models of electoral competition involving multiple issues is one of the more puzzling results in political economics. In this paper, we relax the standard assumption that parties act as expected utility maximizers. We show that equilibria often exist when parties with limited knowledge about the electorate are modeled as uncertainty-averse. What is more, these equilibria can be characterized as a straightforward generalization of the classical median voter result. |
| Publisher | | Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods |
| Place Published | | Bonn |
| Export | | Tagged BibTex XML |
| Download | | |
| Published in: | | Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 72, no. 1, pp. 12-29, 05/2011 |
| Supplementary Material | | |
| Keywords | | Uncertainty Aversion, Multiple Priors, Median Voter, Electoral Competition over many Issues |
| JEL-Codes | | D81, D72 |
