Publikationen von Felix Bierbrauer

Bierbrauer, F., & Hellwig, M. (2016). Robustly Coalition-Proof Incentive Mechanisms for Public Good Provision are Voting Mechanisms and Vice Versa. Review of Economic Studies, 83, 1440–1464

Bierbrauer, F. (2014). Optimal tax and expenditure policy with aggregate uncertainty. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 6, 205–257

Bierbrauer, F., Brett, C., & Weymark, J. A. (2013). Strategic Nonlinear Income Tax Competition with Perfect Labor Mobility. Games and Economic Behavior, 82, 292–311

Bierbrauer, F. (2011). Incomplete contracts and excludable public goods. Journal of Public Economics, 95, 553–569

Bierbrauer, F. (2009). A Note on Optimal Income Taxation, Public Goods Provision and Robust Mechanism Design. Journal of Public Economics, 93, 667–670

Bierbrauer, F. (2009). Optimal Income Taxation and Public Good Provision with Endogenous Interest Groups. Journal of Public Economic Theory, 11, 311–342

Bierbrauer, F. (2016). Effizienz oder Gerechtigkeit? Ungleiche Einkommen, ungleiche Vermögen und die Theorie der optimalen Besteuerung. Bonn: Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Bierbrauer, F., & Netzer, N. (2016). Mechanism Design and Intentions. Bonn: Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Aigner, R., & Bierbrauer, F. (2015). Boring Banks and Taxes. Bonn: Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Bierbrauer, F., & Hellwig, M. (2015). Public-Good Provision in Large Economies. Bonn: Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Bierbrauer, F., & Hellwig, M. (2015). Robustly Coalition-Proof Incentive Mechanisms for Public Good Provision are Voting Mechanisms and Vice Versa. Bonn: Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Bierbrauer, F., & Hellwig, M. (2011). Mechanism Design and Voting for Public-Good Provision. Bonn: Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Bierbrauer, F. (2010). An incomplete contracts perspective on the provision and pricing of excludable public goods. Bonn: Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Bierbrauer, F. (2010). On the optimality of optimal income taxation. Bonn: Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Bierbrauer, F. (2010). Optimal Income Taxation and Public-Goods Provision with Preference and Productivity Shocks. Bonn: Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Bierbrauer, F., & Boyer, P. C. (2010). The Pareto-Frontier in a simple Mirrleesian model of income taxation. Bonn: Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Bierbrauer, F., & Boyer, P. C. (2010). Political competition and Mirrleesian income taxation: A first pass. Bonn: Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Bierbrauer, F., & Hellwig, M. (2010). Public-Good Provision in a Large Economy. Bonn: Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Bierbrauer, F. (2009). On the legitimacy of coercion for the financing of public goods. Bonn: Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Bierbrauer, F. (2008). Optimal Income Taxation, Public Goods Provision and Robust Mechanism Design. Bonn: Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Bierbrauer, F. (2008). A unified approach to the revelation of public goods preferences and to optimal income taxation. Bonn: Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Bierbrauer, F., & Mechtenberg, L. (2008). Winners and Losers of Early Elections: On the Welfare Implications of Political Blockades and Early Elections. Bonn: Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Bierbrauer, F., & Sahm, M. (2008). Optimal Democratic Mechanisms for Taxation and Public Good Provision. Bonn: Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Bierbrauer, F. (2006). Collectively Incentive Compatible Tax Systems. Bonn: Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Bierbrauer, F. (2006). Distortionary Taxation and the Free-Rider Problem. Bonn: Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Bierbrauer, F., & Sahm, M. (2006). Informative Voting and the Samuelson Rule. Bonn: Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Bierbrauer, F. (2005). Optimal Income Taxation and Public Good Provision in a Two-Class Economy. Bonn: Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods