Publications
Journal Article (7)
2024
Journal Article
Cerrone, C., Hermstrüwer, Y., & (forthcoming). School choice with consent: An experiment. The Economic Journal
2021
Journal Article
Cerrone, C., Hermstrüwer, Y., & Robalo, P. (2021). Debarment and collusion in procurement auctions. Games and Economic Behavior, 129, 114–143
Journal Article
Cerrone, C. (2021). Doing it when others do: A strategic model of procrastination. Economic Inquiry, 59(1), 315–328
2019
Journal Article
Cerrone, C., & Engel, C. (2019). Deciding on Behalf of Others Does Not Mitigate Selfishness: An Experiment. Economics Letters, 183
2018
Journal Article
Cerrone, C., & (2018). Soft Commitment: A Study on Demand and Compliance. Applied Economics Letters, 25(16), 1140–1146
,
Journal Article
Cerrone, C., & (2018). Pay for Performance with Motivated Employees. The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, 18(1), 1935–1982
2017
Journal Article
Cerrone, C. (2017). Investment in education under disappointment aversion. Economics Bulletin, 37(3), 1533–1540
, & Working Paper (6)
2022
Working Paper
Cerrone, C., Hermstrüwer, Y., & (2022). School choice with consent: An experiment. Bonn: Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Discussion Paper 2022/2
2019
Working Paper
Cerrone, C., , & (2019). Ignorance is bliss: a game of regret. Bonn: Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Discussion Paper 2019/10
2018
Working Paper
Cerrone, C., Hermstrüwer, Y., & Robalo, P. (2018). Debarment and collusion in procurement auctions. Bonn: Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Discussion Paper 2018/5
2017
Working Paper
Cerrone, C., & (2017). Sophisticated and naïve procrastination: an experimental study. Bonn: Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Discussion Paper 2017/8
2016
Working Paper
Cerrone, C. (2016). Investment in education under disappointment aversion. Bonn: Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods,, Discussion Paper 2016/16
, &
Working Paper
Cerrone, C. (2016). Doing it when others do: a strategic model of procrastination. Bonn: Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Discussion Paper 2016/10