Discussion Paper Series

Admati, A. R., DeMarzo, P. M., Hellwig, M., & Pfleiderer, P. (2013). Fallacies, Irrelevant Facts, and Myths in the Discussion of Capital Regulation: Why Bank Equity is Not Socially Expensive. Bonn: Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Admati, A. R., DeMarzo, P. M., Hellwig, M., & Pfleiderer, P. (2013). The Leverage Ratchet Effect. Bonn: Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Bland, J., & Nikiforakis, N. (2013). Tacit Coordination in Games with Third-Party Externalities. Bonn: Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Bünstorf, G., Engel, C., Fischer, S., & Güth, W. (2013). Win Shift Lose Stay – An Experimental Test of Non-Compete Clauses. Bonn: Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Chmura, T., Engel, C., & Englerth, M. (2013). Selfishness As a Potential Cause of Crime. A Prison Experiment. Bonn: Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Ding, J., & Nicklisch, A. (2013). On the Impulse in Impulse Learning. Bonn: Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Engel, C. (2013). Behavioral Law and Economics: Empirical Methods. Bonn: Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Engel, C. (2013). Deterrence by Imperfect Sanctions – A Public Good Experiment. Bonn: Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Engel, C., & Kleine, M. (2013). Who is Afraid of Pirates? An Experiment on the Deterrence of Innovation by Imitation. Bonn: Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Engel, C., & Ockenfels, A. (2013). Maverick: Making sense of a conjecture of antitrust policy in the lab. Bonn: Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Engel, C., & Zhurakhovska, L. (2013). Do Explicit Reasons Make Legal Intervention More Effective? An Experimental Study. Bonn: Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Fischer, S., Goerg, S. J., & Hamann, H. (2013). Cui Bono, Benefit Corporation? An Experiment Inspired by Social Enterprise Legislation in Germany and the US. Bonn: Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Fischer, S., Grechenig, K., & Meier, N. (2013). Cooperation under punishment: Imperfect information destroys it and centralizing punishment does not help. Bonn: Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Gizatulina, A. (2013). Wondering How Others Interpret It: Social Value of Public Information. Bonn: Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Gorelkina, O., & Kuhle, W. (2013). Information Aggregation Through Stock Prices and the Cost of Capital. Bonn: Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Hakenes, H., & Schnabel, I. (2013). Bank Bonuses and Bail-Outs. Bonn: Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Hermstrüwer, Y., & Dickert, S. (2013). Tearing the Veil of Privacy Law: An Experiment on Chilling Effects and the Right to Be Forgotten. Bonn: Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Kleine, M., Langenbach, P., & Zhurakhovska, L. (2013). How Voice Shapes Reactions to Impartial Decision-Makers: An Experiment on Participation Procedures. Bonn: Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Discussion Paper 2013/11

Magen, S. (2013). Eckpunkte für einen stärker ökonomisch informierten Ansatz im Recht der nicht-steuerlichen Abgaben. Bonn: Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Magen, S. (2013). Fairness and Reciprocity in Contract Governance. Bonn: Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Prantl, S., & Spitz-Oener, A. (2013). Interacting Labor and Product Market Regulation and the Impact of Immigration on Native Wages. Bonn: Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Schweizer, M. (2013). The civil standard of proof – what is it, actually? Bonn: Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Towfigh, E. V., Glöckner, A., Goerg, S. J., Leifeld, P., Kurschilgen, C., Llorente-Saguer, A., & Bade, S. (2013). Does Political Representation through Parties Decrease Voters' Acceptance of Decisions? Bonn: Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods